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Abstract 
The imprecise nature of the transition from social movement to political party cannot be sufficiently 
explained with existing social and political theory, and thus invite to the study of the liminality 
between them.  
Trying to bridge the two disciplines, this project applies a theoretical framework consisting of 
Sidney Tarrow’s cycle of protest, Charles Tilly’s contentious politics, Donatella della Porta’s notion 
of movement parties, and Francesca Polletta’s notion of prefigurative politics.  
It is studied to what extent the social movement theories can help understand the development of 
social movements, their use of repertoires, and their connection with the new political parties that 
develop concurrently with them.  
In conclusion, the new concept movement party fills some of the theoretical gap identified. The use 
of the concept movement party shows how the liminality cannot only be seen as a one-way 
development from social movement to political party, and our findings therefore show the potential 
for pushing the boundaries of social and political theory in this field. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Social movement, movement party, Podemos, SYRIZA, social movement theory, 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
1.1 Problem Area  
“The atmosphere is a little similar to the time after 1968 in Europe. I can feel, maybe not a 
revolutionary mood, but something like widespread impatience” Donald Tusk, the President of the 
European Council, said few days after Greece accepted yet another bailout deal from the EU in July 
2015 (Khan 2015). He added, “I am really afraid of this ideological or political contagion” and 
noted that impatience becoming not an individual but a social feeling is the introduction for 
revolutions. 
What Tusk refers to as an “ideological or political contagion” is the spread of protests that rose 
within European Member States, especially in Greece, Spain, Italy, and Portugal from 2010 and 
onwards, summoning millions at demonstrations, national strikes, and more organised political 
protest organisations calling for e.g. solidarity and “real” democracy (della Porta 2015a: 3). 
 
Though these protests were primarily aimed at the EU, especially the European Troika and its 
implementation of austerity policies in response to the euro-crisis (Rüdig & Karyotis 2013: 487), 
they can be understood in a wider framework of global contention from the Arab Spring to the 
Occupy Movement (Tarrow 2012; Estanque et al. 2013; della Porta 2015a: 3). Acknowledging that 
each of these social movements arose under different political and social conditions, scholars agree 
that they seem to hold similarities e.g. their focus on transnational solidarity (Estanque et al. 2013: 
2), their focus on “real” democracy, as well as their contention with the corruption of institutional 
politics (della Porta 2015a: 3). Another common denominator that scholars point to, is the 
opposition to the neoliberal aspect of globalisation i.e. the continuous centralisation of politics, de-
regulation of financial markets, and standardisation of for example goods (Eriksen 2014: 14, 33-34, 
57, 153). Other scholars who write about globalisation are e.g. Colin Hay (2007), Jan Nederveen 
Pieterse (2012), and Michael Lang (2006). 
 
Austerity policies stand in close relation to the neoliberal market economy and the reactions against 
them can therefore also be understood within this context. These reactions to global neoliberalism 
can hence be understood as alterglobalisation (Eriksen 2014: 15, 174).  
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When dealing with sociology in a global perspective, a range of studies of globalisation and its 
effect on civil society can be relevant (i.a. Islamoglu 2001; Calhoun 2001). A few studies are 
relevant to highlight, as they demonstrate the need for a more in-depth understanding of social 
movements influence on politics, as well as their possible transformation into traditional party 
politics. Generally, some interesting tendencies can be detected when studying how publics in 
Western democracies engage in politics. Scholars state that all Western democracies have seen a 
significant decline in voter turnout throughout the last decades (Hay 2007: 13). Colin Hay further 
detects an intense decline in the number of people having and acquiring party memberships. Silas 
Harrebye has come to the same conclusion and finds that membership of political parties has 
declined since the beginning of the 1990s (Harrebye 2013: 130-131). However, Hay (2007) presents 
a study showing that 40% of party members view and regard themselves as activists (Hay 2007:13).  
So what is this an expression of? The increased disengagement of formal politics is seemingly 
replaced by a growing engagement in civil society (Civicus Blog 2014). Memberships of INGOs 
are increasing (Kaldor 2011: 9) while informal politics is on the rise as more people engage in 
demonstrations, signing petitions, and other activist events (Davies 2008: 2). This highlights the 
need for an understanding of the dynamic between formal and informal political engagement. It also 
calls upon a greater understanding of how a growing civil society and the growing amount of social 
movements can be understood as an effect of, and a response to, an increased dissatisfaction with 
party politics and the political system altogether.  
 
One recent empirical example that seems to show the ideas of social movements transforming into 
political parties, is the anti-austerity movements of southern Europe. Generally, it seems that many 
of the anti-austerity movements in southern European countries followed the same paths during the 
first years, but also that the development has since diversified (della Porta 2015a: 3). In Greece, the 
radical-left party SYRIZA has become a party leading the national government with more than one 
third of the national votes. In Spain, the protest movements in 2014 seemed to give rise to the 
radical-left political party Podemos, which according to the polls in the summer of 2015 had the 
support of around 18% of the population (Heneghan 2015). Meanwhile, the protests in i.a. Italy and 
Portugal do not seem to have led to a change in the political frame, and in both countries, two well-
established parties still share most of the votes in the national elections (Kutsch 2015). This makes 
it even more interesting to study the cases of Greece and Spain, where a change in the political 
6 
 
frame has been and still is altered. Why do some anti-austerity protests seem to diffuse into the 
political system, whereas others do not? 
 
Most studies of the global protests and the southern European protests have focused on the 
movement’s strategies, framing, and organisation during demonstrations. However, not much 
attention has been given to the last part of the movements’ evolvement and their engagement with 
political parties. As such, there seems to be a scientific deficit in terms of studying how social 
movements influence the political system.  
 
However, as these anti-austerity movements have risen in both countries, questions of how to seek 
actual political influence and create political change also rise (della Porta 2015a). It is this interest 
in how social movements in Spain and Greece have developed into party politics that leads us to 
pose the following problem statement: 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
How can we understand the liminality between social movements and political parties in the 
cases of Greece and Spain? 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
1. How can the development of the anti-austerity movements in Greece and Spain be 
understood, with social movement theories?  
2. How can della Porta’s new theoretical framework, bridging social movement theory and 
party political theory, be used to understand both the social movements, the new political 
parties, and the liminality between them? 
3. How do the organisational structures and strategies of the social movements and political 
parties change through their development concurrently in Greece and Spain?   
4. How can our findings provide a deeper understanding of the liminality between social 
movements and political parties, and to what extent can political parties learn from social 
movements? 
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1.4 Explanation of Problem Statement and Delimitation  
We have chosen to use the concept “liminality” when describing the process of change from the rise 
of a social movement to the establishment of a political party. In this process, we search to 
understand and capture the often blurred lines and fluent transformation that exist between the two. 
This concept is used to emphasise that the transformation is a process in which the object of study, 
neither takes the form of a social movement, nor the form of a political party. By a political party 
we refer to a party operating within the frame of the political system, which in the case of Greece 
and Spain has existed since democracy was introduced in the two countries in the 1970s 
(Spourdalakis 2014: 355; Kriesi 2015: 23). By a social movement we refer to a group characterised 
by social solidarity with a common purpose that seeks collective change with sustained interaction 
(Tarrow 1998: 4-7).  
 
The concept of liminality was originally developed within the discipline of anthropology by Arnold 
Van Gennep (1909) in his book “Les Rites de Passage”. Liminality is used to describe the passages 
individual people or groups go through when changing from one status to another. This often 
happens in relation to cultural rituals that mark the change in social status e.g. from childhood to 
adulthood (Thomassen 2014: 21). In its original use, it is meant to describe the middle stage in a 
linear process of change, from one fixed stage to another. Thomassen (2014) emphasises the 
importance of this concept, not only in small-scale ethnographic studies, but also at the heart of 
social theory of the modern, where large groups or entire societies undergo change and transition 
(Thomassen 2014: 3). This shows the relevance of the use of this concept in our problem statement. 
Thomassen further stresses that besides being given a narrow and technical delimitation as 
belonging to the middle stage in concretely acted out passages, it is also evident that liminality 
lends itself to a wider application. The term captures something essential about the imprecise and 
settled situation of transitoriness (Thomassen 2014: 3). This imprecise nature of transition is exactly 
what the transformation from social movement to a political party will be seen as in this project 
which is what the use of the concept in this project is supposed to underline.   
 
To further explore this liminality, we have formulated the four research questions listed above, 
which will help to answer our problem statement.  
The first research question will be answered in the first part of the analysis in which we study the 
phases in the development of the anti-austerity social movements in Spain and Greece in relation to 
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a theoretical framework developed within social movement theory. In this project, anti-austerity 
refers to the activist and political opposition to the austerity policies that was, and still is being 
implemented in Greece and Spain following the economic crisis of 2008. The austerity policies seek 
to minimise the public sector budgets in order to stabilise the national economy after the crisis, in 
some cases after demands from the European Union as a condition for granting loans (Buttonwood 
2015). Austerity policies for example include cuts in social security benefits and public salaries and 
raises in the retirement age and the university fees. 
The second research question will be answered in the end of the first part of the analysis. Here, 
the theoretical concept “movement party” will be introduced in order to see how it can supplement 
our understanding of the social movement theory, which is incorporated in the first part of the 
analysis. In a combination of movement party and social movement theory, we study the phases in 
the development of the anti-austerity contention, now also represented by the anti-austerity parties, 
SYRIZA and Podemos. This will help us explore the theoretical gap and understand the liminality 
between social movements and political parties.  
The third research question will investigate how the organisational structures of the social 
movements and political parties and how their strategies change in a given timeframe for this 
project. This will be explored in the second part of the analysis and further discussed along with our 
fourth working question in the discussion chapter. To enhance our understanding of the anti-
austerity activities, we apply theoretical perspectives on the perception of democracy in social 
movements.  
The fourth research question discussed our findings on the coherence between social movements 
and political parties, and focuses on how these two entities can learn from each other. We will be 
discussing the notion of success in social movements and political parties respectively, and what the 
findings of our analysis contributes with in the discussion of the lack of trust in the existing political 
system. 
 
2.0 Literature Review 
In this section we present an overview of how scholars have approached their studies of the anti-
austerity protests in Greece and Spain. This includes a short overview of the development within 
social movement theory.  
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2.1 Studies of Protests in Greece and Spain 
Most scholars agree that the protests are a response to the economic crisis and some scholars use 
this as a starting point to analyse the European implementation of “the social Europe”, in time of 
crisis and the role of the national governments. Others focus on the legitimacy crisis of the 
European Union and thereby tend to focus more on the actions of the EU than that of the protests’ 
participants (Martinsen & Vollard 2014). Another focal point in the academic studies, related to our 
problem area and underlining the importance of this project, is the focus on the decreasing 
disengagement in formal politics and the rise of engagement within civil society or informal politics 
(Hay 2007; Harrebye 2013; Kaldor 2011). Other academic studies have a more movement centered 
focal point. Some seek to understand the ideas that underpin these protests and thereby focus on 
deprivation theory and materiality, which they see as contrary to previous and post-material waves 
of protests such as the climate and peace movements. The claims and demands of these protesters, 
how they are organised, and what activities they make use of are subject to analyses and 
comparisons between countries (Estanque et al 2013; della Porta & Tarrow 2005; Kanellopoulos & 
Kostopoulos 2014). Since the financial crisis broke out in 2008, and the western countries saw a 
wave of massive protests, the main academic focus has been on the protesters, and scholars have 
collected a wide range of data to make sense of who took part in these protests (i.a. Rüdig & 
Karyotis 2013). This is addressed with a quantitative approach with an extensive use of statistics, 
both national and European surveys, to map out the participants and categorise them according to 
their demographics, as well as try to understand their relation to the political left wing, civil society 
organisations and previous protest engagement.  
 
2.2 Review of Social Movement Theory 
The theoretical literature on social movements, from the end of the 19th century and forward, 
developed from a structural approach by especially Karl Marx and Antonio Gramsci, Marx Weber 
and Alexis de Tocqueville (Tarrow 2012).  
They focused on the social structures’ ability to constrain the individual freedom, and how and to 
what extent, these structures are the source of revolution. Tocqueville further emphasised a local 
and more including form of democracy to be more eligible for success (Tocqueville et al. 2003). 
The academic focus later shifted from social structures to a greater focus on the political process 
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either in form of why people participate in protests i.e. the collective behaviour approach, rational 
choice theory, and new social movement theory. Moreover, the conditions present for a social 
movement to emerge, as well as continue to evolve, are studied with resource mobilisation theory, 
framing theory, and political opportunity theory. From within this approach of political process 
theory, we find scholars such as Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, Doug McAdam, Dieter Rucht, and 
Donatella della Porta who proved prominent within this field (della Porta et al. 2009; della Porta 
2015a: 29).  
 
Tarrow stresses that approaches within this field risk over-emphasising movements themselves and 
thereby neglecting the surrounding environment in which they operate. It can lead to difficulties 
when trying to track how movements interact over time with different elements of polity (Tarrow 
2012: 22). Tarrow has been a leading scholar in the theoretical paradigm shift that has taken place 
within social movement theories (della Porta 2015a). The focus has shifted from looking at specific 
elements of the movements such as resources, organisational structures and their processes, to a 
wider focus on the context of contention i.e. the surrounding environments in which the movements 
operate and interact with players both inside and outside the movement (Tarrow 2012). In 2001, 
McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly co-authored the book, Dynamics of Contention, where they seek to 
identify causal mechanisms and processes that recur across a wide range of contentious politics, as a 
critique to the previous and more movement centered focus (McAdam et al. 2001). The shift thus 
changes the focus towards a more dynamic interaction and stress that contention happens in waves. 
Some scholars therefore place the recent wave of protests in a wider context of the contention with 
the neoliberal economy and thereby link it to other mass protests in recent years such as the Occupy 
Movement, the student revolt in South American countries, and the Arab spring. In addition to this, 
some try and make sense of mass protests and revolts in a historical context (Tilly & Tarrow 2006). 
Tarrow, in collaboration with della Porta have studied the context of protests and social movements 
focusing on the transnational elements in contemporary social movements, the relations between 
public institutions and protest behaviour within social movements (Tarrow & della Porta 2004). 
Polletta and della Porta further focus on the protest behaviour in relation to democracy and the 
transnational aspect of contention is further elaborated on by an in-depth comparison of civil society 
engagement across Europe (della Porta 2009; Polletta 2002; 2013; della Porta 2015a). In more 
recent work, Tarrow places social movements in a broader arena of contentious politics, in relation 
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to states, political parties and other actors, and tries to give a historical account of protests or cycles 
of collective action, including its transnational elements (Tarrow 2012).  
 
2.3 Refining Our Position 
What has been predominant in the above theories is that they focus on the phenomenon of social 
movements in itself and only touches upon the different social and political outcomes they can 
produce without providing any concepts to understanding them as well. Although the notion of 
contention acknowledges the interaction between social movements and political parties as well as 
other elements of civil society, it does not provide concepts to study the sudden rise in anti-austerity 
political parties. Moreover, in the empirical studies presented above, the focus has primarily been 
on the way in which the movements organise and who takes part in this organisation, and is 
therefore more micro oriented.  
Looking briefly at what political party theories can provide for a further understanding of this, we 
find that they do not include social movements as a subject to be analysed, and as such, cannot 
provide any elaborate understanding. Our argument is thus that a middle stage of transformation 
from social movement to political party exist, yet is not fully captured within one of the above 
mentioned disciplines alone without pushing the boundaries of that discipline. The transition from 
social movement to political party seems as a relevant and legitimate, yet understudied element of 
civil society and the publics’ engagement with politics. It has been noted that parties are important 
for movements and vice-versa, but the literature on the relation between the two, is at best sparse 
(della Porta 2015b). The reciprocal differences have been further fuelled as research on parties 
moved away from concerns with the relation between parties and society focusing only on parties 
within institutions. Social movement studies mainly frames them as a social phenomenon, whose 
political aspects had to be located outside political institutions (della Porta 2015b: 2). Therefore, the 
motivation of this project is to illuminate this transformation from movement to political party, as 
well as the interactions between them. By understanding that there is no clearly defined ending of a 
social movement where it simply ceases to exist or completely transform into a political party, the 
concept of liminality allows us to test, which elements of this process that social movement theory 
is able to capture. We seek to put social movement theories into use when describing the interaction 
between the anti-austerity movements in Spain and Greece, and the new anti-austerity political 
parties of Podemos and SYRIZA. Liminality in this particular context is thus not necessarily 
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understood as a linear process of development from one fixed stage to another. It is used to study if 
the interaction between social movements and political parties to go both ways as well as how the 
relation between them changes.  
 
3.0 Theoretical Framework  
The theoretical framework will present the theoretical understandings that underpin our research 
and the concepts that will be utilised throughout the analysis. This chapter will only present the 
overall theoretical understandings and concepts of the theorists included in the project, whereas the 
operationalisation of the concepts to our specific analysis will be outlined in detail in the 
introductions to the two different parts of the analysis.  
The following sections will focus on presenting the theorists used in this project. First, Tarrow’s, 
Tilly’s, and Harrebye’s concepts of contention and cycles of protest will be presented. Secondly, the 
work of della Porta and Polletta on conceptions of democracy and organisation in social movements 
will be outlined. 
 
3.1 The Concept of Contention 
Tarrow and Tilly’s (2006) concept of contention captures the interactions between diverse actors 
including movements, government, supporters, and antagonists. It describes an environment where 
each actor play the game of contention, and Tarrow and Tilly also describe contention as “people 
struggling over which politic should prevail” and in doing so, they often make use of methods that 
disturb the normal social activity such as demonstrations, public meetings, strikes, and other means 
to reach political influence (Tilly & Tarrow 2015: 4). Tarrow and Tilly also calls it “contentious 
politics” and argue that embedded in this dynamic claim making environment of contention, is the 
distribution of power which influence the outcome of these interactions. They describe the concept 
of contentious politics in this way: 
 
“interactions in which actors make claims bearing on someone else’s interests, leading to 
coordinated efforts, on behalf of shared interests or programs, in which governments are 
involved as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties. Thus, contentious politics brings 
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together three familiar features of social life: Contention, collective action, and politics” 
(Tilly & Tarrow 2006: 4).  
 
Tilly & Tarrow (2006) emphasise that contention happens in waves through history and that it often 
entails a transnational diffusion of the claims.  
 
Tarrow and Tilly stress that contentious performances sometimes clump into repertoires of claiming 
routines (Tilly & Tarrow 2006: 16). The notions of repertoires describe the different means that 
actors use in contentious politics to make their claims heard such as demonstrations or strikes. 
When people make collective claims they innovate them within the limits set for the already 
established repertoires for their time and place (Tilly & Tarrow 2006: 16). 
 
3.2 Cycle of Protest 
As argued above, when studying contentious politics and social movements and their interactions 
with and evolvement towards political parties, it is necessary to understand the mechanisms and 
processes that construct and continue to change a social movement. Tarrow (1998) uses the notion 
of the cycle of protest to describe a phase of heightened conflict and contention (Tarrow 1998: 153). 
According to Tarrow, a cycle of protest is in short characterised as:  
 
“a rapid diffusion of collective action from more mobilized to less mobilized sectors; a 
quickened pace of innovation in the forms of contention; new or transformed collective 
action frames; a combination of organized and unorganized participation; and sequences of 
intensified interaction between challengers and authorities which can end in reform, 
repression and sometimes revolution” (Tarrow 1998: 153). 
 
Tarrow argue that a cycle of protest can be divided into different phases; from diffusion to 
mobilisation, and the increased interaction between the social movement and authorities, political 
parties, and organisations, to the peak and decline of a movement (Tarrow 1998: 154-158). Tarrow 
emphasises that a cycle of protest is an outcome of the interactions between different players, which 
means that “actions affect the likelihood of other actions” and the level of success (Tarrow 1998: 
154).  
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3.3 Prefigurative Politics and Participatory Democracy 
A considerable part of the theory on social movements has stressed the role of mobilising structures 
(Chapter 2.2). Della Porta (2015) argues that the organisation of the movement is often connected to 
the goals of the movement and the changes that the movement wants to create. Della Porta 
emphasises that it has particularly been the case in the anti-austerity protest in i.a. southern Europe 
in the 2010s, whose central criticism was that of the representative democracy. Della Porta further 
points to statistics and qualitative studies showing that the criticism in the anti-austerity movements 
did not lead to anti-politics. Instead, calls for more participation and deliberation were made, and 
these calls strongly affected the way that the movements were organised (della Porta 2015a: 164).  
 
Della Porta (2015) argues that expected characteristics of the organisational developments in the 
crisis of neoliberalism is a detachment from institutional politics - and that movements have a 
preference for “prefigurative politics” and forms of mobilisation (della Porta 2015a: 163). Della 
Porta understands prefigurative politics as the organisational and political means that the 
movements choose because they embody or prefigure the kind of society that they want to give rise 
to (della Porta 2015a: 163). Meaning that social movements’ organisation is influenced by their 
conception of democracy. If social movements oppose representative democracy, they will try to 
develop counter-hegemonic modes of interaction and institutions that embodies their desired 
transformation, and that they will organise through participatory democracy  (della Porta 2015a).  
 
Francesca Polletta (2004) also points to the organisational structures of social movements as 
reflecting their democratic ideas. Polletta sees participatory democracy as a mode of structuring in 
regards to political effectiveness, but also emphasises that participatory democracy has been a 
popular feature of the social movements that have risen out of opposition to the current democratic 
system (Polletta 2004). Polletta argues that a sense of common interest in reshaping the current 
political institution, and a shared ideology, has come to define many social movements today and 
few movements structure themselves as the adversary political system does. Instead, they use 
participatory democracy to underline the common ideals and a bottom-up approach to politics. 
Polletta uses the term prefigurative to describe the structure within a social movement that is 
opposing the participatory democracy.  
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Polletta refers to other theorists’ use of the term, prefigurative politics, as being the opposite of 
“strategic” and as describing a structure with minimal division of labour and whose decision 
making is direct and consensus oriented (Polletta 2004: 2). Polletta prefers to use the term 
“participatory democracy” because she does not agree with seeing the social movements’ way of 
organising with inclusive democracy as an opposite to strategic organisation. On the contrary, 
Polletta argues that activists in every social movement finds strategic value in participatory 
democratic decision making and that movements with participatory democracy often has a very 
clear political purpose (Polletta 2004: 6). Participatory democracy gives the opportunity to 
articulate, question, and alter participants’ personal preferences, which according to Polletta is a 
strength. 
 
3.4 Strategic Challenges for Social Movements 
When referring to the social movements’ success, Polletta is not very clear about what this success 
consists of. As aforementioned, Polletta focuses on social movements that oppose the existing 
political system, and the closest Polletta gets to defining the success or the aim of these movements 
is for them to “realise their politically transformative aims” (Polletta 2004: 3). Polletta points to 
the dilemma of the social movements with participatory democracy: they want to affect the current 
political scene without reproducing the current political structures (Polletta 2004: 6).  
 
Polletta refers to previous theorists who have argued that participatory democracy is too demanding 
for the social movement to succeed, and that they have to alter their way of organising in order to 
bring them closer to the political sphere that they are opposing (Polletta 2004: 13-14). Polletta also 
points to the general theory on the organisational structure of social movements which has been that 
social movements that prioritise their goals and their agenda tend to neglect the democratic process 
behind it, while movements that prioritise democratic principles are unwilling to bow to the 
demands of political efficiency (Polletta 2004: 6).  
 
However, Polletta argues that there are features within participatory democracy that would on the 
other hand benefit a social movement with an agenda to change the current political system 
(Polletta 2004: 8). According to Polletta, participatory democracy can create innovative thinking, 
solidarity, and develop enduring mechanisms. However, Polletta acknowledges that the difficulties 
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for the movement lie in choosing a common interest to pursue from a number of individual 
interests. Moreover, it is difficult letting participants decide without specifying when they can 
decide and on what issues they can decide (Polletta 2004: 21).  
 
Thus, Polletta underlines that most participatory groups have struggled to survive past their 
founding or to realise their politically transformative aims (Polletta 2004: 3). According to Polletta, 
the struggles for participatory groups in realising their political goals is often due to economic and 
legal pressures on them to imitate the conventional political organisations and to the little 
preparation time and scarce resources in the movements. Polletta further argues that participatory 
democracy never seems to be a lasting characteristic within a social movement that does take a 
political trajectory. It is exactly this idea from Polletta that the participatory democracy does not 
tend to last in movements which become political parties that we will evaluate in our discussion. 
We will use it to debate whether that is the case with the movements in Greece and Spain evolving 
into political parties or not.  
 
3.5 Conceptualising Movement Parties 
In her introduction to a new yet unpublished book, Donatella della Porta, with point of departure in 
austerity-politics in Europe and beyond, develops her previous studies of social movements (della 
Porta 2015b). Della Porta points to new parties rising as a result of anti-austerity social movements 
and identifies a need for bridging two subfields in order to better understand them theoretically; 
social movements’ and political parties’ studies (della Porta 2015b: 1). 
According to della Porta there is today a clear distinction between social movements and political 
parties (Chapter 2.2). Social movements are usually understood as a gathering with a sense of 
collective identification. Moreover, these social movements “pursue goals of social transformation 
mainly through unconventional forms of participation” (della Porta 2015b: 6). Political parties, 
however, are seen as “free associations built with the aim of achieving institutional power” (della 
Porta 2015b: 6), and achieving this power happens mainly by participating in elections. She 
therefore introduces the concept movement party which is understood as a “sort of hybrid” between 
a social movements and a political party (della Porta 2015b: 6). According to della Porta, a 
movement party is defined by being a party, that still holds strong ties with a social movement. 
Movement parties aim at incorporating the movement’s constituencies and represent their claims. 
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They also “tend to be supportive of protest, participating in campaigns together with other 
movement organizations” (della Porta 2015b: 6).  
 
Della Porta, in her new introduction, outlines how social movements have before produced new 
parties and developed ties with existing parties or party families (della Porta 2015b: 3). Such links 
between social movements and parties often result in them sharing claims, attitudes toward certain 
political topics, or organisational characteristics (della Porta 2015b: 4). However, it varies how 
much political parties relate to movements, and it is not always without problems because “hostility 
has sometimes prevailed, sometimes negotiation and sometimes co-option” (della Porta 2015b: 5).   
 
3.5.1 Conditions and Strategic Choices for Movement Parties 
According to della Porta, the development and success of a movement party depend on the 
conditions available. Della Porta singles out certain conditions that are most favourable for 
movement parties to rise (della Porta 2015b: 10). New parties are often created because they face 
neglected or new issues, which established political parties overlook or choose not to deal with. 
Della Porta calls this an “opening” and argues that factors such as dropping trust in governments or 
political actors can contribute to creating such an opening (della Porta 2015b: 7). An opening can 
also be another form of crisis, and it is favourable for a movement party when a crisis has been 
developing faster than expected, and where it radically challenges everyday life. Della Porta 
furthermore states that movement parties emerge when new grievances and interests are not 
represented in the party system and argues that a movement party is more likely to survive in the 
field, if the rest of the political parties in the field does not take its claims (della Porta 
2015b).                  
        
Della Porta conceptualises the different strategies for movement parties in different situations by 
mapping the trade-offs and pay-offs in different relations between social movements and political 
parties (della Porta 2015b: 2). Della Porta emphasises that for movements, it can have better pay-
offs to search for broader support in a party system than to be identified with a specific side, also 
because movements often introduce new ideas that cut across the party system (della Porta 2015b: 
2).  
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Della Porta points out that “supporting a movement for a party or supporting a party for a 
movement is a choice that includes costs and benefits” (della Porta 2015b: 2) and points to four 
dilemmas that movement parties need to choose between (della Porta 2015b: 11):  
 adaptation and innovation 
 alliances and purity 
 moderation and radicalism 
 rationality towards the mean versus rationality towards the ends 
 
Della Porta works with other forms of dilemmas, however, the above mentioned are especially 
relevant for this project. When a social movement decides upon a strategy these dilemmas are often 
taken into consideration. 
 
3.6 The Use of Social Media 
Before we turn to the movements’ organisation it is beneficial to understand social media, 
especially because people have never before been as closely connected as we see today (Eriksen 
2014: 39, 75). In fact, it is “a more fast-paced, interconnected world” where “everything flows 
more easily”, for example weapons and diseases, but it can also be information and technologies 
(Eriksen 2014: 133). New technologies have emerged, and these are linked to organisational forms. 
They have an impact on social movements because they can enhance protests and they can shape 
the organisational format (della Porta 2015a: 277). Another element is that social media can be a 
helping factor in forming and joining groups as well as the opportunity for ordinary people to share 
and document activities and the opportunity for transnational communication. 
Examples of social media and how to use it as a tool can be Facebook, Twitter, and the use of 
hashtags. 
 
3.7 Operationalisation of the Theoretical Concepts 
We have chosen to constitute our own theoretical framework since one theory alone cannot generate 
a thorough understanding of the concepts we work with in the field of social sciences. Specifically, 
our focus is on understanding how far the social movement theory will help us understand the 
movements, and to what extent the theories can be understood in regard to new political parties.  
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In our literature review we have identified a gap in the theoretical understandings when explaining 
the liminality between social movements and political parties. We acknowledge the fact that 
analysing social movements and analysing political parties belong to two different sub-fields, social 
movement theory and political party theory, and thus the development from social movements to 
political party and the interplay between them is difficult to cover in one theoretical spectrum. 
However, investigating this theoretical gap and the suggestions for a further scientific approach to 
this problem causes us to not have a set procedure for the use of inductive or deductive approaches. 
Thus, in this specific project we reason that using either an inductive or deductive approach will not 
give a thorough understanding of the interaction between our empirical data and our theoretical 
framework.  
 
We will be using Tarrow’s notion of the cycle of protests and contentious politics, to analyse the 
development of the social movements in Greece and Spain and divide it into the different phases, 
using Tarrow’s concepts of “diffusion” and “mobilisation”, “peak” and “decline”, and “reform” or 
“transformation” of the protest. Tarrow stresses the importance of the last phase in the cycle of 
protest, as it is here the contention either dies out or succeeds. This last phase is therefore of great 
importance to us, when trying to explore this liminality between party and movement. Tarrow’s 
understanding of social movements as cycles of protest also touches upon the question of co-
optation of a social movement (Tarrow 1998).  
However, Silas Harrebye (2012) in his Ph.D. “CRACKS” on social activism operationalises 
Tarrow’s concepts adding phases and points that can be tracked during the development of a social 
movement (Harrebye 2012: 47). Harrebye uses the concepts of “grumbling”, “triggering point”, 
“tipping point” and “demobilisation” to describe a cycle of protest. In the analysis we intend to use 
both Tarrow’s and Harrebye’s concepts in combination when analysing the development of the 
movements in Greece and Spain. The characteristics of the different concepts and phases will be 
drawn in and further described during the first part of the analysis (Chapter 6.1). These concepts 
will be tested through this analysis to see to what extent they can be used to understand the 
development of the social movements and the political parties. 
 
It is imperative to examine whether this theoretical framework together with della Porta’s 
theoretical ideas of movement parties can provide concepts to understand the development of the 
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new political parties, which seem to develop concurrently with the movements. In this way, the 
concepts of Tarrow, Harrebye, and della Porta will be tested on the two selected cases, analysing 
the development of the anti-austerity social movement and the anti-austerity parties in Greece and 
Spain. In the end of the first part of the analysis, we will conclude on the usability of these social 
movements theoretical concepts.  
 
Della Porta is currently investigating the aforementioned theoretical gap, and we have been 
corresponding with her on this joint motivation towards a greater understanding of the field. Della 
Porta has recently sent us her current work in the field, an introductory chapter for a book on the 
coherence between social movements and political parties. Using this chapter (della Porta 2015b), 
we want to further our understanding of how social movements can transform into political parties 
from a theoretical perspective. The notion of movement parties will thus be implemented in the first 
part of the analysis to be able to continue the use of Tarrow and Harrebye’s understanding of the 
cycle of protests. As Bryman points out, “the crucial question is not whether the findings can be 
generalised to a wider universe but how well the researcher generates theory out of the 
findings”  (Bryman 2012: 71). 
 
We further use Polletta and della Porta to investigate the internal structures of both the social 
movements and the parties of the two cases. Polletta and della Porta’s concepts will be drawn in and 
tested in the second part of the analysis to study if and how the social movements in Greece and 
Spain are occupied with rethinking democracy (Chapter 6.2). They will moreover be used when 
analysing how social movements’ and movement parties’ perceptions of democracy changes 
through their development and how it influences their organisation and choices of repertoires. In the 
second part of the analysis, Polletta’s and della Porta’s notion of “participatory democracy” and 
“prefigurative politics” will also be used when seeking to understand the movement and movement 
parties. 
 
4.0 Methodology 
This chapter will elucidate the method and the methodological considerations used in this project. It 
will explain why a parallel case study with comparative elements has been relevant and which cases 
that has been selected. Moreover, choice of empirical data and an explanation of our data will be 
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clarified. The use of theory in the project will be explained, and lastly we will outline our research 
design. 
 
4.1 A Parallel Case Study with Comparative Elements 
In order to answer our research questions, we need to understand how social movements develop, 
how they interact with the political system, and what causes some of them to make way for new 
political parties. Hence, we have chosen two cases that we will analyse parallelly and compare to 
get a thorough understanding of how the social movements in southern Europe have developed. 
What elements from social movements the new political parties have inherited and how they 
interact. The reasons for doing a parallel study with comparative elements are reflected in the 
choice of empirical data, since the events in the two countries occur differently and as such, it has 
been difficult to find matching empirical data in both countries. This leads us to define the method 
in this project as a parallel study with comparative elements. 
The reason for choosing the comparative elements lies in the notion that a comparative case study 
can provide concepts to emerging theories and the distinguished characteristics of each case may 
contribute to further theoretical reflections (Bryman 2012: 74-75). There are many different types of 
cases, however, the exemplifying case is able to give in depth answers to our research questions. We 
have thus chosen two exemplifying cases which will be investigated in parallel and in comparison 
throughout the analysis. The findings will be summed up and compared immediately after 
Analytical Part I and II (Bryman 2012: 70; Yin 2009). The two cases are chosen to exemplify a 
broader category of which they are members; in this case, the anti-austerity social movements in 
southern Europe that have inspired the birth of new political parties. However, we also recognise 
the fact that one of the central criticisms of case studies is that findings deriving from them can 
never be used to generalise (Bryman 2012: 71). Furthermore, we as researchers cannot, with our 
limited time, become experts on the economic, social, and political situations in both Greece and 
Spain. As such, a comparative study’s findings are hard to extrapolate to greater patterns as the 
conducted analysis is contingent with the unique circumstances and characteristics of the particular 
cases being studied (Gomm 2009: 40; Yin 2009: 268-269). Since our focus is mainly on 
investigating the gap between the theories conceptualising social movements and those 
conceptualising party politics, the two cases will exactly be seen as examples of anti-austerity social 
movements. With these examples, we want to, first, study the relevance of the social movement 
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theories, and see how far these theories can help us explain the evolvement of social movements; 
and second, gain an understanding of the liminality between social movements and political parties. 
We will be interpreting our results as an example of what a new understanding of the theories can 
provide and what limitations it has. We do this in order to reflect on our findings and be able to 
pose better questions for future research, and to understand the liminality between these movements 
and the new political parties, and the interplay between the two. 
The comparative aspect of our method can help us understand the similarities and differences that 
affected SYRIZA and Podemos in their development as political parties, in their respective 
countries. Bryman argues that a comparative case study can contribute to new theoretical 
perspectives that can shed light on the complexities of this transition (Bryman 2012: 72-75). This is 
why we have chosen to take in comparative elements. As aforementioned, we want to analyse how 
anti-austerity movements might be able to inspire new parties in different ways and through 
different paths. This will provide us with an idea of how, and to which extend, social movement 
theory can be used to understand the development of new political parties. The analysis of the 
differences as well as the similarities provides us with less unequivocal results to discuss and thus 
get a deeper understanding of the complexity of this process. The parallel case study with 
comparative elements can in this way help us gain an understanding of the relevance of social 
movement theory in relation to more than one example, and provide a better basis for discussing the 
new theoretical perspectives on the liminality between social movements and political parties.  
 
4.2 Selecting Our Cases 
As seen in the introduction, many of the recent social movements in southern Europe have been 
opposing not only the policies in question but also the entire political system nationally as well as 
internationally. What caught our interest was the trajectory some of these movements took as 
political parties, evolving and adapting into a system quite different from the one in which the 
social movements arose. We were also curious as to why social movements that had such close 
relations to political parties, academically were seen as different objects once they entered into the 
traditional political system (Chapter 2.2). 
We want to understand what happens when social movements make way for new political parties 
that manage to change the political balances. Therefore, we have chosen to compare Greece and 
Spain which are the clearest examples of that happening in recent years in southern Europe. The 
23 
 
similarities and differences of these two cases will help us test the theories in regard to 
understanding the liminality between the movement and the party in question. Another argument for 
choosing these two cases is that while the anti-austerity movements in both countries seem to have 
caused two anti-austerity parties to gain political support at the expense of the traditional political 
parties, it seems to have happened in different ways. We acknowledge that there have been quite a 
few social movements in both countries as a reaction to austerity measures, and other new parties 
have arisen after the economic crisis. The reason for choosing Podemos and SYRIZA is that they 
have been the most significant anti-austerity parties in each of the two countries and that they are 
pointed to by other scholars as most successful parties in terms of support (Levi 2015). 
Furthermore, they are simply the cases with the largest amount of empirical data available on the 
interplay between social movements and new political parties, since they are the most studied. 
When investigating the evolvement of social movements in southern Europe we need to be aware of 
our point of departure. We understand that we are starting our analysis and investigation in the 
middle of a social uprising but when focusing on the evolvement of the social movement; we know 
that we are shooting at a moving target. We delimit ourselves from taking international and 
economic factors into account, such as the national and political culture of the countries or the 
austerity policies imposed by the EU. We recognise the economic politics of the EU imposed in 
2010 as being the take-off for the anti-austerity movements in Greece and Spain. We also recognise 
these movements as being the point of departure for the trajectories of the political parties analysed.  
 
Our knowledge of the two political parties was limited to begin with, yet, this gave us a chance to 
look at the two cases without the implications of prior knowledge. We are aware of the potential 
problem in explaining contrasts in these cases without taking into account all the possible issues 
that affect a certain case, for example nationally, socially, economically, and ideologically aspects. 
We understand that looking at these cases without including every aspect possible can potentially 
give a somewhat tainted picture. However, using the comparative case study gives us the means, not 
only to look at the two cases from the perspectives available on both cases, but also to draw 
knowledge from their differences and what they can provide for us in understanding the liminality.  
Lastly, we acknowledge that the movements in Spain and Greece are a continuous process of social 
interaction and are therefore not a fixed object of analysis. This further implies that they have not 
reached an end and will, to some extent, continue to evolve even if our time frame ends. The time 
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frame we have chosen to analyse is illustrated in the timeline, which will be explained in the section 
on empirical data (Chapter 4.3.1). 
 
4.3 Choice & Use of Empirical Data 
In this project, we have chosen not to produce our own empirical data. We are trying to capture an 
overall development of the movements and parties in Greece and Spain. Since we, with our research 
questions, try to capture the dynamics in two different countries over several years, it is a rather 
macro-level development that we want to investigate.  It would not be possible, within the frames of 
this project, to produce our own meaningful empirical data covering this period, and therefore we 
have chosen to build our empirical data from other primary and secondary sources such as other 
scholars’ data and analyses of different aspects and on quantitative data such as electoral and public 
opinion statistics.  
 
4.3.1 The Empirical Data for the First Analysis & Timeline 
As a product for our analysis, we have created a timeline that maps and organises a large part of our 
empirical data. The timeline is a useful tool when conducting a parallel case study with comparative 
elements. In our project, the timeline covers the period from when SYRIZA is established as an 
electoral alliance in 2004 and up until November 2015 and provides an overview of the most 
important events and developments in the two cases. It maps all of the most relevant political events 
and protest events along with both qualitative and quantitative data on the development of the two 
parties, Podemos and SYRIZA, and the public opinion in both countries. The timeline will provide 
an important visual overview over how the two cases have developed parallelly, how they have 
conversed over time and whether they have reused each other’s ideas and best practices. The 
timeline enables us to conduct our research using a variety of empirical material, which we find 
imperative if we are to understand social movements and their making way for new political parties. 
The timeline will function as a reference frame for the rest of the analysis. We have used the visual 
media, Tiki-Toki, to make an interactive timeline. This media helps the reader gain a better 
overview of the movements as he or she moves through the analysis. Moreover, it enables us to 
combine our different empirical data in a sophisticated and manageable way. A guide for the 
timeline media Tiki-Toki can be found in appendix 3. A link to the timeline is moreover found in 
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appendix 3 and in the introduction to the analysis (Chapter 6.0). The data presented in the timeline 
is constituted of information from both primary and secondary sources. The references to the 
original sources of the data are mentioned in each post in the timeline and can be found in the 
bibliography of the project. However, since the timeline is to be regarded as a product itself, it is 
used and referred to as primary empiric data.  
 
The quantitative data included consists of statistics on the Greek and Spanish populations’ trust in 
the national governments and the EU respectively and on the unemployment rate in both countries. 
We have included statistics from when the crisis started in 2008 and for as long as valid statistics 
exist. Since the first two are only developed after two years, they are only included up until 2013, 
while the unemployment rate from the beginning of the year is included up until 2015. These 
numbers can be found in January, in the timeline, every year. The statistics are developed by the 
well-established and credible statistical agencies Eurostat and Gallup, and presented in appendix 2 
and in the timeline. The other part of the quantitative empirical data consists of statistics on voter 
turnout and electoral results in all relevant national and regional elections in Greece and Spain in 
the period that we study. All of these statistics are drawn from the website www.electionguide.com, 
which assembles statistical data on all the official elections in the world, and are presented in the 
timeline as well.  
 
The rest of the events and other types of information in the timeline derives from qualitative 
empirical data. It is drawn from primary sources such as manifests from Podemos and SYRIZA and 
discussion forums for members of the social movements such as the website 
www.opendemocracy.net and from secondary sources consisting of scientific articles building upon 
comprehensive data themselves, books, and newspaper articles. References to these sources are 
likewise all found in the different posts in the timeline and in the bibliography. A website like 
www.opendemocracy.net can be disputed. The website is a so-called digital common, an open 
discussion forum where scholars, policy-makers, activists, and private debaters can publish 
contributions to ongoing debates. It has been frequently used to debate the anti-austerity social 
movement in Spain, specifically the 15M movement and Podemos, and also by some of the activists 
and leaders of the movement. It is one of these debates that we have included as a part of our 
empirical data. Of course, the articles from 15M members cannot and will not be seen, in this 
project, as representative for the entire movement. Since social movements rarely communicate to 
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the public by more official channels, www.opendemocracy.net is one of the best sources to the 
voices of the leading activists and is therefore included as a source to the reactions of the movement 
when an anti-austerity party develops in Spain.  
 
We have chosen to include news articles even though they do not, in themselves, have the same 
credibility as scientific articles or publications. However, since the field we study in this project is, 
as mentioned, still developing and some of the very relevant events included in our analyses 
happened within the past year, books and scientific articles concerned with these events have not 
yet been published. Therefore, we would not be able to include these events and other developments 
in our timeline and our analyses without the use of news articles accounting for them. For example, 
it is in the past year or two that critique of the two parties has arisen in both countries, and it is very 
relevant to include studying the interplay between the social movements and the parties, as we do.  
 
Using news articles as empiric data, we are aware that journalists do not have the same obligations 
to refer to the remaining knowledge in the field that they are writing about, such as researchers do. 
Moreover, we acknowledge that a news article does therefore not provide as broad and reliable a 
picture of the field as scientific data does. To include as solid data from the past year as possible, 
we have, when using news articles as sources for facts, such as the number of participants at certain 
events or a strike being started, always checked the information in other news medias as well.  
 
The facts, events, and information that we have chosen to include in the timeline is, as already 
briefly mentioned, not only consisted of written empirical data. Manifests and other written 
documents cannot alone encapsulate the events and utterances that have guided and shaped the 
protests. When analysing the field we do in this project, marches, demonstrations, claims on the 
demonstration banners or accounts of political meetings are just as important data. Therefore, key 
events, protests, and occupations are included in our empirical data in order to make sense of how 
the social movements in Spain and Greece develop over time. As mentioned in the above section, 
we have acknowledged that social movements and their evolvement concurrently with political 
parties in Spain and Greece take place in the context of national austerity policies and bailout 
packages from the EU. However, the first protests in both Greece and Spain were clearly a reaction 
to the first bailout packages from the EU in 2010, and the national measures taken as a result of 
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them. Therefore, we include the bailout packages in the timeline to illustrate the background for the 
protests. 
 
4.3.2 The Empirical Data for the Second Analysis 
The timeline constitute primarily the empirical ground for the first analysis focusing on the phases 
in the development of the social movements and later the anti-austerity parties in Greece and Spain. 
The timeline, along with the first part of the analysis, lays the ground for the second part of the 
analysis. However, in the second analysis, apart from the data presented in the timeline, we also use 
other scholars’ analyses of the developments that we study as secondary empirical data when their 
observations can contribute with new perspectives. That can for example be studies of the 
organisational development of the movements or parties, or of the use of different repertoires by the 
activists in the movements. When such perspectives are drawn in, we refer directly to the scientific 
articles in which they are developed.  
 
4.3.3 Unpublished Articles 
Three of the scientific articles that we refer to are unpublished. The first is Movement parties in 
times of (anti)austerity by Donatella della Porta. We have been in contact with della Porta at a guest 
lecture she participated in at Roskilde University in November 2015. We explained our project and 
she emailed the article to us. The article will be found in appendix 1, but referred to as “della Porta 
2015b” throughout the project.  
The second article is Podemos, a Hurricane in the Spanish Crisis of Trust which we use to analyse 
15M and Podemos’ organisation. We wrote to Professor Pavia (one of the authors) to gain access to 
the article and he emailed it to us. The authors are all professors at Valencia University and 
explained that they have been through a process of updating the article, which is now to be 
published again in an unspecified political journal in 2016. Pavia agreed in sending it to us as long 
as we would not circulate it, hence the article is referred to as “Pavia et al 2015”, but it will not be 
found in an appendix.  
Almost the same is the case for our third article which is the text by Hanspeter Kriesi. It is written 
as a chapter to an unpublished book under the research project POLCON, Political Conflict in 
Europe in the Shadow of the Great Recession under the European University Institute. This text will 
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be referred to as “Kriesi 2015”. The article is accessible as a finished working paper from the 
institute’s website and is therefore used in the project, and referred to in the bibliography. 
 
4.3.4 New Knowledge Presented in the Discussion 
In chapter (Chapter 7.0) we present our discussion. It consists of two main aspects. First, we discuss 
the notion of success, and secondly, we discuss how our findings throughout this paper can be 
applied as suggestions for political parties. In order to discuss these aspects we will be incorporating 
new perspectives and knowledge, which is not presented in the above theoretical or methodological 
chapters of the project. We have chosen to do so, because these new perspectives can help us 
underline our arguments and they can further bring in new perspectives that the findings of our 
analysis gives rise to. An example of new knowledge presented in the discussion chapter is from a 
lecture with della Porta. This has been gathered when della Porta and Steven Duncombe visited 
Roskilde University in November 2015, as guest lectures at the conference New Social Media and 
Activism. We had an informal conversation with della Porta on her current research and will from 
that conversation be paraphrasing in non-verbatim quotes. In our references we will thus write 
“informal conversation with della Porta/Duncombe, during guest lecture, November 5th 2015”.  
 
The discussion will thus appeal to a broader field since we incorporate new knowledge to underline 
our argumentation, which could possibly open up for thinking in alternative directions.  
 
5.0 Research Design 
In the above chapters, the chosen theoretical framework and methodology is outlined in order to 
answer our problem statement. In the following, the structure and the content of the rest of the 
project will be outlined.  
 
5.1 Analysis 
The following analysis will be divided in two parts; the second part building partly on the results of 
the first. The first part of the analysis will study the different phases of the development of the 
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social movements in Greece and Spain with the concepts from Tarrow (1998) and Harrebye (2012). 
Towards the end, the concepts from della Porta’s new article, also presented in the theoretical 
chapter (Chapter 3.5), will be drawn in, and the analysis will be continued, studying not only the 
social movements, but also the anti-austerity parties, Podemos and SYRIZA. Concepts will be 
tested in the first part of the analysis, and it will end with some concluding remarks on the 
development of both the movements and parties, and the interplay between them and the 
applicability of the theoretical concepts to understand it.  
The second part of the analysis will build on the phases of the development identified in the first 
part. These will be used to study the organisation and use of repertoires in both the anti-austerity 
movements and the two anti-austerity parties in Greece and Spain. The focus will especially be on 
the conceptions of democracy in the movements and the parties and how it influences their 
organisation. It will be analysed with the concepts of della Porta (2015a) and Polletta (2004). The 
second part of the analysis ends up concluding on the influence of the movements’ conceptions of 
democracy, leading up to the discussion.  
 
5.2 Discussion 
The discussion (Chapter 7.0) takes its point of departure in the findings of our two analyses, 
discussing both the theoretical and the practical/empirical findings in a broader context. The 
usability and the limitations of the theory included in the project will be set into perspective with 
the notion of success for social movements as an example, discussing whether our findings support 
or challenge the existing literature on the success of social movements and movement parties. 
Furthermore, the notion of movement parties will be discussed more broadly along with the 
findings from the second part of the analysis. This discussion will take its point of departure in the 
lack of trust in the political parties today, and discuss what the movement parties’ organisation and 
conceptions of democracy suggest, for the future development of political parties in general. After 
the discussion, we will be concluding on our four research questions and finally on our problem 
statement. 
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5.3 Future Research 
Since we, in this project, study a rather broad field of development in order to i.a. investigate the 
apparent theoretical gap, it is not possible for us to reach completely definitive conclusions on our 
problem statement and the question of how to understand the liminality between social movements 
and political parties in Greece and Spain. Rather, we will, after our analyses and discussion, be able 
to pose more relevant questions for the further research needed in order to study this liminality. 
Therefore, a perspectivation will follow our conclusion, not only listing the one-page obligatory 
suggestions for further research, but picking up some of the elements that our analyses and 
discussion touched upon, but which could not be fully examined in this project. In this 
perspectivation, we will develop our reflections on these elements and suggest with what methods, 
theoretical disciplines, and methodology they could be further studied in future research. The focus 
in future research (chapter 9) will be on how to study the liminality between social movements and 
political parties better.  
 
6.0 Analysis 
In order to follow our line of thought it is advised to have the timeline open in a web browser.  
 
The timeline can be accessed here: 
http://www.tiki-toki.com/timeline/entry/550790/Timeline-Greece-and-Spain/ and a technical guide 
to the timeline can be found in appendix 3. This guide will illustrate how to access the timeline and 
how to navigate in it. 
 
6.1 Analytical Part I: Cycle of Protest in Greece and Spain 
We will examine the various events in the timeline in order to understand the characteristics of the 
different stages in the development of the movements in both countries, and to formulate phases 
that can work as a frame of reference for the rest of our analysis. It is thus not the purpose to 
conduct a thorough analysis of all the events in the seven-year period that the timeline illustrates 
and what causes them to happen, but rather to systemise all the events in phases in order to gain an 
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overview and an understanding of the development, from when the social movements begin to the 
political parties are formed or gain political influence.  
Referring back to our notion of liminality, it is important to note here that not only does it help to 
understand a possible development from social movement to political party. It also serves to 
understand the blurred lines that exist in form of interactions between what happens in the streets 
and what happens at the political arena. To decompose and make the liminality visible we structure 
the events of the movements alone and in relation to our cycle of protest, before we incorporate the 
activities of the political parties SYRIZA and Podemos.  
 
We will divide the development of the anti-austerity movements in Greece and Spain into the 
following phases according to our theoretical framework: grumbling, mobilisation, peaks and 
tipping points, and a demobilisation phase. In a combination with Harrebye’s notion of triggering 
points, the different phases and the shift between them will be described. Furthermore, we will take 
our point of departure in Harrebye’s understanding of the cycle of protest more as a circular than a 
linear process and therefore not leave out the possibility of some of the phases repeating themselves 
or starting over, during the period that we analyse. The notion of triggering points is embedded 
within the different phases when something has proved to trigger a particular development within 
that phase and the other phases will likewise be theoretically described when analysed.  
 
6.1.1 Grumbling  
Harrebye (2012) describes the grumbling phase as the time right before dissatisfaction is openly 
expressed. In other words, dissatisfaction might be increasing yet only on the verge to take its form 
and be expressed openly. In 2008 and in the years that followed, the financial crisis affected the 
European member states and especially Greece and Spain. An increasing unemployment rate, the 
closure of business, cuts in social security benefits, and decreasing salary rates for those still 
employed, seems to contribute to a growing dissatisfaction and thus to the grumbling among both 
the Greek and Spanish people (Timeline: post 16). From 2008 until the first phase of mobilisation 
the austerity measures implemented as a response to the crisis, can thus be seen as a grumbling 
phase for the protests to come, where a social movement still does not exist. Before we can use the 
term social movements to describe the reaction to the austerity, a certain level of mobilisation has to 
have taken place and the protests need to have reached a certain size (Tarrow 1998: 154). As 
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Tarrow (1998) describes it, the magnitude of conflictual collective action rises above the typical 
level. It is then remarkably higher in the phase of mobilisation than both before and after (Tarrow 
1998: 154). Since the number and volume of protests in 2008 is at a low level, both in the case of 
Greece and Spain, it supports the argument that this can be characterised as a grumbling phase 
(Timeline). The dissatisfaction takes place at an individual level or in the private sphere and has not 
yet been triggered into mobilisation.  
To this one might add that the effects from the financial crisis does not strike immediately and the 
influence of rising unemployment and cuts in social security benefits continues to increase for both 
countries and the level of grumbling over the situation is thus assumed to increase accordingly. 
 
6.1.2 Mobilisation  
Greece  
As Harrebye (2012) emphasises, there can be several trigger points during the evolvement of a 
social movement. One can argue that the first trigger point is seen in Greece in February 2010, 
when the first bailout package from the EU is accepted. It triggers the dissatisfaction among the 
Greek people to start mobilising in the first general strike in Greece after the financial crisis started 
in 2008 and in rallies in Athens and many other Greek cities in February 2010 (della Porta & 
Mattoni 2014: 147). The protests continue from this point on in form of many more strikes, 
demonstrations, marches etc. gathering more and more people. Before February 2010, there was no 
remarkable contestation in Greece, and one may argue that the bailout package and the following 
strike is the first triggering point to the anti-austerity movements in Greece.  
 
As we see in the timeline, the mobilisation phase seems to be continuing until the protests peak in 
the winter of 2012. Approximately 200.000 Greeks participated in the demonstrations and marches 
in February 2010, while around 500.000 took part in the biggest demonstration in February 2012. 
As stated previously, Tarrow underlines that mobilisation is seen when the amount of conflictual 
collective action rises above the typical level (Tarrow 1998: 154). Thus, since about 30% of the 
Greek population is estimated to have taken part in the protests from 2010 to 2012 this is definitely 
the case in Greece (Kriesi 2015: 17). Both Tarrow and Harrebye emphasise that mobilisation is a 
process (Tarrow 1998: 156, Harrebye 2012: 53) and as seen in the timeline, the mobilisation in 
Greece does not seem to grow constantly over the two years, either. Rather, it seems to grow in 
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waves, triggered by different political events. For example, the signing of the first Economic 
Adjustment Programme for Greece on May 3rd, 2010, seems to be triggering a growth in the 
mobilisation to 250.000 Greeks protesting around May 5 2010. Similarly, the Eurozone leaders 
agreeing on a 50% debt write-off for Greece in return for more austerity measures in October 2011 
can be seen as a triggering event for the mobilisation which rises to between 300.000 and 500.000 
people in the end of October 2011. Moreover, Papandreou stepping down as Prime Minister of 
Greece in favour of, ECB vice-president, Lucas Papademos in November 2011, seems to be another 
triggering event for the mobilisation to finally reach around 500.000 people few months later in 
February 2012. Harrebye further emphasises that the mobilisation phase is characterised by more 
different society groups that do not normally participate in contentious politics (Harrebye 2012: 53). 
As seen in the timeline that is also seen in the case of Greece when i.a.  self-employed citizens and 
salesmen join the protests in February 2011.  
 
Spain 
Like in the case of Greece, the Spanish mobilisation grows in waves triggered by different events, 
but commence a year prior to the Greek mobilisation. The Spanish mobilisation seems to be 
triggered in 2009, when the European Trade Unions (ETU) called for a European day of action 
against austerity measures on May 14th 2009, which took place in Madrid, Bruxelles, Berlin, and 
Prague (Timeline). This particular event was not arranged in Greece. 
One day later, the 15th of May 2009, 150.000 people marched the streets of Spain in 58 cities under 
the parole “Fight the Crisis”. It thus becomes clearer that the arranged events on the previous day 
did in fact trigger the Spanish people to move from individual grumbling and into collective 
mobilisation (Timeline; Kriesi 2015). Dissatisfaction and grumbling over the negative effects of the 
crisis had increased to a level where the dissatisfaction started to be expressed and take the form of 
public protests and sit-ins, thus marking the beginning of a mobilising phase.  
Tarrow (1998) and Harrebye (2012) describe how the beginning of a mobilising phase is 
characterised by someone taking advantage of a political possibility for instance a political scandal. 
In this case it is the global financial crisis that encourage the creation of coalitions between actors 
who normally do not associate with each other resulting in the formation of new organisations or 
the reinforcement of existing ones (Harrebye 2012: 53). The transnational cooperation between the 
European trade unions in the fight against austerity in 2009 can be seen as an example of this 
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reinforcement of cooperation, as a transnational coalition is starting to form in support of the same 
cause. With the local and regional elections taking place only few days after the first protests, they 
might have been strategically taking advantage of the political situation and possibilities.  
Harrebye emphasises how the first public actions can act as a trigger for a revolution as it speaks to 
the people who for various reasons still find themselves in the grumbling phase and have not yet 
taken any actions to support the cause (Harrebye 2012: 50). The first actions of protest can thus 
have a suiting and agenda setting effect and attract more actors to join the protest. The contention 
slowly mobilises the masses. This becomes more evident further below in the section on peak and 
tipping points.  
 
Unlike Greece, the Spanish mobilisation increases in size at a much slower speed. Yet, it still seems 
to respond to austerity measures as it increases in size parallel to the continuity of the socialist 
government party (PSOE) implementing austerity measures, as well as a continuous increase in the 
level of unemployment (Timeline). In September 2010, Spain has its first national strike in eight 
years with 55.000 people demonstrating in Madrid alone (Timeline; Kriesi 2015). General strikes 
and protests continue throughout 2010, growing in size for every protest. When the government in 
January 2011 announced a rise in the retirement age, from 65 to 67, it seems to serve as a trigger 
point for additional protests as more people join the protest in the first half of 2011. The events 
leading up to the peak and around the time of the peak will be further analysed in the section on 
peak and tipping points. 
 
Similarities & Differences in the Mobilisation Phase 
Although the mobilisation phase for both Greece and Spain seems to follow each other, some 
differences can be detected. Demonstrations in Spain related to austerity, began already in 2009 and 
slowly continued to increase from 2009 to 2011. The mobilisation in Greece, on the other hand, 
does not escalate remarkably before the first bailout package is accepted in 2010, but instead of 
slowly increasing, it gains in size at a much quicker pace than Spain and it continues to rise until 
2012. Both in the case of Greece and Spain, mobilisation seems to rise according to the level of 
unemployment - and to the decline in trust towards the national governments. During the period of 
mobilisation from 2010 to 2012 the Greek people’s trust in their national government decreased 
from 24% to 13%, while the unemployment rate increased from 9.6% to 17.9% (Timeline: posts 10, 
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). As in Greece, the trust in the political representants continued to drop, and the unemployment rate 
to increase during the mobilisation phase in Spain. From 2009 to the beginning of 2011, the 
unemployment rate increased from 11.3% to 19.9% and the trust in national government has 
decreased from 42% to 31%, which illustrate the still growing dissatisfaction contributing to the 
mobilisation in both countries (Timeline: posts 11, ). By comparison, the level of trust in the Greek 
national government was in 2008 as low as 32% compared to 58% in Spain (Timeline: posts 6, 7). 
This was before the financial crisis became a reality in 2008 and therefore the falling trust since, 
seems to reflect a discontent with how the governments in both countries handle the crisis. The 
lower level of trust to the Greek government prior to the crisis could serve as an explanation for the 
Greek movement to mobilise much faster than in Spain, as there was already build up more 
dissatisfaction among the Greek people.  
 
6.1.3 Peak & Tipping Points 
Greece 
As mentioned in the section above, the anti-austerity movement mobilises in waves in Greece, and 
one can argue that two peaks of the protests are also seen, respectively, in the fall and the winter of 
2011/2012. The protests first seem to peak in October 2011 when demonstrations and strikes are 
seen as a reaction to the 50% debt write-off in return for further austerity measures by the Eurozone 
leaders (Timeline: post 44b). This mobilises between 300.000 and 500.000 people (Timeline: post 
44b). Harrebye sees a peak in the protests as a “treshold of change” that often result in some kind 
of response or change which he calls a tipping point (Harrebye 2012: 54).  
One can argue that Papandreou stepping down as Prime Minister in November 2011 is a tipping 
point in Greece, since many of the protests had been targeting him and his austerity policies. His 
resignation could thus dampen the anger of the protesters. However, since he is, as mentioned in the 
section above, replaced by a former ECB President who is identified with EU’s strict austerity 
policy, the resignation instead seems to work as a triggering event for even more protest. The result 
is an even stronger peak in the protests in February 2012 with around 500.000 Greeks gathered at 
one single protest event (Timeline). This peak is further triggered by the Troika loan package given 
to Greece precisely in February 2012 (Timeline: post 32). Hence, trust in the national government is 
being the lowest yet since the crisis started in Greece (Timeline).  
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The closer to the peak, the more violent the Greek protests get (Timeline). During the fall of 2011, 
many clashes between police and demonstrators in the streets were seen, including use of tear gas 
and chemicals by the police and violent attacks from the protesters (Timeline). This responds with 
the growing radicalisation of some of the groups in the protest that Tarrow emphasise as a 
characteristic of a peak of protest (Tarrow 1998: 157-158). Tarrow further argues that more 
different and creative forms of collective action are developed towards the peak of the protests 
(Tarrow 1998: 155). This is in Greece seen in, among others, the Movement of the Squares inspired 
by the Indignados in Spain which grows in Greece in the summer of 2011. Moreover, it can be seen 
in creative forms of contention such as activists blocking the door to the parliament preventing the 
politicians from passing new austerity measures in the end of June 2011 (Timeline).  
 
In addition, Tarrow argues that protests are often joined by groups not normally known for taking 
part in contentious politics during their peak (Tarrow 1998: 155-156). It is definitely the case in 
Greece in the fall and winter of 2011/2012 when people of all different classes and sectors, also 
from the private sector, join the protests (Diani & Kousi 2014: 395). Similarly, more actors start to 
play a substantial role in the protests, from citizens’ action committees and anti-authoritarian 
groups, to political parties from the left (Diani & Kousi 2014: 395). The peak of the protest in 
Greece is also characterised by new and broad alliances among the different participants, which 
Tarrow describes as typical for a peak (Tarrow 1998: 157-158). Even though the different groups 
and organisations, from the Greek Indignados to the unions, have very different views of the 
existing party system and party affiliations, they all participate in the general strikes with common 
claims in this period (Diani & Kousi 2014: 395). According to Tarrow, such new and broad 
alliances contribute to convince insurgents that the old, political system is collapsing (Tarrow 1998: 
158). We cannot conclude from this overview analysis whether they do so or not. However, the 
inauguration of former ECB President Lucas Papademos as Prime Minister in Greece can be said to 
change the political circumstances.  
The following peak of protest in February 2012 can be seen as marking another tipping point 
causing the protest to take a new direction in order for them to challenge the political development 
that they oppose in a new way. It means that the austerity measures that they oppose are still 
implemented, and their demands have thus not yet been met from inside the political system.  
One can argue that the national election in May 2012 and the elected parties’ failure to form a 
government marks the tipping point, as it seems to be a contributing factor for SYRIZA to form a 
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single political party. They do so with many of the same claims as, and a lot of cooperation with, 
the social movements and thus diffusing a part of the dissatisfaction into institutionalised politics. 
This point will be further elaborated in the following section on demobilisation and impact. 
 
Spain 
Like in the case of Greece, mobilisation happens over time and is not constantly increasing, but 
instead happens in waves with several triggering points and peaks. In the case of Spain, the 
mobilisation is experiencing a peak in the first half of 2011, followed by a tipping point, which 
leads to a brief demobilisation before reaching yet another peak in December 2012.  
 
At the end of the Spanish mobilisation phase, we saw that a change in the retirement age triggered a 
whole new wave of contention with the situation. When the government party, PSOE, additionally 
introduced a rise in university tuition fees it led the students to take action in the street protests 
(Timeline: post 33). As described above, such new and different groups are likely to join the 
protests just before they reach their peak. From January 2011 to May 2011, the Spanish 
mobilisation did not only increase in size, but both student organisations and  national unions joined 
the anti-austerity movement, and as many as 200 different movements were protesting side by side, 
making similar claims, supporting the argument that a peak was about to be reached (Perugorría et 
al). In this regard, the first peak has many characteristics similar to the peak of the protests in 
Greece.  
 
According to Tarrow, new movement organisations are often formed just before the peak is 
reached, resulting in what appears to be sporadic collective action (Tarrow 1998: 157). As seen in 
the timeline, this sporadic collective action can be understood in relation to the social network 
“New Democracy Now” calling for action to take place at 14th of May 2011, and the rise of several 
new protest movements, among those, the “Los Indignados”, “Take The Squares”, and “The 
Spanish Revolution”. These served as an influential factor in the innovation of new forms of 
contention in the Greek mobilisation, as mentioned above. These different movements would later 
join forces under the name 15M, which symbolises their diffusion into one movement on the 15th 
of May 2011, after having protested side by side. It thereby re-enforcing their common claim and 
making it stronger (Perugorría et al). This, like in the case of Greece, supports Tarrow’s point, that 
38 
 
new and broad alliances are formed around the peak. With the unemployment rate still rising, and 
the trust in the national government being as low as 31%, the participation rate for the protests in 
the first half of 2011 reached its first peak in June 2011, with 250.000 people attending a single 
event (Timeline Stats).  
 
As stated in the previous section on Greece, a peak in protest is often followed by a tipping point 
which changes the direction the movement is taking, and the national election in November 2011, is 
arguably such a tipping point (Harrebye 2012: 54). Comparable to the case of Greece, the ruling 
party in Spain became the image that the contention was directed against and the ruling party, 
PSOE, stepping down from the power, seems to be the first tipping point in Spain. PSOE being in 
government from when the crisis started and thus also responsible for implementing austerity 
measures, became the target for the contention against austerity and the European troika until 2011, 
and the anti-austerity movement thus called for PSOE to resign from the government (Timeline). 
The first peak in protest happening right before the regional elections suggests that the anti-austerity 
movement had influenced the election results leading to PSOE losing 15% of its votes, compared to 
the previous election (Timeline). The effects of this become more visible in the national elections in 
November 2011 where PSOE loses to the conservative People's Party (PP) and officially had to step 
down from power (Timeline: post 46).  
PSOE stepping down changed the political circumstances and the successful change in government 
seemed to cause a brief decline in the mobilisation. Adopting Harrebye’s argument, movements do 
not always fade because they fail but because they succeed (Harrebye 2012: 55). It can be seen as 
the movement, for a short while, experiencing some level of success and therefore automatically 
demobilising while waiting for the new ruling party to engage with their claims. As seen in the 
above, this was contrary to the case of Greece, where the different actions made by government 
parties and the change in government in 2011 did not dampen the Greek protests that only kept 
growing.  
In Spain, the new ruling party PP did not change the cause of austerity policies and introduced the 
first bailout package in December 2012 which caused a second peak in the protests (Timeline).  
 
The unemployment rate reached 21,4% in 2012, and the first bailout package was introduced in 
December 2012 (Timeline). Contrary to the case of Greece, the first bailout package was not a full 
bailout. Nonetheless, its corresponding austerity measures still led to a massive remobilisation of 
39 
 
protests (Estella 2015). In November and December 2012, these protests reached the second peak 
with barely a day without protests or strikes (Timeline; Kriesi 2015: 25). This bailout package 
further increased the opposition to the European Troika and the trust in the EU among the Spanish 
people also decreased from 36% in 2011 to only 24% in 2012 (Estella 2015; Timeline: post 30,48). 
Returning to the argument by Harrebye, a tipping point serves as a change of direction (Harrebye 
2012: 54). The dissatisfaction previously directed at the Spanish national government in relation to 
austerity, after the peak, is then directed more towards the European Union. This is underlined by 
trust in the national government actually increasing slightly, with 2%, in the same period. 
 
6.1.4 Demobilisation & Impact 
Greece 
From the spring of 2012 the start of a demobilisation can be seen in Greece. Protest and strikes 
continue, but at a more “normal” level than during the peak with an average of 76.000 participants 
per protest event, and 200.000 at the largest protest event in September 2012 (Timeline; Diani & 
Kousis 2014: 395). According to Tarrow, the demobilisation phase is characterised by more 
conventional forms of action dominating again (Tarrow 1998: 156). This was the case in Greece 
from the spring of 2012 when the innovative Movement of the Squares was no longer as active and 
the broad coalitions existing during the peak no longer existed except when shared claims were still 
seen in some of the remaining national strikes (Diani & Kousi 2014: 596). 
 
Tarrow and Harrebye agree that there can be various reasons for the demobilisation of a protest 
movement. It can be caused by changes in the political opportunity structure, repression, repertoire 
exhaustion, or a co-optation of the movements themes into mainstream politics (Harrebye 2012: 
55). It is possible that some of the demobilisation of the Greek protests was caused by repertoire 
exhaustion, as the protests had at that point been going on for more than two years, without 
obtaining anything remarkably in terms of ending the austerity policies. Instead, the bailout 
packages and the austerity policies continued (Timeline). Also, the rising violence in Greece could 
be seen as a sign of this, and according to Tarrow, when the claims are not met, some retreat into 
their private lives, while others engage in more and more desperate acts of violence in order to 
reach their goals (Tarrow 1998: 156). However, as mentioned before, movements do not always 
fade because they fail, but because they succeed. Since the coalition of SYRIZA register for the 
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national elections in June 2012 and gain 26.8% of the votes by demanding, amongst other claims, 
an end to the austerity policies like the protests movements, the demobilisation can rather be seen as 
a sign of cooptation or recuperation of the movement themes into institutionalised politics 
(Timeline; Timeline: post 52). Of course, SYRIZA’s program for the election in 2012 was not a 
complete copy of the demands from the protest, but overall they articulated the core claims; 
stopping the austerity policies, bringing down the government, and ensuring a more democratic 
process (Timeline: post 52). SYRIZA, running for the national elections in 2012, might thus be seen 
as what Harrebye (2012) calls “selective facilitation” of the movement’s demands in 
institutionalised politics. SYRIZA then utilises this aforementioned “treshold of change” from the 
massive protests to gain support for their claims (Harrebye 2012: 55). To further support this 
argument, the election result for the SYRIZA coalition from 2004, when they were formed, only 
surpassed the threshold of 3% of the votes, suggesting that the majority of the population was not 
yet in line with SYRIZA’s quite reformative demands (Timeline: post 1; Spourdalakis 2014: 354). 
At this time, the support for SYRIZA was at a very low level and, likewise, Greece had not 
experienced widespread protests or national strikes in relation to austerity at the time. In 
comparison, the election result from 2007, right before the crisis, implied a slight increase in voter 
turnout, but still only at 5,04% of the total votes in support for SYRIZA (Timeline: post 5). 
SYRIZA being the strongest opposition party as a result of the elections in June 2012 might be 
some of the reasons for the protests gradually demobilising in spite of the Greek government 
continuing to implement austerity policies. However, the implementations of austerity measures do 
not seem to be the only influential factor for the facilitation of movement demands into 
institutionalised politics. Looking at the results from the 2009 election one can see that although 
austerity measures have already been implemented at the time of the crisis, SYRIZA did only 
received 4,6% of the votes (Timeline: post 13). This emphasises that the failure of the traditional 
parties to form government in 2012 further opened up for this facilitation by SYRIZA (Timeline: 
post 51). 
 
General strikes continue in the fall of 2012, the biggest, as aforementioned, in September 
summoning 200.000 Greeks. Contention is thus still seen after 2012, but nonetheless, the protests 
decline after SYRIZA gains power, articulating some of the same claims as the protest did and still 
do. Especially as SYRIZA register as a single party in July 2013 and continues to grow. The party 
gains 36.3% of the votes in the election for the national parliament in January 2015, and forms a 
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government with support of one other party, while Tsipras becomes Prime Minister of Greece 
(Timeline: post 52, 81). When SYRIZA gained political power, and a public mandate via vote, they 
were able to make some of the same claims as the social movements put forward. This can be 
interpreted as a clear impact of the social movements, as their claims reached and gained foothold 
within the established political system. 
 
Spain 
Although a second bailout package is introduced in Spain in 2013, the level of massive collective 
protests decreases in the period 2013-2014 (Timeline). Using Tarrow and Harrebye’s understanding 
of the cycle of protests, this phase can therefore be described as a decline in movements’ activities 
and a phase of demobilisation, since the level of protests is thus lower than before. As stated in the 
section above, movements can decline for various reasons, one of which is due to exhaustion of the 
use of repertoires, and the need to rethink one’s repertoires. According to Tarrow, many retreat into 
their private lives again or engage in desperate acts of violence (Tarrow 1998: 156). We have found 
no documentation suggesting that Spanish protesters should have engaged increasingly in violent 
acts during this phase of de-mobilisation. On the contrary, della Porta (2015) several times 
emphasise how the Spanish anti-austerity protests were predominantly conducted in a peaceful 
manner compared to the same phase of the Greek protests.  
 
Another reason for a demobilisation is according to Harrebye a repression by government or 
framing transformation (Harrebye 2012: 55). Repression might be too harsh a word to describe the 
lack of success that the Spanish movement is experiencing, but their voices of contention have 
largely been ignored by the ruling parties. The Spanish media has called it “the death of 15M” but a 
self-reflecting analysis made by activists from the 15M movement itself, rejects this claim 
(Timeline: post 68b). According to them, the demobilisation is not so much a decline in movement 
activities but rather a retraction into local and more community based assemblies where the 
repertoires and framing activities are further developed (Timeline). This could further imply that the 
types of repertoires used so far in the mobilisation process, for example mass protests and general 
strikes, have proved insufficient. Instead, by retreating into their private lives, like Tarrow 
emphasise, the movement participants instead engage in local activities to develop the movement’s 
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repertoires as well as their framing strategy in line with Harrebye’s characterisation of one of the 
reasons for decline.  
The secondary data available suggests that a low level of protests continued throughout 2013, 
although many activists were present at the squares throughout the year (Timeline; 
taketehsquares.net). 
 
After the phase of demobilisation in Spain, Podemos was established as a political party in January 
2014 supporting the same cause and with quite similar claims to that of the anti-austerity protests 
which had taken place in the streets from 2009 (Timeline). This suggests a diffusion of movement 
ideas into the political system, or using the words of Harrebye, it mirrors a co-optation or 
recuperation of the movement themes into institutionalised politics (Harrebye 2012: 55). This is 
similar to the case of Greece, and it is meaningful to argue that the protests had a successful 
political impact. Although we cannot say that Podemos rose from the 15M movement, we can say 
that a political party now exists which engage with the contentious claims made by the 15M 
movement. Both Podemos and 15M later protests side by side against austerity measures 
(Timeline), which emphasise the liminality between the two. If we look at the voter turnout at the 
national elections in 2008 and 2011, we see that it has decreased from 72% to 73% in 2008, and 
from 68% to 66% in 2011 (Timeline: posts 9, 46). The next national election takes place in 
December 2015 and it is therefore not possible to include in this analysis. Trust in the national 
government has likewise decreased from 42% in 2009 to only 18% in 2013 (Timeline: posts 11, 
60). Keeping these numbers in mind, a national survey published in November 2015, in El 
País,  further placed Podemos as the main Spanish political party in projected votes, and its’ leader 
as the most respected amongst the electorate (Timeline; Pavia et al. 2015). From this we can 
conclude, that while people lose trust in their national government, less people participate in 
elections. The national survey suggests that this lack of trust and support for the political system has 
been converted into support for Podemos.  
 
Liminality Between Social Movements & New Political Parties  
This is as far as Tarrow and Harrebye’s concepts enable us to analyse the development of the social 
movements in Greece and Spain - from the building up to them, the grumbling, and until they 
demobilise again and we see some kind of impact. In this case the impact is a facilitation of some of 
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the movements’ claims by a party in the established political system, in form of SYRIZA and 
Podemos representing the same claims as the anti-austerity movements. However, as it is seen from 
the analysis above, the protests does not completely die out when the parties gain strength, but 
continue at a much smaller scale parallel with the party political development. As we search to 
understand the liminality between the anti-austerity social movements and the anti-austerity parties, 
it could be relevant to try out whether some of Tarrow and Harrebye’s concepts can be continuously 
used when turning to analyse the party political development. In this context, they might be used to 
gain a better understanding, not only of the movements, but also of the parties that stem from the 
movements or develop concurrent with them. This will be analysed and discussed in the following 
section. 
 
As outlined in the theory (chapter 3.5), della Porta (2015) tries to capture the connection between 
social movement and party by conceptualising this interplay as a movement party. According to 
della Porta, a movement party is characterised by aiming at incorporating and representing a 
movement’s claims and maintain strong ties with the social movement (della Porta 2015b: 6). As 
seen in the above sections, both SYRIZA and Podemos, being political parties, gain support when 
beginning to articulate many of the same, still quite reformative, claims as the anti-austerity 
movements in the streets and, as such, can be interpreted as movement parties.  
The conditions that della Porta describes as being the best circumstances for the rise of such 
movement parties are present in both cases. Especially the economic crisis and the lack of 
representation of movement claims in institutional politics are present. Della Porta argues that an 
opening in the institutionalised system is needed in order for a movement party to emerge, 
articulating a social movement’s claims (della Porta 2015b: 8). Della Porta specifically mentions a 
drop in the trust to national politicians or government as an opening. The remarkable decline in the 
trust for the national governments in both countries analysed is a significant part of the reason why 
Podemos and SYRIZA could gain ground. This opening also seems to have been an opportunity to 
have a monopoly on the anti-austerity claims in Greece and Spain. On the other hand, if the 
dominating political parties had started to engage with, or adopt, the same anti-austerity claims, the 
opening for SYRIZA and Podemos would probably have been smaller. Another contributing factor 
for the relevance of the concept movement party to describe, both Podemos and SYRIZA, is the 
close relation that seems to be between the parties and the movements in both countries. Della Porta 
underlines that a movement party and the social movement that it arises from often campaign 
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together or is more likely to support protests than the more traditional political parties. This is very 
clear in the case of Spain, since both Podemos and 15M protests side by side, demanding the same 
claims and thus a very different form of action compared to other political parties in Spain. 
Moreover, both parties can still be described with the characteristics outlined in the beginning of the 
project as defining social movement, such as social solidarity, a common cause and the search for 
collective change via sustained and collective interaction. This is what characterises them, at least in 
the beginning when they campaign in the streets, more as movement parties than as normal political 
parties normally operating with a party political program within the frames of established politics 
and not seeking radical change.  
 
6.1.6 Continuation of Cycle of Protest with Movement Parties 
Understanding Podemos and SYRIZA as movement parties, we argue that Harrebye and Tarrow’s 
concepts could also have relevance in conceptualising the development of the movements and the 
new parties in recent years. This can be beneficial when investigating the liminality between them 
and if and how it changes as the movement parties develop. We will therefore, in the following, 
continue to use their concepts from the cycle of protests, when analysing the recent development in 
the two countries in both movements and parties alongside with elaborating further on della Porta’s 
new concept, movement parties.  
 
Using the concept of Tarrow and Harrebye, one could then see SYRIZA and Podemos growing as 
movement parties, from respectively June 2012 and January 2014, as a sort of mobilisation phase 
for the parties. Trying to analyse this, one would also have to measure mobilisation in another way 
than in the above sections. Above we have, according to Harrebye and Tarrow’s concepts, been 
“measuring” protests in numbers of participants in demonstrations and strikes, in the degree of 
diversity or alignment in claims, and in the involvement of different social classes, society 
organisations, or organisations involved etc. Measuring the mobilisation of the movement parties, 
one would have to include measures from electoral politics such as election results and opinion 
polls measuring support (della Porta 2015b: 1). Since they can be seen as movement parties, 
operating in the area between movement and party, one would also still have to include their 
interaction with the remaining movement in the streets. Emphasising that election results alone does 
not count for the full support and that the voices in the streets have to be taken into account, one 
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could see Podemos’ and SYRIZA’s above mentioned support for or taking part in different strikes 
and demonstrations as a sign of coherence between the movements and the parties.  
 
In the case of Spain, the notion of movement parties enables us to continue the use of Tarrows 
phases of the cycle of protest to describe the activities of Podemos and 15M and then reflect over 
the interaction. As seen in the timeline, the creation of Podemos in January 2014 co-sited with the 
Spanish government exiting the bailout program and starting to pay back the loans, resulting in 
further austerity measures, which led to a massive re-mobilisation of contention against austerity 
(Timeline; Pavia et al. 2015: 3). The unemployment rate in 2014 had further increased to 26% 
(Timeline: post 66). Under the parole “out with the troika” and “don’t pay the depth” the protests in 
March 2014 reached a staggering peak with hundreds of thousands of people protesting. Some data 
even suggests that more than 1.5 million people participated (Timeline: post 69).  Podemos, as a 
movement party, thereby continues its’ mobilisation phase, from January 2014, and as such 
continue its work described in the demobilisation phase of Spain.  
 
In May 2014, Podemos received 8% of the national votes at the European parliamentary elections, 
which further underpins the notion of transnational diffusion that Tarrow (1998) underlines, and can 
be seen as a sign that a little part of the Spanish people trusted Podemos to be able to make relevant 
claims, against austerity, at an international level. Also, it eludes the point that some people do not 
feel represented by the bipartisanship that has prevailed between the socialist and conservative 
party, and therefore supports Podemos as an alternative. Podemos has not yet participated in the 
national or regional elections which then make it difficult to evaluate whether it has been gaining 
support from the massive remobilisation on the basis of a peak in protest only. National opinion 
polls from 2015 estimate that PSOE and PP still hold 24.6% and 23.4% of the Spanish people’s 
votes. This is closely followed by Podemos with 18,6% (Hanna 2015).  
 
This link of transnational diffusion becomes more evident in January 2015 where the leader of the 
Greek SYRIZA and the Spanish Podemos met to discuss politics as well as support each other’s 
campaigns against austerity which further underpins the transnational diffusion (Timeline). 
Following from this, in March 2015, people were protesting in the streets, both in Greece and Spain, 
under the joint parole “For dignity - Against austerity measures” (Timeline; post 82). The meeting 
between the two leaders thus triggered a new wave of protest with 100.000 in Spain (Timeline: post 
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82). While 15M is considered “dead” and Podemos has not yet received support in form of national 
and regional election votes, one can still analyse how contention is happening. As such, the level of 
protest that takes place after the two leaders meet, using the same arguments as Tsipras and Iglesias 
arranged for their joint campaign, implies that the social movements against austerity have 
continued under the party political development. In June 2015, 15M state that the large success of 
Podemos is mostly founded on the movement’s activities, but that Podemos is taking the credit for 
it (Timeline). The liminality thus gives a picture of blurred lines between the two, and that 
interactions between movement and party are closely related. This underlines how Podemos can be 
seen as a movement party. As della Porta emphasises, political parties’ relation with the movement 
along the way is not always without problems and sometimes it is characterised by hostility (della 
Porta 2015b: 5). The above mentioned hostility from 15M towards Podemos in 2015 can be seen as 
a sign of this and more interestingly suggests that Podemos is moving further away from the 
movement towards being more of a normal political party than a movement party. As outlined in 
the theoretical chapter (3.0) della Porta draw up four different dilemmas that movement parties need 
to choose strategically between. One of them is between moderation and radicalism, and Podemos 
moderating their claims might hence be seen as a strategic choice in order to gain influence, build 
alliances or make trade-offs. In this analysis, we are not able to determine how strategic or 
intentional this choice has been for Podemos, but is seems that they are evolving towards becoming 
a normal political party rather than a movement party. 
 
Using the concepts in this way to analyse the connection between the movements and the parties, as 
a whole, allows us to understand the reactions in the streets better if the movement parties fail to 
meet the expectations of the dissatisfied people. In both the case of Greece and Spain, the 
dissatisfaction is not remarkably bettered even though the protests demobilise to a much lower 
level, and their claims start to be articulated by movement parties within the established political 
system (Timeline). Therefore, a new mobilisation of protest must be expected to lie under the 
apparent order if the movement parties does not live up to the expectations of change from the 
Greeks and Spaniards previously, or still, engaged in the protests. Another example is when protests 
were seen again in Greece in the summer of 2015 after SYRIZA, who, as seen in above started out 
as a movement party, ended up approving yet another bailout package and thus went directly 
against the referendum, they had put forward themselves. This simultaneously meant that SYRIZA 
went against the majority of the Greeks who voted no to the bailout package and the inherent 
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austerity measures (Timeline: post 88). Seeing SYRIZA as a movement party might likewise be 
seen as a strategic choice of adapting to the existing rules of the game in politics rather than 
innovating the political and economic system that they started out opposing. This is one of the main 
strategic dilemmas a movement party have to consider, according to della Porta (della Porta 2015b). 
The protests during the summer of 2015 and the first general strike in Greece after Tsipras became 
Prime Minister in November 2015 could thus, with Harrebye’s understanding of the cycle of protest 
as a circular process, be seen as sign of a another mobilisation of protest starting up with some of 
the same claims against the austerity policies (Timeline; Wearden 2015).  In this way, Tsipras 
ending up approving the bailout package could be seen as a triggering event for a new cycle of 
protest to begin. Seeing SYRIZA as a movement party and using the concepts of Harrebye to 
analyse it, SYRIZA decision to accept the demands from the EU, in the summer of 2015, highlights 
a new tipping point for the party’s fight against austerity, which causes it to change strategy and 
move in a less reformist direction as a political party. However, SYRIZA held on to their support 
and gained 35.4% of the votes in the national election for the parliament in September 2015 after 
their failure to stop the austerity measures (Timeline: post 92). In terms of traditional politics, 
SYRIZA does not seem to be challenged more than before and, as mentioned before, it is still too 
soon to elaborate on the success of SYRIZA, both as a movement party or a political party. In fact, 
neither the social movement theory used in this project nor della Porta’s new concepts bridging 
social movement theory and political party theory can profoundly be used to explain SYRIZA’s 
continued support. This reason for this is that they go so directly against the claims from the 
movement that their support seemed to have grown from in the first place. It raises the question of 
whether the voters for SYRIZA are the same Greeks as those engaging in anti-austerity protests in 
2010-2012, or especially in 2015, which will be elaborated further on in the discussion and future 
research chapters. Here, it might only be seen as a sign of SYRIZA moving slightly away from 
being a movement party to being a political party seeking less radical change than before, and being 
much less in line with the claims of the social movement. Quite on the contrary, it might be a sign 
of SYRIZA doing well as a “real” political party when still gaining the 35.4% of the votes after 
accepting the bailout package. An alternative explanation is that their backing is a sign of their 
ability to represent and attract other parts of the population. 
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6.1.7 Preliminary Conclusion 
In the section above, we have given an outline of the phases in the development of the social 
movements in Greece and Spain and their transition into, and interaction with, the established 
political system. We find that Tarrow’s cycle of protest combined with Harrebye’s concepts, make 
us able to understand the different phases in the development of the movements and what events 
that causes the movements to grow and later to decline. It is clear how the development of the anti-
austerity social movements cannot be separated from the new anti-austerity parties. Thus, a full 
understanding of this liminality cannot be comprehended by stopping the analysis when the 
movements in the streets decline or demobilise. Combined with della Porta’s concept movement 
party, we see how the movements’ claims are later articulated by political parties who, at least to 
begin with, maintain a close relation to the social movements in the streets. They can therefore be 
seen as movement parties. This concept allows us to study the liminality between the anti-austerity 
social movements and the anti-austerity parties that gain a substantial foothold in both Greece and 
Spain. It shows how this liminality cannot only be seen as a one-way development from social 
movement to political party, but that there seems to be a rather long period in between, where the 
new movement parties influence the movements and vice versa. It also enables us to analyse how 
the social movements, in this interplay with the movement parties, keep track of the parties. We can 
moreover gain clarity of the social movements’ hostility toward the movement parties if they 
strategically, or by other reasons, move away from the demands of the movements and/or their own 
starting point. When the liminality between them is not a linear process of development, we find 
that the activities of both the movements and the parties overlap and interact with two different 
theoretical disciplines. This can be seen in the political aspect of the movements which is not only 
located outside institutional politics, but also in the activities of the political parties, which are 
located within civil society. Using movement party as a concept allows us to capture this 
complexity and thereby provides a better understanding of both movements and parties; an 
understanding that would otherwise not be accessible. The term movement party, only from the pun 
of it, allows us to test and make use of social movement theory on subjects, which would otherwise 
not be characterised as a social movement; exemplified by the political parties SYRIZA and 
Podemos. The term is thus able, to a certain extent, to bridge the social movement discipline with 
the political science field, by allowing researchers within them to test its’ boundaries. Referring 
back to the notion of liminality, one can argue that the concept movement party, by its 
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interdisciplinary characteristics, is able to enhance and support the knowledge that can be created 
within the two disciplines.  
However, the above analysis suggests that only some of the theoretical ideas in social movement 
theory provide concepts that can be used to study and understand this interplay between movement 
and party. Della Porta’s new concept, bridging social movement and political party theoretical 
perspectives, does not enable us to fully understand the movement parties’ political trajectory and 
their choices within the established political system. As seen above, it can be used to identify when 
the movement parties distance themselves from the social movements and take the trajectory of a 
political party. There is a notable limitation as the concept cannot fully provide an understanding of 
how the movement parties interact with the other political parties in the political system, or what 
strategic choices that lie behind it. Other empirical data could have been used to test this concept 
further, which would provide us with a different perspective. This will be elaborated in the section 
on future research. One can therefore still argue that this field is in need of a more comprehensive 
theoretical framework encompassing both social movements, political parties, and the liminality 
between them. This is in line with what Thomassen (2014) argues that whenever previously existing 
borders or limits are lifted away, or dissolve into fundamental doubt, the liminal presents itself with 
a challenge: how to cope with this uncertainty? According to Thomassen, this opens up for new 
meaning formation to take place, which has the potential to push traditional and social theory 
(Thomassen 2014: 3). As such, we find that a new discipline is needed to be able to fully encompass 
the complexity of this liminality.  
The above analysis outlines the phases in the development of the social movements in Greece and 
Spain and tests the project’s theoretical concepts on the parallel development of the anti-austerity 
parties and the social movements. It thereby allows us to study more in-depth, the organisational 
development of both the movements and the parties. 
 
6.2 Analytical Part II: Organisation of Movement & 
Movement Party 
In the second part of our analysis we will look more closely at the repertoires used by the social 
movements as well as how they have organised themselves. We will also be analysing the 
movements’ conceptions of democracy and how it influences them and the parties’ organisational 
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development. We will look at how the movements and movement parties make use of prefigurative 
politics and participatory democracy as means to underline their claims and whether they are 
inspired of each other.  
 
6.2.1 Repertoires used by Movements  
Contention has been a common denominator for the social movements analysed in this project. It 
has formed the actions performed during the different phases. As stated in the theoretical 
framework, contention creates an environment where various actors can raise claims and by doing 
so, different repertoires are in play (Chapter 3.1). Moreover, repertoires are subject to time and 
place, but in this current wave of contention, the two movements in Spain and Greece have 
primarily had an interest in democracy. There has been a wish to improve democracy and to involve 
citizens more. As seen in the above analysis, the movements also inspired others and had a 
transnational aspect, which della Porta (2015) finds relevant when it comes to social media. The 
anti-austerity movements in southern Europe have all made use of petition signing, demonstrations, 
public meetings, press releases etc.  
 
As seen in the timeline the two anti-austerity movements have turned to each other, either for 
inspiration or to demand action. For example, as the timeline illustrates, in May 2011, The Los 
Indignados of Madrid, asked the Greeks on Facebook if they had fallen asleep (Timeline: posts 35, 
40). They encouraged the people in Athens to continue the joint fight against austerity policies. To 
this encouragement from the Los Indignados, the Greek Indignados, Aganaktismeni, responded also 
on Facebook. They wrote “We are awake/ Nstamos Despiertos” (Timeline: posts 35, 40). Whilst 
posting this on Facebook the group invited everybody to a rally on the 25th of May 2011 in 
Syntagma Square (Timeline: post 34). At the same day, there was a protest in Madrid and there was 
a live Skype connection between Athens and Madrid. Using social media as a protest repertoire in 
this way is an example of the possibilities accompanying the fast-paced, interconnected world 
described with reference to Eriksen and della Porta in the theoretical chapter. It is further an 
example of how social media can enhance protests, as della Porta argues (della Porta 2015a: 277). 
As stated in the timeline, this activity strengthens the sense of mutuality between the movements in 
the two countries. The protests in the two cities reflect a use of a more traditional repertoire, 
however technology has added to the use of this repertoire. By using the online activist network 
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openDemocracy.net the social movements, in both countries, have been able to track each other's 
activities, encourage each other and learn from each other's strategies and mistakes. 
Facebook posts are used to enhance the event further and ensure that it reaches many people and 
potential followers. Moreover, the Skype connection ties the two cities together and it ties the two 
groups of protests even though they are in two different cities and in two different countries 
(Timeline: post 34). Thus, the traditional repertoire of protesting in the streets is enforced by 
technology and its’ spatial and transnational advantages.  
 
The technological aspect in the repertoires can also be seen in the claims that the movements have 
used. A Greek critique, for example, said: “Error 404-Democracy not found” (Castells et al. 2012: 
156). A 404 error occurs online if a web-page does not exist anymore and has been removed 
deliberately. In this case, democracy in Greece does not exist anymore, according to the protesters, 
or at least they do not feel represented by it.  The use of hashtags has also been an important 
repertoire, and part of new social media techniques, as described with reference to della Porta 
(2015a). During protests and demonstrations in Spain the hashtag #AbreTuWIFI, (#OpenYourWifi) 
became an important tool. This hashtag encouraged people to open their WI-FI in their private 
homes and ensure that strangers could use the WI-FI for free. This would allow for easy 
communication and easy recruiting of citizens who wished to participate and share videos etc. from 
the event (Timeline: post 34). 
 
Tarrow and Tilly’s (2015) emphasise that collective claims can be innovated within the already 
established limits for repertoires (Chapter 3.1). This can be seen in the beginning of Podemos’ 
political journey. When they had to receive signatures in order to form the party, they used online 
marketing. People could simply give their signature online whilst reading the political manifesto 
(Timeline: post 68c). Podemos did not have to ring doorbells in order to get the needed signatures. 
The new party had to stand out from the crowd and be innovative. If the movement party can 
illustrate how innovative they can be in this regard, the Spanish citizens might view them as 
innovative in other aspects as well. Innovation of repertoires was also seen in the Greek 
movements. At the beginning of the anti-austerity movement the actions were more traditional 
oriented with strikes and demonstrations, and as mentioned, Greece saw no less than 27 general 
strikes in the years between 2010 and 2012. However, as seen in the first part of the analysis, the 
actions changed character and became more violent, but also more creative, for example including 
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the experiment of blocking the parliament for the politicians hindering them from passing another 
bailout package (Timeline: post 42).  
 
The use of social media have contributed to facilitate the protests in terms of organisation and 
practicalities from making banners to raising awareness and urging people to show up. It has even 
been claimed that “The movement’s mobilization took place entirely via social networking sites and 
microblogs” (Ekathimerini 2012). The impact of social media on civil society, and the potential for 
mobilising within social movements remain a debated topic from a range of scholars in this field 
(Castells et al. 2012; Theocharis et al. 2015; Rüdig and Karyotis 2013). While being contested for 
its democratic potential (ability to facilitate), social media, for the scholars above, remain a new tool 
for mobilisation. This is imperative for our two cases as they demonstrate that the utilisation of 
notably Facebook and Twitter, by both Aganaktismenoi and 15M, were crucial for their repertoire, 
and decisive for their ability to organise (Kousis 2014: 143). Similarly, sharing pictures and videos 
from the occupations and demonstrations have been used to create a sense of shared purpose and 
shared feeling. That is a case, where Polletta’s argument about the importance of individuals’ sense 
of shareholding, and involvement and influence on cause of actions can be stimulated by the 
interconnectedness that social media rest upon (Polletta 2004: 2). This highlights the Indignados, 
and Greek equivalent Aganaktismenoi, have been as Tarrow emphasise, both national and 
transnational. 
 
6.2.2 Conceptions of Democracy: Aganaktismenoi and SYRIZA 
As the Greek protests, and the Aganaktismenoi movement, are to be unfolded, we wish to 
commence by highlighting one characteristic that is paramount for their organisation. When 
studying protest in Greece in modern history (1980-) it becomes clear that most protests up until the 
anti-austerity protests, had been significantly funded and organised by either trade unions or 
specific political parties, most notably PASOK (Castells et al. 2012; Theocharis et al. 2015: 202). 
We acknowledge that the characteristics of protests are contingent with a specific socio-political 
and historical context in Greece. Studying this, it becomes clear that the mobilisation phase of the 
Greek protest was on the contrary largely represented by an apolitical and non-affiliated mass of 
people, who took their frustration and arguments to the streets without what have notoriously been 
the facilitators of large protest events: 
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“most importantly, this mobilization is in striking contrast to the organization-based protests 
that have taken place in the country for many decades, which were mainly organized by – 
and brought to the streets – the “usual suspects,” such as labor union and political party 
activists” (Rüdig and Karyotis 2013). 
Instead, a range of organisations, from smaller protest groups to larger and more defined 
organisations as Aganaktismenoi stemmed together in their contention, as seen in the mobilisation 
and during peak described in the first part of the analysis. To understand the activists’ motivation 
and mobilisation it becomes relevant to study who actually participated in protest happenings. In a 
comprehensive statistical study, using logistic regression analysis, Rüdig and Karyotis (2013) have 
studied participants that took their dissatisfaction to the streets: “[…] Socialization into taking 
particular forms of political action through prior protest involvement is an essential component of 
explaining who actually protests” (Rüdig & Karyotis 2013: 489).  
Rüdig and Karyotis (2013) emphasise that one fifth of all participants have all previously been 
involved in strike actions. However, this is not the sole explanation, as economic deprivation also 
has been found to be a decisive variable. Economic deprivation is the deficit of economic means to 
uphold a lifestyle and ordinary life that an individual are accustomed to, which is recognised by 
society as being a sufficient way of life (Rüdig & Karyotis 2013). Their key finding is that 
economic deprivation, such as poverty and unemployment, as well as feeling affected by austerity 
policies, have been a great motivator and predictor of the likelihood of protest participation (Rüdig 
& Karyotis 2013: 492). In line with this argument, della Porta argued that a group of “affected 
people” were the cornerstone that made protest a preferable action (informal conversation with 
della Porta during guest lecture, November 5th 2015).We also saw in the first part of the analysis 
how a smaller, affected, and frustrated part of the population could trigger a larger mobilisation by 
starting to express their frustration openly. Returning to the individuals that participated in protests 
and occupations in Greece, SYRIZA as a party coalition, actively sought to encourage “collective 
action but were unable to capitalize (in electoral terms) on the left-wing orientation of protests 
prior to the May/June elections of 2012” (Rüdig & Karyotis 2013: 490). It was also seen in the first 
part of the analysis, as well as supported by scholars. Moreover, it is important to note that anti-
austerity contention in Greece is not solely a matter for individuals that define themselves as 
belonging to a particular political party or ideology 
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“[…] the socio-political context illustrates the presence of a left-leaning protest culture in 
Greece, not all of the major past protest events are linked to radical left- wing politics; the 
number of people mobilized greatly exceeds the electoral support that radical left parties 
received (before 2012)” (Rüdig & Karyotis 2013: 492). 
This is relevant as it illustrates that the social movements, and the events associated with them, were 
not all directly linked to SYRIZA’s political acts, formation, and organisation. However, what is 
striking is the way that namely Aganaktismenoi distanced itself from what can normally be 
conceptualised as party politics, where debates and decision making is more centralised (Kousis 
2014). Della Porta argues that not being associated with any particular side within politics can 
further improve the possibilities for broad support from within the party political system (della 
Porta 2015b: 2). The fact that SYRIZA and Podemos do not articulate themselves according to 
either left or right wing dogmas, and instead address the issue of economic deprivation, can thus be 
another influential factor for their mobilisation.   
Aganaktismenoi, and many of the large protest events and occupations, instead applied a more 
prefigurative approach to politics. Some would say more ad hoc, as debates and discussions 
happened and played out after people met on the streets with the common purpose of signalling 
dissatisfaction (Kousis 2014). To what extent these events lived up to strict criteria of direct 
democracy or participatory democracy is somewhat hard to determine. However, it clearly 
challenges the boundaries created by representative democracy where politicians - with the mandate 
of the population - act out politics. At the occupation of the squares this link was entirely erased, as 
the protest was a manifestation of the public’s concern and advises to how the problems should be 
faced. Therefore, it is central if or how the events and the occupations can be seen as representing a 
particular organisation. What happened at the squares was grounded in people’s mobilisation 
representing clear organisation strategies. The “piazza” occupations, large gatherings at central 
squares in front of governmental buildings, throughout Greece’s largest cities enabled a culture of 
debating and negotiation (Kousis 2014; Castells et al. 2012). Namely, the two months long 
occupation at Syntagma Square in front of the parliament in Athens brought about a potential for 
engagement and participation in political debates (Kousis 2014: 155-157). The strong representation 
of people opposing austerity policy and the level of representation in democratic decisions led 
people to pose an alternative for political planning. At the occupations, meetings were organised on 
a weekly and even daily basis, while musical and cultural events also took place (Kousis 2014: 155-
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157). National, international, and specific local issues were then discussed, and the political issues 
varied a great deal, but were taken up because people had the ability to bring up issues of 
pronounced importance to them 
“In most of these occupations, co-ordinating groups were formed, meetings were organised 
on a daily or weekly basis and minutes of meetings were taken […] local issues of grave 
concern were discussed, such as the selling of ports or gold mines, or the degradation of 
health services” (Kousis 2014: 155). 
SYRIZA played a complex role during the large protests. The party’s activists were present, and 
sometimes protagonists (Spourdalakis 2014: 356; Kousis 2014). However, as a strategy the party 
refrained from direct attempts to capitalize politically: “SYRIZA’s activists have been present and at 
times even became protagonists in every movement of resistance […] but never under the party’s 
banner” (Spourdalakis 2014: 359). Reportedly, SYRIZA’s own activist did not feel the need to 
actively represent, and become synonymous with SYRIZA. Instead, it was important to play a 
facilitating role, and a role of support. “Their presence has been visible and they have often used 
their status to protect activists from police harassment as well as to legitimate the movements’ 
initiatives” (Spourdalakis 2014: 358). 
SYRIZA’s organisational structure is further relevant to analyse in order to gain a detailed picture 
of the coalition and party’s development. The internal structure has been described as diverse and 
rather loose. This should be seen as an effect of the pluralist foundation that SYRIZA was 
established upon (Theocharis 2014). The relatively high number of far-left parties, union groups, 
and think tanks made it necessary for SYRIZA to compose a chain of command that was able to 
cope with the diversity of interest. In effect, the parties manifest has changed over time, and more 
importantly, the manifest is seen as a constantly changing model for the progress and future of the 
party (Spourdalakis 2014: 359-360). As such, the party explicitly has welcomed new ideas and new 
political visions for the manifest alteration. 
 
6.2.3 Conceptions of Democracy: 15M and Podemos 
To understand the organisation of both 15M and Podemos, and the coherence between the two, it is 
important to understand how they organise themselves. As seen in the first part of the analysis, 15M 
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arose in Spain as a reaction to the austerity policies that were imposed in the country and as result 
of the dissatisfaction with the current political system and dropping trust in the national 
government. As also seen, 15M was established just before the first peak in the protests in Spain, 
because the digital platform Real Democracy Now (DRY, Democracia Real Ya) called for a mass-
demonstration (Timeline: post 38). 
 
When looking at the participants in the protest events, it is clear that many different people in 
society have participated. As seen in the first part of the analysis, very high participation rates were 
seen in both countries, while the mobilisation was lower in Spain than in Greece. Perugorría et al. 
also investigates these statistics. They referred to statistics showing that “in early June a majority 
(54%) of the adult population supported the protests, and in a later poll following the November 
elections, one in ten reported they had actively participated in 15M protest activities” (Perugorría 
et al. 1). When examining the Indignados it is stated that they, compared to other protest 
movements, were “younger, less male-dominated, more highly educated and less organized” 
(Kriesi 2015: 22).   
 
From the end of 2012  and all through 2013, 15M altered their organisational structures (Timeline). 
As seen in the first part of the analysis, they demobilised the movement and began mobilising in the 
smaller Spanish communities. This meant that 15M took participatory democracy out of the squares 
in the big cities and into the local communities throughout Spain (Gutíerrez 2013). Della Porta 
argues that social movements use participatory democracy as a counter reaction to the current 
democratic system in a country, and as a reaction to the low level of trust among the citizens to their 
politicians and their ability to react to new political claims (della Porta 2015a). The altered 
organisational structures of 15M underline the necessity to take the people’s claims seriously in the 
political parties. A distinct coherence between the lack of trust in the political system and people 
protesting on the streets can be detected, which was also emphasised in the first part of the analysis 
arguing that the mobilisation of the protests grew corresponding to how the trust in the national 
government declined.  
 
As also seen in the timeline, Madrid’s Puerta del Sol square was peacefully reclaimed and occupied 
by protesters (Gerbaudo 2012: 11), and various prototypes were presented, e.g. day-care centers, 
open libraries, and food gardens (Timeline: post 68b). These prototypes illustrated an alternative 
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prefigurative way of thinking. The prototypes have been built, according to 15M, collectively and 
portray a network where openness is vital. Their contribution to prefigurative politics and 
alternative ideas can be seen with their “creative, innovative, proposal-oriented nature”. Moreover, 
they held open assemblies that have an non-hierarchical structure, where everyone could participate 
(Gutiérrez 2013). As outlined in the theoretical chapter, Polletta sees such forms of prefigurative 
politics as a strategic act in the search for a new type of democracy (Chapter 3.3.1), 15M’s 
prototypes and assemblies can thus be seen as an attempt to illustrate to the broader public that it is 
in fact possible to live and to conduct politics in another way and that there is a political purpose of 
their organisation.   
The prototypes have an element of substitute thinking where practical projects could be outlived 
and show elements of the alternative life. However, will these ideas and prototypes of life be altered 
when movements become parties? Polletta argues that when political parties enter into the 
traditional political system, it becomes increasingly difficult to implement the prefigurative politics 
which they, as a social movement, claimed was necessary for society. In the case of Spain, 15M’s 
prototypes would be difficult to implement for Podemos, as it requires a majority in parliament. 
This again, makes it increasingly interesting that Podemos changed their political trajectory in May 
2015, and moved away from their radical starting point (Timeline: post 83). However, after that 
alteration Podemos still claimed that they wanted a change in the societal structures in Spain 
(Hedgecoe 2015). For example, Podemos gained the required signatures by claiming that there was 
an alternative to the political parties within the traditional political system. As Iglesias proclaimed 
when Podemos launched their new manifesto in 2015, “In these elections there aren’t many 
options, there are basically two: to leave things as they are or to change, [...] we believe things can 
change” (Hedgecoe 2015). 
 
To understand the rise of social movements and the need and want for representation of certain 
political claims, one has to look at people’s trust in the political system and the desire for new 
actors therein. When trust in the political parties is low, and certain groups of citizens have claims 
that are neglected, the support for a new political party that grows out of this contention is much 
bigger than if all citizens’ claims are represented, as also concluded in the first part of the analysis. 
 
Podemos was officially born on the 14th of January, and from that moment on the party took a 
rocketing development (Timeline). By the end of April the party had collected the required 15,000 
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signatures and by May 25th they had won 8% of the votes for the European Parliament election 
(Timeline: post 70, 72). The European election marked their entrance into institutionalised politics. 
Podemos then started to organise as a political party by electing representatives from the regional 
and local communities that were part of its organisational structures. This institutionalisation both 
shows that Podemos has taken the strategy of social movements with it, and learned from it, and at 
the same time it shows that participatory democracy in the party can give broad supportive action, 
as it builds upon the organisational structures in the local communities. This underlines della 
Porta’s argument that political parties can learn from the organisational structures of social 
movements (della Porta 2015b). The different organisational structures of Podemos, compared to 
the traditional political parties, are further seen in their first People’s Assembly that were held in 
October 2013 (before the party officially existed). It was intended to display the party’s 
organisational abilities and underline the participatory democratic strategies that the party claimed 
(Pope 2014). Furthermore, the assembly was intended to indicate the public support to the party 
(Pope 2014). The assembly was a demonstration of the intentions of Podemos and an emphasis of 
Podemos wanting to break with the current political structures. This is further elaborated by the fact 
that a political party had never asked its’ members to decide its political trajectory before, in 
Spanish history (Pope 2014). The organisational structures in Podemos were rooted in asking the 
people what they wanted and then reacting to it. This assimilates the basis of how some social 
movements operate and to a certain extent how Los Indignados, described above, organised 
themselves in the squares. As Pope argues, the only way Podemos could hope to topple the political 
system in Spain was through the people’s involvement in the party’s political claims, since the hope 
for Podemos was that a great number of supporters would legitimise the party’s political claims 
(Pope 2014). This cause of action lines up well with della Porta’s notion of the organisational 
structures of a party often being connected to the changes the party wants to make in the alternate 
political system i.e prefigurative politics, in this case the influence of the people in the party’s 
political trajectory (Chapter 3.3.1). As Podemos grew in support, the party distanced itself more 
from the original structure; for once the leadership of the party was put on one person, Pablo 
Iglesias, instead of the rotating three-way leadership (Pope 2014). Moreover, Podemos published a 
new policy manifest in May 2015, where the party took a noticeable change and moved towards the 
centre of the political spectrum and away from its original radical roots (Timeline: 83; Hedgecoe 
2015). This shift in politics had a number of negative effects for the party. First, the party took a dip 
in the national polls (Hedgecoe 2015). Second, Juan Carlos Monedero, one of the founders of 
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Podemos, resigned from the party with the argument of no longer being able to follow the political 
trajectory of the party (Timeline: post 84; Hedgecoe 2015). As Polletta argues, and as seen clearly 
in the case of Podemos, the organisational structures of a party movement can alter the movement’s 
pursuits and affect the support for the party (Chapter 3.3.1). The original pursuits of Podemos to 
change the alternate political system, seems to have become a secondary priority for the party. By 
taking a step towards centre politics, one can argue that Podemos has melted into the political 
system they were born to change, and, as mentioned in the first analysis, develops towards a regular 
political party instead of a movement party. As Polletta also emphasises, when becoming a political 
party within the traditional political system, one has to negotiate, and to be able to change the 
traditional political system, one first have to be a part of it (Chapter 3.3.1). 
 
Podemos’ modifying their structure, and their original political goals, resulted in 15M distancing 
themselves from Podemos as the party turned less radical, as also seen the first part of the analysis. 
For example, Simona Levi, a theatre director and long-time activist in 15M, argues that Podemos 
has taken much more credit than they deserve compared to the civil society movements who are 
fighting anti-austerity. As Levi points out, Podemos, with Pablo Iglesias as the frontrunner, has 
more than once taken credit for societal changes as collective victories. Persons, who are not 
involved in Podemos, creates changes that Iglesias takes credit for on behalf of Podemos, and 
instead of crediting the entire civil society, Podemos is recognised as the sole victorious part (Levi 
2015). Levi argues that the leadership of Podemos constantly turns to a tactic of reinterpretation and 
claiming authorship of collective struggles, both currently and in the past, to promote Podemos as a 
civil society party (Levi 2015). This tactic has been enforced after Podemos turned its back on the 
rotating three-way leadership, and instead put Iglesias in front as sole leader of the party. Both 
Harrebye (2012) and della Porta (2015b) emphasise how movements’ and activists’ awareness of 
their surroundings is an important strategic element. Being aware that 15M and other movements 
have already build up a momentum prior to the creation of Podemos, and that Podemos uses this 
momentum and takes credit for it, indicates that Iglesias has a very good understanding of his 
surroundings and that he can use this understanding strategically.  Levi moreover states that “we 
need Podemos. It is another comrade in our struggle” but also stresses that “Podemos alone cannot 
and should not represent Everything” (Levi 2015).  
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Levi no longer sees Podemos as a part of civil society. Podemos’ turn into the political system they 
originally opposed underlines Polletta’s argument that participatory democracy never seems to be a 
lasting characteristic for social movement taking a political trajectory (Chapter 3.3). 
 
6.2.4 Preliminary Conclusion 
Our analysis of Aganaktismenoi and the Spanish Indignados demonstrates that between the two, 
great similarities exist. In terms of contention, they both oppose the same economic measures. They 
act on a public distrust to the political system, and invite and facilitate an alternative to 
representative democracy. Starting with the repertoires, and modes of mobilisation, it is evident that 
best practices have been shared among the activists, and online interconnectedness has been pivotal 
(Castells et al. 2012; Kousis 2014; Theocharis 2014). Social media was used throughout the phases 
of both social movements’ development, and using this repertoire, the transnational aspect that 
Tarrow and Tilly (2015) emphasise is at the forefront. By keeping each other in check, motivating 
action, and constantly showing support and articulating common purposes have comparatively led 
us to conclude that in terms of repertoire - the social movements in Spain and Greece hold 
pronounced resemblances. 
 
Continuing with the social movements’ organisation, we have found a difference in what role 
traditional repertoires for mobilising and facilitating protests and contention have played. In Spain, 
labour unions played a much stronger and present role than it was the case in Greece. In Greece, the 
absence of the trade unions is what scholars list as a crucial break with the country’s history of 
protest, where political parties (namely PASOK) and trade unions, conventionally have been the 
key facilitators. Our study of organisational changes highlights that there have been a link between 
the parties and the social movements. While the establishment of Podemos more directly grew out 
of the protest, and the part of the protest who needed a voice in formal politics and the institutions 
of political decisions. In Greece, we also saw how members of SYRIZA, actively sought to 
participate in demonstrations but strategically chose to avoid showing their support of SYRIZA.  
 
The organisation of SYRIZA and Podemos have shown similarities but also elements that remains 
distinctive for them. The greatest similarity is how manifests have played a crucial uniting role 
between the parties and the social movements. As part of an adaptation of people’s interests both 
61 
 
SYRIZA and Podemos have altered their formation of manifest to be much more inclusive, than 
traditional political parties form their manifests. As analysed, in Spain, The People’s Assembly was 
meant as a demonstration of Podemos’ democratic credentials. Podemos, with Iglesias in front, 
asked all Spaniards to help decide the party’s political claims. This was the first time in Spanish 
history that a political party asked its voters to decide the party’s policies and the trajectory of their 
visions. Thousands of people participated in the assembly. The founders of Podemos said from the 
beginning, that they wanted to win an outright majority, and for that to happen, civil society had to 
be involved (Pope 2014). In Greece, SYRIZA have also applied an approach towards their 
manifests that put emphasis on the necessity of citizens’ continued scrutiny (Spourdalakis 2014). As 
such, SYRIZA have stated that they invite people to form, contest, and debate their manifest and its 
future alteration (Kousis 2014; Spourdalakis 2014).  
 
A second similarity is the two movements’ facilitation and representation of prefigurative politics. 
The events arranged by social movements, in Spain and Greece, were manifestations of distrust and 
dissatisfaction. Simultaneously the gatherings and occupations of key squares represented 
alternatives to political debating and consensus making. Here, political discussion was set up, while 
participation was invited and discussions were encouraged (Kousis 2014; Gutiérrez 2013; Castells 
et al. 2012). This, together with comprehensive and creative attempts to pose an alternative system 
with creation of day-care centers, open libraries, and food gardens indicate that a prefigurative 
stance towards politics have been mobilised in both cases. This, interestingly, lives up to the criteria 
of prefigurative politics formulated by Polletta, where politics is not only what you aim to acquire 
and change, but actively changing the behaviour of a likeminded group of people and proving it 
possible. 
It has been difficult to strictly judge whether the happenings at the occupations and demonstrations, 
lived up to formal criteria for direct, or participatory, democracy. Instead, we are led to conclude 
that the data we have analysed clearly demonstrates that the events were filled with ad hoc 
organised debates and discussion. This is why it is evaluated as a sign of prefigurative politics, as 
they believe in the representative democracy’s functionality has been not only contested but also 
substituted with political debates within an alternative framework at the occupations. One could 
moreover argue that the mere fact that a significant part of the population, in both Greece and 
Spain, stemmed together and discussed political content in itself holds a democratic value. This 
value is defined by its’ potential and ability to engage civil society with politics. From our 
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comparative position, it is striking that the attempts and claims to prefigurative politics, as a 
reaction to anti-austerity, have been particularly strong in both countries. This value of the 
experimentations with participatory democracy in the social movements will be discussed further in 
the next chapter in a broader context of the declining trust in contemporary politics.  
In terms of the political environment, differences exist between Greece and Spain. Podemos’ 
establishment and internal organisation hold a much stronger association directly to the Indignados 
movement. SYRIZA was already a known political actor (a coalition of parties) before anti-
austerity protests broke out (Timeline). This is imperative, and perhaps the clearest difference, 
where the histories of the parties have had diverse developments. We have to state that this 
difference might be an important part of the explanation for how SYRIZA and Podemos have acted, 
so far, politically. One thing is to investigate their relationship with the social movements; here they 
have both, more or less obviously, supported and encouraged the protests in the streets. Another 
thing is the pragmatic and parliamentary premises that exist in the realm of politics. One could 
argue that national politics and EU politics play out with relative autonomy and that it is represented 
by its own rules and institutionalised processes, in each of the two countries. This is where we find 
a delimitation of our project, but also where we might find a clear difference between SYRIZA and 
Podemos, as SYRIZA have been in governmental charge while Podemos still functions as an 
opposing party. The recent development of Podemos analysed above, where it has been argued that 
they now actively are seeking a more middle-oriented position in the left-right political spectrum 
(Hedgecoe 2015). This suggests that Podemos still seeks influence, while SYRIZA has it and it only 
seems to have strengthened the support for the party to lead the government. This is a clear 
difference, and SYRIZA compared to Podemos actions therefore should consider how formal and 
institutionalised politics plays out as trade-offs, negotiation, and pragmatic solutions. However, 
similar is that the social movements in both Spain and Greece want to break with these rules of the 
game, but so far it seems that neither SYRIZA nor Podemos have succeeded in changing their 
organisation to match the organisations of their supporting social movement. They have rather 
ended up accepted many of the rules of the game in institutionalised politics that the anti-austerity 
movements in both countries opposed, in order for them to gain influence. SYRIZA and Podemos, 
although differently and at different points in their lifespan, picked up on people’s dissatisfaction, 
offering the articulation of their claims and an alternative to the existing system and political 
spectrum. 
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7.0 Discussion; Moving Forward  
We wish to present and discuss our research reflections in relation to two issues. First, we will be 
discussing the notion of success and whether social movements can enhance political 
communication and strategy or not. In this discussion, we include the question of how our research, 
and the research field, can progress to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the 
liminality of social movements and political parties. Secondly, we wish to discuss how our findings 
can be understood as suggestions to how political parties can rethink their organisation and ways of 
engaging with public demands and political expressions coming from civil society.  
 
7.1 The Notion of Success 
What success is and how to define it, is a recurrent debate within social movement studies 
(Chenoweth & Stephan 2011; Harrebye 2012; Polletta 2004). This is a discussion in which we want 
to participate, bearing our findings in mind. Our argument is that the study of social movements 
cannot solely be based on strict categories of, and fixed criteria for, success. As outlined in the 
theoretical chapter (Chapter 3.0), both della Porta, Polletta, and Tarrow underlines the difficulties in 
assessing a social movement’s success. However, a few other scholars have elaborated on how 
success can be understood in the context of social movements.  
With an extensive and impressive empirical data material, it has been found that non-violent 
protests by far have been more successful than violent tactics (Chenoweth & Stephan 2011). 
Another perspective, or suggestion, is that success should be judged on what social movements 
themselves initially defined as their ultimate end goal(s) (Harrebye 2012). While the study of non-
violent contra violent methods holds some valuable suggestions both on an academic and a practical 
level, we are more sceptical of notions of success based on the premise that it is easily observable 
and distinguishable. This relates itself to a broader discussion of how causality can be understood. 
Our scepticism is grounded in our own findings. Our study of contention in Spain and Greece, and 
its political influence through Podemos and SYRIZA, indicates that while anti-austerity is the 
overarching goal, resisting austerity policy is a long process and happens through different 
channels. It would therefore not be meaningful to make an assessment of the level of success of 
social movements in Spain and Greece without clearly weighing up which processes they have 
initiated and how they facilitate austerity policy scepticism through political parties. However, the 
64 
 
goal of changing politics profoundly to being more inclusive of the citizens, which was also a goal 
as seen in the analyses, especially for the Indignados in Spain and Greece (Chapter 6.2), must be 
seen as unsuccessful. The reason for this is that some of the movements’ claims diffused into the 
established political system and the greater part of the remaining social movements demobilised - 
and thus largely accepted the existing political system. Polletta also touches upon the notion of 
success and seems to be in line with Golan. She argues that social movements can only, in a strict 
social movement theoretical sense, be said to succeed if they realise their politically reformative 
aims (Chapter 3.3, 3.4) As seen, the movements in Spain and Greece have not yet succeeded in 
changing the political system profoundly, and that makes us emphasise Harrebye’s (2012) point on 
the success of social movements. He argues that a social movement’s success criteria depend on 
where it positions itself between revolutionist and reformist (Harrebye 2012: 55). Changing the 
austerity policies must be seen as a rather reformative goal and is thus easier to succeed with, while 
changing the entire democratic system is a more revolutionary goal and thus not possible to succeed 
with while accepting the premises of the existing political system.  
 
There is also a tendency to separate social movements and party politics in terms of what is defined 
as success. As della Porta describes, party politics is usually judged and assessed on votes and 
political reform while social movements are assessed on a more differentiated level of changing 
people’s aspirations and perceptions of what needs to be handled or changed politically (della Porta 
2015b). This is very natural as social movements’ affect people in multiple ways that are harder to 
read compared to what we normally conceptualise as success for political parties (informal 
conversation with Duncombe during guest lecture, November 5th 2015). The connection between 
the two considerably different notions of success can also be studied through the scope of our 
findings. The two parties, SYRIZA and Podemos, can be seen as quite successful in a party political 
related understanding of success, gaining support in the opinion polls and elections. However, as 
seen in the analyses, criticism of the parties’ actions has been rising the past year, especially in 
Greece, with demonstrations targeting SYRIZA’s contemporary actions specifically. This suggests 
that, from the perspective of the social movements, SYRIZA and Podemos might not be regarded as 
successful before stronger measures against austerity policy have been introduced. It therefore 
highlights that adopting the concept of movement parties is important because it accepts that 
constant evaluation of success - and its’ implicit criteria - are a defining characteristic of the 
interplay between movements and parties.  
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Another case that illustrates this is “The Occupy Movement”. It has often been discussed whether or 
not the movement has been successful. Often it has been criticised for its lack of ability to pose 
alternatives to what it fights against (Way 2011). One could, however, argue that in terms of 
bringing the notions of the 1% and 99% into common consciousness and political rhetoric is a 
successful element of their campaign of contention. Sub-initiated resistance movements such as the 
“Bank Transfer Day” are equally a manifestation of how the Occupy Movement inspired and led to 
certain impact (Berman 2011; White 2011). The project was highly transnational, and inspired 
movements, and pushes were introduced in a number of European countries, including Denmark. In 
America alone 600.000 people chose to change from Bank of America, because of the introduced 
fees for debit/credit card usage (Berman 2011).   
Returning to our findings, the same can be said to have happened in Spain and Greece, where 
notions of austerity and its’ effects have been enhanced by social movements effort to drive a 
criticism to the forefront of political discussions. It has also convinced people that Podemos and 
SYRIZA were the best representatives and managers of this resistance towards austerity policies. In 
this project we have been clear on the fact that what we are investigating is not a completed process, 
thus we surely acknowledge that the success of the parties is an ongoing process. However, it is 
clear that the two parties, Podemos and SYRIZA, have managed to mobilise huge support in the 
public by formulating a critique of  the current political system, but the parties have also changed 
course in regards to their claims. Results from the national elections in Spain, December 2015, will 
illustrate more clearly whether Podemos’ change of course according to movement claims, will be 
met with distancing and hostility by the movement. 
 
Alternatively, success could be understood simply as a positive expression of an increasingly 
politically engaged civil society in Spain and Greece. Della Porta suggests, in her analyses of the 
anti-austerity movements in southern Europe, that participation in the movements have contributed 
to a more active perception of politics between the participants (della Porta 2015a: 274). Surveys 
suggest that it leads to increasing engagement in what della Porta calls expressive forms of political 
participation, such as boycotting or buying certain products, and to increasing membership of civil 
society organisations or other activities. As our findings from the second part of the analysis also 
suggest, engagement in the form of changing the way of living towards illustrating the change one 
want to see, what Polletta calls prefigurative politics, can also be part of the impact of a social 
movement. Such contributions to change at the individual level could also be seen as a part of the 
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success of the social movements in southern Europe. Della Porta’s analysis further shows that 
raising awareness has been the most dominant motivation for the participants in the social 
movements in southern Europe (della Porta 2015a: 276). Focusing on an increased engagement in 
non-established politics, creating change at an individual level and on increasing awareness of a 
certain issue as a success criteria for social movements might contribute to creating a more broad 
and manageable notion of success. By seeing success in this way, it would moreover be able to both 
study how the social movement itself, and possible party political developments on the background 
of the social movements, contribute to raising awareness of the issues or inspire to increased civil 
society political engagement of various forms.  
 
Our findings suggest that political engagement and contention happens through multiple channels. 
The study of such thus needs to encompass an understanding of the public and civil society’s 
engagement with the politics from an outset that combines social science and political science. As 
such, the study of people’s motivation, their choice of repertoire, and activist activities become 
equally important as studies of how parties organise and implement policies, as seen in the section 
above. This point will be further developed in the chapter on future research (Chapter 9.0). 
 
7.2 (Dis)enchantment: What Can Political Parties Learn from 
this Study? 
Della Porta, whose work also constitutes a part of the theoretical framework for the project, visited 
Roskilde University (RUC) as a guest lecturer in November 2015. Here, della Porta detected the 
overarching problem of politics in the EU, and especially southern Europe: “The main challenge is 
the crisis of the political system […] and the crisis of the party system” (informal conversation with 
della Porta during guest lecture, November 5th 2015). 
 
Della Porta saw this in a broader frame of the insufficiency of neoliberal economic policies that 
have led to a crisis of legitimacy, and distrust in national and supra-national (EU) politics. As we 
have studied the social movements’ events and contention, in Spain and Greece, it has also become 
evident that a growing scepticism is broadly found. As seen in our findings we have tracked a clear 
negative development in the population’s trust in both the national governments and in the EU in 
Greece and Spain. The most significant example is the trust in the national government in Spain 
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declining from 68% in 2008 to only 18% in 2013. Similarly, as aforementioned, recent 
demonstrations in Greece have been mobilised against SYRIZA’s current political actions, as voters 
feel betrayed by recent economic policies. One could argue that this might be a case of a larger 
systemic problem when political aspirations are institutionalised. The critique is then that when 
politics become a matter of negotiations or gaining votes, the political aspirations and visions suffer. 
The question then remains, and the paradox still prevail, whether or not anti-austerity can be refused 
and challenged through institutional politics – a system that these movements initially were a 
critique of. This is then a question of isomorphism. Della Porta describes this as a central dilemma 
for movement parties with participatory democracy as a strategy: they want to affect the current 
political scene without reproducing the current political structures (Tarrow & della Porta 2004: 6). 
Isomorphism, in sociology, is the notion of a process or a structure of a given organisation 
compared to other organisations, and it refers to imitation and adaptability towards the system that 
the organisation enters, or already is a part of (DiMaggio & Powell 1983). In the case of Spain and 
Greece, the social movements reached a point, where problems of how to avoid being part of the 
system that they challenged, but also actively used to gain certain political outcomes, became 
pivotal and paramount. In our conversation with della Porta, when she visited RUC, it was in this 
we found a common interest: “I think it is very interesting this paradox. The fact that social 
movements in the beginning are very anti institutionalised politics, but then took the chance and 
entered party politics “ (informal conversation with della Porta during guest lecture, November 5th 
2015).  
 
Della Porta then presented some interesting points on the developments of SYRIZA and Podemos 
that are relevant to this discussion. Della Porta argued that because of people being affected by 
austerity policies combined with what she described as a political vacuum, or an unoccupied 
political space, social movements inspired and drove Podemos and SYRIZA forward through 
intense mobilisation of discontent. One element that we have found compelling throughout our 
study, is how political parties seem to be able to learn from social movements. Especially since our 
findings suggest that there in the case of Podemos and SYRIZA have been, and still are to a certain 
extent, a growing interaction and overlap with the movements they arose from. Keeping the lack of 
trust in politicians, and declining levels of party memberships in mind, we see this tendency as a 
call for alternative thinking in terms of party structures, political debating culture, and organisation. 
Chantal Mouffe (2007) has been studying social movements and activists roles in opposing 
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neoliberal agendas with some interesting results and suggestions. Mouffe views “the political as 
antagonism” and argues that, if capitalism is to be challenged, it has to happen on multiple levels 
and fronts. Mouffe coins anti-austerity against austerity as a “war of position” and argues 
eloquently that 
 
“in order to be successful, linkage with traditional forms of political intervention like parties 
and trade-unions cannot be avoided. It would be a serious mistake to believe that artistic 
activism could, on its own, bring about the end of neo-liberal hegemony” (Mouffe 2007). 
 
Mouffe presents an interesting point here that centres on the question of how contention can play 
out, both within and outside of the political system. Contention can be enhanced if the frustrations 
at the streets are accompanied with formal political pushes towards certain policies. Mouffe 
highlights that contention must happen through multiple channels. Our argument is, that it is not 
meaningful to study social movements of anti-austerity without also studying their influence 
through institutionalised political lines and that elements from social movements can improve, or 
even enchant, traditional political parties. It can occur if political parties succeed in adopting the 
desires and aims of the social movements, while not compromising their parliamentary position. 
Our cases demonstrate that SYRIZA and Podemos, to some degree, have enhanced and formed their 
political projects to include the social movements’ agenda. As the above discussion suggests, the 
two parties even seem to do better, as long as they succeed in representing the movements’ claims, 
and it further seems to benefit them to participate in contentious politics alongside the social 
movements’ activists. It is to illustrate this apparent dynamic that we use the word (dis)enchantment 
in the project’s title and here, suggesting that the incorporation of elements from the social 
movements can add something extra to political parties. This can for example be the case if political 
parties adopt some of the creative and inclusive elements from social movements. If political parties 
manage to do so, they might be able to sustain and further develop the enthusiasm, engagement, and 
sense of belonging among their supporters that normally characterise social movement activists and 
thus ensure a more active base of supporters for their political parties.  
However, the counter argument is also important to discuss. It is possible to imagine that social 
movements might actually disenchant some political parties. For example, if the movement in the 
streets engage in violent acts or is in other ways at odds with the law, these activities can damage 
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the political reputation of the movement party, as well as its relation to other and more 
institutionalised parties.  
Recent developments in Greece and Spain, as seen in the above, further suggest that Podemos and 
SYRIZA’s support from the movements is declining and they are being heavily criticised. 
Accountability is key here, and as our analyses and above discussion also suggest, we are led to 
argue that the social movements that we have studied have largely enchanted SYRIZA and 
Podemos because they have been giving support and created coherence and excitement around the 
new parties. In this way, Podemos and SYRIZA seem to have capitalised politically on the mandate 
that the contention has established. The argument is further that the mobilisation which the social 
movements have successfully established highlights that political parties have something to learn 
from the way social movements organise and appeal to people’s political imagination in order for 
the people who have elected them to feel that their concerns are being represented. In the following 
section, we will put this into perspective by drawing on examples where participatory democracy 
measures have been sought.  
 
7.3 Experiments with Participatory Democracy in 
Institutionalised Politics 
In the above discussions, we have initiated the discussion of the questions; can social movements 
enhance civil society and explicitate its’ discontents? And can political parties learn from their 
practice? To put our findings further into perspective, it is worth, in closing, to discuss both the 
questions together in relation to a few contemporary examples of established political parties 
inspired by elements from participatory democracy.   
 
As discussed above, Podemos and SYRIZA have been enforced by a broad civil society mandate, 
facilitated by social movements, to oppose austerity policies, when gaining support as parties. 
Another contemporary example, also referred to by della Porta at her guest lecture at RUC, is the 
recent leadership race within the British Labour Party in September 2015 (informal conversation 
with della Porta during guest lecture, November 5th 2015). For the first time in British labour 
history, it was possible for people “from the outside of the party to vote” (informal conversation 
with della Porta during guest lecture, November 5th 2015). People not holding a party or trade 
union membership were able to sign up as supporters of the party and thereby acquire a vote. Out of 
70 
 
the close to 600.000 voters, 54% were full-party members, and respectively 26 and 20% of the 
voters where trade union members and people who registered as supporters (Dathan 2015). 
Labour’s choice of expanding the eligible voter pot is by della Porta seen as a response to the crisis 
of their own party (informal conversation with della Porta during guest lecture, November 5th 
2015).  We argue that it can also be seen as an adaptation to a social movement-oriented way of 
thinking, building on the idea that the broader mandate and mobilisation should not be limited and 
restricted by strict membership holdings. As also seen in our two cases in the analysis, social 
movements tend to formulate their goals, desires, and indignation as inclusively as possible, thereby 
inviting potential like-minded citizens to take part in the movement. Participation in social 
movements is as such also not granting you any privileges in the organisation of the movement. 
This is in opposition to a traditional party structure where engagement is foremost a right obtained 
through membership. The Labour case is a thought-provoking contemporary case in conjunction to 
what we have identified in Spain and Greece, where the social movements have to a large extent 
inspired and guided how Podemos and SYRIZA have organised themselves. Especially, as 
mentioned in the analysis, Podemos’ online manifest came about by inviting the willing and 
concerned to vote on which political aims and visions that was to be included in the party’s political 
program. This links back to what Polletta also argues is key to a social movement’s likelihood of 
success; the chances of success are heightened when people feel that they share the ownership of 
decisions. It suggests, in line with the points from the last section, how social movements’ 
repertoires and their practice of participatory democracy might inspire political parties and thus 
enhances how well the parties engage with the public sphere and demands.  
Elsewhere, new parties have also experimented with operating within the established political 
system while building on, as well as sustaining, an engagement and participation like the one in 
social movements. The new party, Alternativet (meaning: The Alternative), in Denmark, has vowed 
to always speak the truth, even if it might be unsettling in an attempt to combat populism, 
misleading political rhetoric, and equivocation (Alternativet 2015). Simultaneously, Alternativet 
wants to replace that with a more engaged civil society through building a strong volunteer base, 
aspire to create a more including debating culture and continually discuss the formulation of the 
political program in open meetings. The case of Alternativet is a very interesting contemporary 
example for putting our findings into perspective, since these policy formulation meetings 
resembles in some ways the open political meetings in the public squares detected in the analysis of 
the social movements in Greece and Spain. The party further encourages to peaceful demonstrations 
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in which the leading figures takes part, in support of different values than Podemos and SYRIZA, 
but emphasising some of the same inclusive elements as them. Alternativet arguably lend some 
tactics in terms of organising and mobilisation from what the included social movements theorists 
argue are the core of social movements’ strategies and formation, and with della Porta’s concept it 
might arguably be seen as some kind of movement party. Alternativet is also a rather new party, but 
gained 4,8% in its first election, for the Danish national parliament, in June 2015 (Dall 2015) and 
has also been lauded for setting a new political agenda (Hansen 2015). Alternativet also appeal to 
citizens’ behaviour and responsibility, especially within values as sustainability and climate 
responsibility, and thus raises a prefigurative element to the party. Alternativet thus holds some of 
the same inviting elements as the social movements and movement parties analysed in the project 
and are an important new phenomenon, when discussing whether social movements can enhance, 
and possibly enchant, political parties.  
 
The Labour election in the UK and the new Danish party, Alternativet, can be seen as examples of 
political parties lending inclusive elements from the organisational repertoire of social movements. 
As argued above, both in the cases of Podemos and SYRIZA and in these two cases briefly 
discussed, the connections with and co-optation of elements from the social movements seem to 
enchant the political parties, making them able to conduct politics in a “new”, more including way 
and build on a broader public mandate. 
 
However, there also seems to be a limit to the permanence of these movement parties. Our findings 
suggest that SYRIZA and Podemos are moving towards a less reformative and also less inclusive 
political path, leaving behind some of the claims from the social movements they have risen on the 
basis of and also weakening the link to these movements. Also the example of the Danish 
movement party, Alternativet, has been criticised by its own activists for becoming too 
institutionalised in pursue of political influence (Husted 2015). Likewise, Polletta points to the 
general theory on the organisational structure of social movements which has been that social 
movements that prioritise their goals and their agenda tend to neglect the democratic process behind 
it, while movements that prioritise democratic principles are unwilling to bow to the demands of 
political efficiency (Polletta 2004: 6). This suggests that an actual movement party, conducting 
politics in a truly different way with a close relation to a social movement, might only exist for a 
shorter while before it ends up taking a more institutionalised path in pursue of political influence. 
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It seems to be for various reasons, and sometimes because of a practical need to obtain political 
results to show to the movements supporting the party, and the movement parties discussed here all 
seem to see a need for developing a more institutionalised structure after a while. At least for them, 
it has not completely been compatible with keeping a close relation to the social movements or as 
inclusive an organisation as to begin with. There is thus a limit to the extent to which political 
parties can learn from, and adapt to the organisation of social movements. Polletta’s theoretical 
assumption that participatory democracy is never a lasting characteristic for social movements, has 
thus proved to be true in both cases analysed.  
 
This might suggest that a movement party is, however substantial and inspiring,  not a permanent 
phenomenon, but merely a stage towards an institutionalised, political party. An argument can thus 
be that parties need to be institutionalised to a certain extend in order for them to subsist over a 
longer period, but as our findings and this discussion suggests, they might still incorporate elements 
from social movements emphasising a more participatory organisation or open membership, making 
the supporters of the parties feel more included and the politics or leadership to be built on a 
broader mandate. This suggests that movement parties, adhering strictly to participatory democracy 
as a main method, are more likely to either change their course of direction once they enter into 
institutional politics or fail to reach the certain level of institutionalisation that is required for them 
to subsist.  Movement parties per se, though, does not have to be a temporarily phenomenon, but 
have the potential to be more permanent if the correct balance between being institutionalised and 
making including forms of politics, and thereby keeping its broad mandate, is found.  
 
8.0 Conclusion 
Both Greece and Spain have, in the years from 2009 and onwards, seen widespread protests 
mobilising a significant part of the populations in anti-austerity social movements. Tarrow and 
Harrebye’s concepts enabled us to analyse the development of these social movements from the 
grumbling, through the phases of mobilisation, the several peaks of the protests, and until they 
demobilise again and an impact is seen. The impact was a facilitation of some of the movements’ 
claims by the parties, SYRIZA and Podemos, representing the same claims as the anti-austerity 
movements. They, in different ways, picked up on people’s dissatisfaction, offering the articulation 
of their claims and an alternative to the existing system and political spectrum. 
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However, our empirical data showed that the protests did not completely die out, when the parties 
gained strength, but continued parallelly with the party political development, and Harrebye and 
Tarrow’s social movement theory concepts did not enable to analyse this development. Including 
della Porta’s term movement party on the contrary enabled us to understand the party political 
development concurrently with the remaining social movements. It functioned, to a certain extent, 
to bridge the social movement field with the political party field and made it possible to understand 
the interplay between the social movements and the political parties. We therefore conclude that the 
new concept, movement party, fills some of the theoretical gap identified. The use of the concept 
movement party also showed how the liminality cannot only be seen as a one-way development 
from social movement to political party. Our findings therefore illustrate the potential for pushing 
the boundaries of social and political theory in this field. As such, we conclude that a new discipline 
is needed to be able to fully encompass the complexity of this liminality and the phenomenon 
movement parties. 
 
Looking at the social movements and political parties’ conceptions of democracy, organisation, and 
use of repertoires, we conclude that the political contention in both countries holds a democratic 
value. While the movements and movement parties had in periods developed very differently in 
Greece and Spain respectively, the attempts and claims to prefigure politics have been particularly 
strong in both countries. Similar for the social movements in both countries have been their aim of 
breaking with the rules of the political game, but so far neither SYRIZA nor Podemos have been 
able to develop their organisation to match the participatory ideas of their supporting social 
movement. It has resulted in a growing hostility in the social movements towards Podemos and 
SYRIZA. 
 
Our findings provide new perspectives on the definition of success in relation to social movements. 
We conclude that it can benefit the studies of the liminality between social movements and political 
parties to see success more broadly as an increasing engagement in civil society, and awareness of 
the issues articulated. Sticking to the fixed, and rather diverging, definitions of success within social 
movements studies and political party studies respectively, is one of the barriers in combining them 
meaningfully in the study of the liminality between the social movements and political parties.  
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In the context of declining trust in the political system and the crisis of party politics, our findings 
moreover contribute by suggesting how political parties can learn from social movements. If 
political parties succeed in incorporating desires and organisational elements from social 
movements, while not compromising their parliamentary position, it can enhance them as parties. 
Political parties that manage to do so can sustain and further develop the enthusiasm, engagement, 
and sense of belonging among their supporters that normally characterise social movement activists, 
and thus ensure a more active base of support. However, we conclude that for the cases studied and 
the additional cases discussed, it is not possible to completely sustain this organisation and the 
activities of a movement party for a longer period. A need to gain political outcomes results in a 
more institutionalised organisation, decreasing the cooperation and interaction with the social 
movements that gave rise to them, in the first place. The paradox then remains that anti-austerity 
social movements need to accept the system that they oppose in other to influence it. Further 
research for studying both this paradox and the liminality between social movements and political 
parties in general, is therefore needed.  
 
9.0 Future Research 
Every research study needs to reflect on the limitations and applicability of its’ findings. Our study 
has proven that understanding the ensemble and interplay between social movements and political 
parties is an important pertinent issue. As della Porta pinpoints “In terms of parties and 
institutionalised politics social movements politics [...] social movements studies, tended to leave 
the party representation of movements out as a topic” (informal conversation with della Porta 
during guest lecture, November 5th 2015).  The timeline represents what we believe is a crucial and 
imperative first step towards understanding how protests and alternative ways of showing one’s 
dissatisfaction can spread and influence politics and contention. The methodological choice of using 
a timeline to pinpoint key events have led us to conclude that the anti-austerity movements in 
Greece and Spain hold similarities and also, to some degree, inspired each other. This leads us to 
reflect on how future research should address this area of study in order to extent our knowledge of 
social movements and their possible transitions into institutionalised politics. What is needed is a 
more comprehensive understanding of the individuals involved in contention, both on the streets as 
representatives of social movements, and off the streets in political parties exemplified by Podemos 
and SYRIZA. These ties can also be seen in overlapping membership between the movement and 
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the political party. When an activist who is involved in the social movement is also present in the 
political party this will have an effect in “attitudinal changes in the party with respect to those 
themes at the core of the social movements” (della Porta 2015b: 4). If looking at the people 
participating in the activities, on or off the streets, this would include a combination of qualitative 
and quantitative approaches. Qualitatively fieldwork, observations, and interviews covering 
activists’ motives, motivation, and practical organising could provide a more unique insight into 
how social movements practice their contention. Are ideals of prefigurative politics and 
participatory democracy predominant and principal when they meet and plan? A similar qualitative 
study of Podemos’ and SYRIZA’s practices could illuminate more extensively whether social 
movements, in terms of their organisation and debating culture, have inspired the parties. 
Quantitatively statistics and questionnaires would also be relevant to incorporate, as it is necessary 
to have more data on Podemos and SYRIZA’s supporters, to have a thorough foundation for 
investigating in depth. It would be interesting and necessary to investigate how it is possible to 
categorise individuals who participate in protests in the streets and with individuals who vote for, 
and participate within, Podemos and SYRIZA. This could provide useful knowledge on 
demographic factors, and also highlight, debunk, or strengthen hypotheses about who actually 
participate in informal and formal politics, and how it is interconnected. This is a core correlation 
that has not been fully covered and studied, but could prove crucial to the understanding of social 
movements’ transition into institutionalised politics.  
 
Analysing more in depth, if and how, the rhetoric of the anti-austerity movements are adopted and 
used by the new movement parties would further highlight the liminality between them. It would 
likewise be interesting to see how and to what extent these rhetorical strategies have influenced the 
rhetoric used by other political parties when addressing the same cause. A discourse analysis would 
show, to what extent, the anti-austerity movement parties are able to set the frame for the austerity 
debate.  
 
We acknowledge that the social and political contexts in which the social movements operate 
significantly inspire, guide, and constrain social movements’ choice of tactics and organisation. In 
Spain and Greece, considerable differences exist in terms of electoral system, party structures, and 
histories of coalitions. These are differences that need to be explored more thorough. This is not 
only key to the understanding of how Podemos, SYRIZA, and social movements are constrained by 
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a political system that they are embedded in, but also imperative for social movement theory to 
include. There are a few reasons for this. First off, the electoral systems of Greece and Spain, while 
holding similarities, also holds distinct rules that only exist in their legislative framework. However, 
while this have not been our focus, we have had many discussions on how this needs to be studied 
in a future research, as we have detected that electoral systems always, and intelligently, is subject 
to scrutiny in terms of securing meaningful and just representation. Throughout our research, it 
became evident that specific electoral systems determine the likelihood of success for smaller 
parties. Podemos, more than SYRIZA, strategically used the electoral system in Spain combined 
with the spread and rising popularity of the 15M movement. Podemos used the knowledge of 
15M’s involvement in smaller communities to decide who they wanted to put up for election. 
Secondly, this could prove crucial for social movements, as they undeniable also make active and 
strategic choices and rationales to how influence is best sought.   
Della Porta pinpoints that the features of a given electoral system significantly shape, sometimes 
constrain, the possibility of movement parties’ chances of getting votes, and acquire a forceful 
mandate. A greater notice to the electoral system, its characteristics and possible opportunities, 
cannot stand alone. We suggest that such a study should include a more comprehensive study of the 
whole spectrum of political parties in Spain and Greece. Histories of coalitions, but also 
representation and historical ties to certain demographic groups would be beneficial to uncover. 
Similarly, we must acknowledge that we, along with most scholars focusing on social movements 
and anti-austerity have a bias towards only studying left-wing parties and movements. There are 
good reasons for this bias. One example is Golden Dawn in Greece. Golden Dawn, as a social 
nationalist movement and later a political party, also opposed austerity policy, but with much 
stronger nationalist, isolationist, and EU sceptical rhetoric (Andronidis 2014). Our project set out to 
understand how movement parties could be understood, and if social movements theory needed to 
refine its’ concepts to encompass the new imperatives shown by anti-austerity movements, in Spain 
and Greece, as they became closely tied to political parties. We have discussed how our empirical 
material, in a different - but with the same intentions - could look like. One main point here is that 
most scholars, so far, have tended to study parties and movements with left leaning political 
aspirations. Instead, we see our findings as able to be evaluated in a larger frame of civil societies 
and political contention growing in Europe. If the anti-austerity movements can be said to hold a 
critic of the EU system, the tendency towards more nationalism, scepticism towards the EU, and the 
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rising popularity of right wing parties could intelligently be incorporated in studies with the same 
intentions as ours.  
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1. Movement parties in times of (anti)austerity and movements: An introduction 
During austerity policy and the waves of protest against it, while the downward trend in party-
movement relations haw pushed towards expectation of further separation, a new wave of 
movement parties emerged. This became visible, first, in Latin America since the 1990s with a 
parallel move in Europe (in particular, in Southern Europe) more than a decade later. The 
stunning electoral success of movement parties like Syriza in Greece, Podemos in Spain and the 
5 Star Movement in Italy challenged expectations of an increasing separation of movement and 
party politics in social movement studies as well as those of a decline of the radical left in studies 
of political parties. This paper presents a social scientific analysis of these topical socio-political 
phenomena, within a cross-national comparative perspective. 
A first contribution of this volume is in the bridging of concepts and theories developed in two 
quite successful subfields in the social and political sciences: social movements’ and political 
parties’ studies. In particular, focusing on movement parties that have been successful in 
electoral politics, we will address the relevant issues of social movement effects as well as on 
party system changes. Bridging both traditions of studies we will reflect on the genesis of 
movement parties within broad transformations in social conflicts induced by the neoliberal 
critical junctures, as well as on the organizational changes that from social movements spilled 
over into party politics. Rather than searching for structural determinants, we will however take a 
processual stance, considering the emergence and success of movement parties within an 
approach which is relational, as it looks at repeated interactions of various actors, dynamic, as it 
addresses these interactions through trials and errors, and constructed, as it consider those actors’ 
construction of their social reality (della Porta 2014). 
This paper will review the existing research on relations between parties and social movements, 
setting the theoretical stage for the empirical analysis that will follow. It will, in particular: 
• Conceptualize movement parties as based upon a specific type of relations between 
movements and parties. Movements have developed special links with political parties or 
party families by targeting parties, allying with parties, founding parties. Movement 
parties are conceptualized with reference to these different types of relations (Kitschelt 
1989). 
• Single out the conditions under which social movements are expected to influence 
parties, up to the foundation of movement parties (Kriesi et al 1996; della Porta and Diani 
Appendix 1
2 
 
2006; Goldstone 2003; Tarrow 1989; 1996; 2014). Following existing literature in social 
movement studies and party studies, explanations for movement party emergence are 
located within: the structure of political cleavages, the representative capacity of existing 
parties, the characteristics of electoral competition and party systems, the degree of 
electoral volatility and systemic support as well as electoral laws. We shall add to this 
analysis the characteristics of social movements can lead to the foundation of a party. 
• Addressing movement parties strategies (in frames, organizations and forms of action) by 
mapping the trade-offs that a tight relation between movements and parties creates for 
both actors. Supporting a movement for a party or supporting a party for a movement is a 
choice that includes costs and benefits. For a movement, a search for broader support in a 
party system could have better pay offs than being identified with a specific side. As for 
parties, support for a movement could bring about a new base of reference but, especially 
on divisive issues, could also discourage other members, sympathizers or electors.  As for 
movements, as introduce new ideas that often cut across the party system, they might 
have an advantage in addressing different parties, rather than being identified with only 
one of them, as well as in focusing their resources on anti-conventional forms. 
While it has been often noted that parties are important for movements and vice-versa, the 
literature on relations between the two is at best sparse. Reciprocal indifferences has been further 
fuelled as research on parties moved away from concerns with the relations between parties and 
society, focusing on parties within institutions, and social movement studies mainly framed  
them as a social phenomenon, whose political aspects had to be located outside of the political 
institutions. 
Critiques of a vision of movements as outsiders have been voiced, however. As Jack Goldstone 
(2003) suggested, institutional politics is permeated by social movements considered “an 
essential element of normal politics in modern societies”, that do not institutionalize and fade 
away.  Rather, “parties and movements have become overlapping, mutually dependent actors in 
shaping politics to the point that long-established political parties welcome social movement 
support and often rely specifically on their association to win elections” (Goldstone 2003, 4). 
Relations between the two are various: “Movements compete with parties. Movements infiltrate 
parties. … Movements become parties” (Garner and Zald 1985, 137). Social movements have 
often addressed programmatic challenges to parties, by proposing new issues; organizational 
challenges, by promoting a participatory model; electoral challenges, by raising support for some 
emerging topic in the public opinion (Rohrshneider 1993), and even succeeded in changing  
parties programs and organizations (Piccio 2011; della Porta 2007). In a recent contribution, 
McAdam and Tarrow (2010) singled out six of types of relations between movements and 
parties:  
• Movements introduce new forms of collective action that influence election campaigns. 
• Movements join electoral coalitions or, in extreme cases, turn into parties themselves. 
• Movements engage in proactive electoral mobilization. 
• Movements engage in reactive electoral mobilization. 
• Movements polarize political parties internally. 
• Shifts in electoral regimes have a long-term impact on mobilization and demobilization. 
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On the side of party studies, relations between parties and movements have been addressed as 
relations between parties and interest groups. Within party literature, relations between parties 
and movements can be conceptualized as organizational linkages. A linkage has been defined as 
“any means by which political leaders act in accordance with the wants, needs, and demands of 
the public in making public policy” (Luttbeg, 1981, 3). A link between elite action and citizens’ 
preferences provided a “substantive connection between rulers and ruled” (Lawson 1980, 3). 
Particularly important have been considered the relations between parties and interest 
organizations as  
“Linkage through organisation … means that a considerable part of interest selection and 
aggregation is achieved without the involvement of party elites. Appropriate 
organisational environments like, for example, trade unions, religious organisations or a 
party’s own youth organisation, select and aggregate relevant grievances into reasonably 
coherent packages of political demands which then become the object of negotiation 
between organisational and party elites. In principle, this facilitates agreement on 
political packages which will normally not reflect all demands initially raised by a given 
organisation, but represent a mutually acceptable compromise. … Clearly, organisational 
linkage provides party elites with a much clearer image about relevant grievances among 
relevant portions of their electorate than direct linkage, because intra-organisational 
process of interest selection and aggregation have already identified those demands 
which are most relevant to a majority of organisational members. If organisational elites 
reach agreement with party elites, they will then mobilise their organisation in support of 
this party, not least in an election campaign. As long as organisational integration is high, 
organisation members may cast their vote according to their leaders’ recommendation 
even if they disagree with individual elements of the deal, because their prime loyalty is 
to the organization” (Poguntke 2002).  
Relations between parties and interest groups are said to co-evolve, adapting to each other, 
through competition and cooperation; they see each other as  means potentially useful for their 
ends, and so try to influence each other through overlapping leadership or other forms of 
pressure, but also provide brokerage for reaching out of own’s networks as well as bridging 
identities (Heaney 2010). In fact, political parties strive to craft platforms that will draw the 
support of majorities of voters, while interest groups pressure the government to enact policies 
that advance the substantive agendas or ideological perspectives of narrower constituencies. In 
negotiating these tensions, parties and groups may work cooperatively or they may find 
themselves at cross‐purposes. Groups sometimes prop up parties by supplying them with 
essential volunteers and financial resources, thus enabling a group to dictate key parts of a party's 
agenda. At other times, a group may find itself “captured” by a party such that the group must 
accept a party's weak efforts on its behalf because the other major party refuses (or is unable) to 
bargain for its loyalty. Occasionally, groups find themselves wedged between the parties in such 
a way that they become decisive on selected policy matters. On the other hand, groups may be on 
the sidelines sometimes as the major parties clash on the great issues of the day (ibid.).  
When looking at party systems, a very first observation is that some social movements have 
produced new parties (and party families): the labor movements rise from, or gave birth to, 
socialist parties; regionalist parties have been rooted in ethnic movements and the Greens in the  
environmental ones. In social movement studies, the political opportunities approach has linked 
parties evolution to social movements. As Tarrow (2015) noted, “Many parties begin life as 
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movements. Think of the labor movement that gave birth to social democratic parties in western 
Europe; or the abolitionist movement that was at the core of the Republican party during and 
after the American Civil War; or the indigenous peoples’ movements that produced ethnically-
supported parties in Bolivia and Ecuador in recent decades. Movements frequently give rise to 
parties when movement activists transfer their activism to institutional politics”. In parallel, in 
party studies, influentially Lipset and Rokkan (1967) have located parties within social 
cleavages, in which they originate and which they contribute to perpetuate. 
Movements have moreover developed special links with a political party or party family. Social 
movements have allied with parties: have overlapping membership, organized together various 
forms of collective action, funded each other. Considering parties more broadly, external 
linkages have often been created with various types of interest groups and civil society 
associations, such as religious one for confessional parties or ethnic one for ethno-nationalist 
parties. Linkages to movements can be stressed in the very name of the party, in the opening of 
participation to movement members, in support for movement claims, in the shared use of 
protest. The presence of overlapping membership at grass-roots and leadership levels as well as 
the presence of movement activists in party lists testify for these ties. Party members may 
“engage in social movement activities themselves, thus promoting and leading to attitudinal 
changes in the party with respect to those themes at the core of the social movements’ 
mobilizations” (Piccio 2015). Indeed, “for a social movement to be more likely to have an 
impact on a party, a certain degree of overlap must exist between the party and the social 
movements’ identities” (Piccio 2015). The traditional allies of the progressive social movements 
have been mainly the leftist parties (Kriesi 1989; Kriesi et al. 1995; della Porta 1996), and “the 
radical left is by far the most important party group in protest politics” (Hutter 2012). In fact, the 
configuration of power on the left is particularly important for social movements (Kriesi 1989a, 
296).  
Social movements have indeed been extremely sensitive to the characteristics of their political 
parties of reference: they have often privileged action in society, leaving parties the job of 
bringing their claims to institutions. They have placed themselves on the political left-right axis, 
and have constructed discourses compatible with the ideologies of their allies.  For their part, 
parties have not always been impermeable to the pressures of movements: from the Labour party 
in Great Britain to the Social Democrats in Germany, from the French socialists to the Italian 
communists, the programmes and members of the institutional left have changed following 
interactions with social movements, and increasing awareness on themes such as gender 
discrimination or environmental protection.  
These transformations happen through proactive electoral mobilization,  when movements 
become more active in the context of an electoral campaign; reactive electoral mobilization , as 
escalating protest in the wake of a disputed election; shifts in the electoral fortune of a party; 
movement-induced polarization (Tarrow 2015). As mediators between civil society and the state, 
the parties of the left need to mobilize public opinion and voters, so that the programs and 
membership of the institutional left, be it British Labor, German Social Democrats, French 
Socialists or Italian Communists, have often been altered by interaction with social movements 
(i.e., Maguire 1995; Duyvendak 1995; Koopmans 1995; Koelble 1991; Piccio 2012).  
The extent to which parties relate to movements is, however, variable. The strategy adopted by 
the left towards social movements has, however, not been unchanging over time and space. 
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Hostility has sometimes prevailed, sometimes negotiation and sometimes co-option. What 
explains the strategic choices made by the parties on the left?  
In attempting to answer this question, attention has been directed to political cleavages. While 
some have suggested that a rigid left-right division delays the development of new social 
movements (Brand 1985: 319), others have highlighted the stimulus provided by strong 
communist parties. Among the latter, Tarrow has argued that the parties of the left, in particular 
the Italian Communist Party (PCI), acted as ‘offstage but creative prompters in the origins, the 
dynamics, and the ultimate institutionalization of the new movements’ (1990: 254). Comparative 
research has indicated that, in general, the “old left” has been more disposed to support 
movements where exclusive regimes had for a long time hindered the moderation of conflicts on 
the left-right axis (Kriesi et al. 1995, 68; della Porta and Rucht 1995). 
Second, the existence of party divisions within the traditional left influences attitudes towards 
social movements. Where the left is divided between a social-democratic (or socialist) and a 
communist party, this increases the relevance of the working class vote, discouraging left-wing 
parties from addressing postmaterial issues (Kriesi 1991, 18).  To the contrary, the global justice 
movement, stressing the traditional demands of social rights and justice, seems to have been 
more able to influence the institutional Left in countries such as Italy, France or Spain, where the 
moderate Left feared the competition of more radical Communist or Trotskyte parties (della 
Porta 2007).  
In fact, electoral competition is an important variable in explaining the reaction of potential allies 
towards social movements. The propensity to support protest has been connected with electoral 
instability, which renders the winning of new votes particularly important. In fact, member-
challenger coalitions are most probable in closely divided and competitive political situations 
(Tilly 1978, 213-14; Piven and Cloward 1977, 31-2). Alliances between parties and social 
movements can be facilitated when the electoral environment is more unstable (Piccio 2015). 
Fourth, the position of the left towards social movements can be influenced by whether or not 
they are in government. Kriesi (1991: 19; see also, Kriesi 1989b: 296-7) has suggested that when 
in opposition social democrats take advantage of the push provided by social movements; in 
power, on the other hand, they are forced by budgetary and other constraints to limit their 
openness to emerging demands. To maximize their re-election chances they must privilege those 
economic questions that interest their hard-core vote. It should be added that the actions of left-
wing parties in government depend on the composition of the governing coalition and their 
weight in it. They are obviously freer to take decisions when governing alone. When in coalition 
with center-right parties or moderate left-wing ones they will be forced to adopt policies less 
favorable towards the left-wing social movements. When governing with other parties of the left, 
on the other hand, they might adopt attitudes closer to these new collective actors. 
Beyond being in government or not, the attitudes of the parties of the left towards social 
movements are related to an additional dimension: their openness to reform politics. Indeed, 
parties might be pushed towards changes in their strategies and policy orientations by, for 
instance, the perception of a challenge to be addressed or opportunities to be exploited. This 
availability towards changes could be different for mainstream versus peripheral parties (Kriesi 
2015). 
Whatever the reasons for alliances, we can speak of movement parties when relations with social 
movements are particularly tight. Social movements are usually defined as networks or groups 
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and individuals, endowed with some collective identification, that pursue goals of social 
transformation mainly through unconventional forms of participation (della Porta and Diani 
2006). Political parties are instead defined as, in Max Weber’s (1922) influential definition as  
free associations built with the aim of achieving institutional power. This is mainly done through 
participation in election--in democracy, “a party is any political group that presents at elections, 
and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public office” (Sartori 1976, 64).  
Movement parties emerge as sort of hybrid between the two. As organizations, they participate in 
protest campaigns, but also act in the electoral arenas. As social movements are networks of 
organizations and individuals, movement parties can be considered as part of them as testified 
for by overlapping memberships as well as organizational and action links. According to 
Kitschelt, “movement parties are coalition of political activists who emanate from social 
movements and try to apply the organization and strategic practice of social movements in the 
arena of party competition” (Kitschelt 2006, 280). Additionally, even if in different formats, 
movement parties tend to have some characteristics in common: they aim at integrating the 
movement constituencies within their organizations.  
Movement parties also represent movements’ claims. As for framing, “movement-based parties 
are more likely to be driven by ideological militancy than by pragmatic political considerations” 
(Tarrow 2015). Also, even if using (also) an electoral logic, they tend to be supportive of protest, 
participating in campaigns together with other movement organizations, as “in terms of external 
political practice, movement parties attempt a dual track by combining activities within the arena 
of formal democratic competition with extra-institutional mobilization” (Kitschelt 2006, 281). 
 
2.The genesis of movement parties 
When do movement parties rise? In addressing this question, we can draw inspiration from social 
science research on both parties and movements, by singling out some necessary, if not 
sufficient, conditions at the level of the cleavage structure, the party system and social 
movements.  Bridging party and social movement research, we might consider the following 
model: 
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Transformations in the cleavage structures. Research on the emergence of new parties has 
stressed the role of emerging cleavages, New parties are especially likely to emerge face to 
neglected or new issues (but strength of post-materialism does not explain green parties) 
especially in times when economic or other  problems  becomes more visible and politicized 
(Kitschelt 1988, Muller Rommel 1993). As economic competition erodes protected property 
rights and also increased cultural diversity, globalization as critical juncture has been related in 
Europe with the formation of a cleavage between winners and losers. While first research in 
Europe had looked at the populist right-wing parties as mobilizing the losers in the electoral 
arena (Kriesi et al 2008; 2012), research in Latin America (Roberts 2014; Silva 2009; Yashar 
2009; Van Cott 2005) has focused instead on the ways in which the neoliberal critical junctures 
produced countermovements towards social protection. Also in Southern Europe, neoliberalism 
and its crisis has transformed the cleavage structure which was at the bases of the domestic party 
systems with the emergence of a precarization of labour as well as a proletarization of the middle 
classes. Movement parties have emerged where the crisis has been faster and where it more 
radically challenged everyday life. 
Conducive conditions in the electoral field. Research on the political system has singled out the 
relevance of some institutional conditions. So, it has been noted that, “In some countries (e.g., 
the United States), ballot access requirements make it difficult for any but the few largest parties 
to gain the opportunity for electoral success. Plurality or majority electoral systems with single-
member districts have sometimes (e.g., in France) been adopted specifically to deny electoral 
success to extremist parties, and have had the same effect on other small parties” (Harmel and 
Robertson 1985). Studies on parties have discussed the effects of the electoral system on the 
emergence and success of new parties, with however inconclusive results. While some 
opportunities must be available in terms of formal electoral access, even more important is 
however the level of electoral volatility. institutional conduciveness has been linked to degree of 
decentralization, proportionality, reserved seats for minority, low barriers for registering parties, 
low threshold for earning seats (van Cott 2015).  
Unrepresented claims and the delegitimation of political parties--especially of center left-
parties--between representation and responsibility. Movement parties emerge when these new 
grievances/interests/identities are not represented in the party system. In this sense, the number 
of existing parties should affect the coverage of demands, as a large number should increase the 
possibilities that new issues are covered (Harmel and Robertson 1985), with lack of 
representation of some interests/identities (Hug 2001). New parties rise in a structured 
environment in which of highest importance is the behaviour of existing parties which are often 
unwilling to follow new movements, as they also think they will soon fade  (Hug 2003).   While 
the relevance of institutional thresholds is still debated, the emergence of new parties is for sure 
linked to the reactions by the other parties. The emergence and success of new parties is in fact 
embedded within relations inside the party system as “the behavior of mainstream parties 
influences the electoral fortunes of the new, niche party actors” (Meguid 2005). This is the case 
as “mainstream parties also manipulate the salience and ownership of the new party’s issue. It 
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follows that competition is not restricted to interaction between ideological neighbors, as the 
standard spatial theory claims; non-proximal parties play a critical role in the success and failure 
of Western Europe’s niche parties” (ibid.). van Cott pointed at relevant characteristics of party 
systems such as dealignment, fragmentation, weakness of the left (initially, the channel of access 
for indigenous people)—especially the decline of once strong left. As Kitschelt  noted, “social 
movement parties are most likely to appear where (1) collective interest are intensely held by a 
large constituency, willing to articulate their demand through disruptive, extra-institutional 
activities, (2) established parties make no effort to embrace such interests for fear of dividing 
their own electoral constituency and (3) the formal and informal thresholds of political 
representation are low” (Kitschelt 2006, 282). If these new parties emerge especially when 
movement entrepreneurs realize they need a complex reorganization of the society, assume there 
is a constituency, and there are low barriers to entry, they are successful “only where an 
intensively felt, salient political interest harbored by a quantitatively significant constituency 
lacks representation in the existing party system” (Kitschelt 2006, 282). Looking at the Latin 
American experience, Ken Roberts (2014) noted in fact that new parties emerged on the Left in 
those countries in which center-left parties had been leading forces in the implementation of 
neoliberal reforms. This has been the case also in Southern Europe.  
In this regard, research has looked at the loss of representative capacity that is linked to 
increasing exogenous constraints, such as responsibility towards international and market-related 
conditionalities, which thwarted established parties’ capacity of representation, reducing their 
electoral support (Mair 2009; Streeck 2014). With the financial crises of the years 2000s and 
2010s, parties’ conception of responsibility is challenged. If the mobilization on the right of the 
losers of globalization seemed a major phenomenon at the electoral level, in the 2000s the 
critique of globalization (especially in its neoliberal form) developed on the left as well, in this 
case more within contentious politics. Movement parties emerged as established parties were 
most dramatically losing citizens’ trust. This happened especially when left-wing parties 
supported austerity policies. The relations of cooperation of center-left parties with social 
movements have been reduced as leftwing parties moved to the center, while movements 
addressed more and more frequently social issues. Similarly to the Latin American cases, also in 
Europe movement parties emerged and succeeded when center-left parties were perceived as 
compromising with austerity policies. During the economic crisis the Pasok in Greece, the 
Democratic party in Italy and the PSOE in Spain all turned toward neoliberal policies based on 
structural reforms and privatization programs which translated into cutting social spending, 
increasing retirement age, reforming the labour market, reducing the public sector etc. 
Massive movement mobilization with anti-establishment frames. The emergence of movement 
parties is also related to the characteristics of social movements themselves. In particular, 
movement parties tend to be successful when social movement mobilize new cleavages on which 
representation in institution is perceived as weak. In general, “Parties should be seen not as being 
in complete control of the political agenda, but rather as sharing that control with other, non 
electoral, organizations…. This sharing of roles presents no problems for the parties as long as 
these latter organizations are linked to them in some way. A weakening of these links, however, 
and/or the emergence of new, non-party associated organizations, and/or a weakening of the 
agenda-setting role of those associated non-electoral organizations that do exists, could imply a 
challenge to the hold of party systems on the mass public” (Mair 1983,  420). Antiausterity 
protests took in particular different forms—some more traditional, channeled through existing 
organizations (including unions and parties), some more innovative.  
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In recent times, the legitimacy crisis of late neoliberalism has fuelled anti-austerity protests, 
which have  pointed at the corruption of an entire political class as the mechanism through which 
the profits of the few prevailed over the need – the very human rights – of the many. In 
opposition to the corrupt elites, the protestors defined themselves as part of the large majority of 
those suffering from social and political inequalities. Social movements became in fact more and 
more critical of representative democracy. While these attitudes reflected a drop in trust in 
existing parties which was widespread in the electorate, social movement activists remained 
however convinced of the need for political intervention to control the market (della Porta 2015). 
This brought about the—almost paradoxical—choice to create new movement parties. The 
widespread mistrust in the existing political parties then favoured the electoral success of the 
new parties.  
In addressing the question, Under what conditions do ethnic parties form and endure?, Van Cott 
(2005) has stressed the role of strongly rooted and unitary movements, together with the 
configuration of power within the party system. Organizers from declining left-wing parties are 
important in bridging frames of cultural recognition and autonomy to anti-neoliberalism. The 
main results of her research are so summarized “We can predict that ethnic parties are more 
likely to form where an indigenous social movement organization is fourteen years old, has 
achieved some success in the social movement sphere, and has a dense network of affiliates 
extended throughout the target area: where the organizations participate effectively in a 
constitutional reform; where obstacles to ballot access are relatively low; where decentralization 
opens the possibility for competition in districts where indigenous people are concentrated; 
where the left is relatively weak; and where seats have been reserved for indigenous candidates. 
Such parties will perform best when these additional conditions are present: persistently high or 
moderately increased party-system fragmentation; leaders of a declining left seeking to join a 
more dynamic electoral project; a relatively high level of organizational unity exists within an 
ethnic movement that has a dense networks of organizational affiliates; and the existence of at 
least one subnational district (preferably, newly formed district) where Indians are a majority or 
near majority” (ibid., 223). 
Much research has indeed indicated the role of massive waves of protest but also of inclusive 
frames in the emergence of successful social movement parties. In fact, new parties have been 
successful when they have appealed to a mobilized constituencies during waves of contentious 
politics. The point was made, for instance, with reference to ethnonationalist parties in Latin 
America. There, ethnopopulist parties are said to have succeeded, whereas traditional ethnic 
parties instead have failed, because of “the low levels of ethnic polarization and the ambiguity 
and fluidity of ethnic identification in the region have meant that indigenous-based parties can 
win votes not only from self-identified indigenous people but also from people from other ethnic 
categories who share some identification with indigenous cultures or who support the parties 
based on their positions on other issues. To win the support of people from other ethnic 
categories, ethnopopulist parties have avoided exclusionary rhetoric, reached out to members of 
different ethnic groups, and employed traditional populist appeals” (Madrid 2008). In fact, “In 
order to win votes from members of a variety of different ethnic groups, inclusive indigenous-
based parties have had to develop an appeal that extends beyond indigenous issues. The most 
successful indigenous-based parties, the ethnopopulist parties, have used classical populist 
strategies to attract votes. The ethnopopulist parties, like classical populist parties, have attracted 
politically disenchanted voters by denouncing the traditional parties and the existing elites. They 
have also won support by adopting a highly redistributive, nationalist, and state interventionist 
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agenda just as the classical populist parties once did. They have, for example, opposed neoliberal 
reforms and other policies promoted by the U.S. government, advocating the nationalization of 
natural resources and the redistribution of wealth. Finally, ethno-populist leaders, like traditional 
populist caudillos, have attracted voters by dint of their charismatic personalities. These 
strategies have enabled the ethnopopulist parties to fuse traditional populist constituencies - 
politically disenchanted urban mestizos with nationalist and statist views - to their rural, largely 
indigenous base” (Madrid 2008). 
 
3. Organizational resources and strategic choices 
The dominant party organizations as well as the movement parties have changed in various 
periods. 
Historical evolution of party organizational models. Party literature has devoted much time to 
singling out dominant organizational models and their evolution in time. Literature on political 
parties described in fact a trend of continuous approaching of the parties to the state institutions 
and distancing themselves from the society instead (Panebianco 1998; Katz and Mair 1995; della 
Porta 2014). After the mass ideological party, defined as an invention from the left, had won 
over the so-called committees’ parties, or parties of the notables, various labels were used in 
order to point at the later autonomization of parties from their linkages with a specific social base 
(catch-all parties), an attempt to integrate individuals in the political system (electoral parties), 
general connections with society (cartel party). These tendencies seem to peak in what I name 
neoliberal populist parties—organizationally light, heavily personalized, split in non-ideological 
factions, characterized by heavy manipulative use of mass media but also by a power rooted in 
the occupation of institutional positions, often used for clientelistic or corrupt exchanges.  
Evolution of alternative movement parties’ organizational model as partial alternative to 
hegemonic ones. While party literature focused on dominant party model, we can parallel it by 
looking at movement-sponsored, challenging party models. While initially movement-related 
parties had a small organizational core, they expanded in the class-based, mass, ideological 
party. New social movements emerged then to challenge that model, stressing especially a more 
horizontal structure, with green parties developing a fragmented relation with movements (e.g., 
Poguntke 1993). Between parties and movements, tensions increased in fact on the relevant 
organizational format. Face to more and more bureaucratized parties, the democratic quality of 
participation has remained central in the visions and practices of social movements. Left-
libertarian parties have reflected this mood, with attempts at developing more participatory 
conceptions of politics, remaining however by far less integrated—more dual—than those 
between labour movements and labour parties. Finally, nowadays movement parties can be 
expected to in part challenge and in part adapt to a hegemonic organizational model which is 
“lighter”, more personalized and more reliant on (old and new) media.  
The new organizational models in selected movement parties as influenced by movements’ 
characteristics. Referring to some main concepts in social movement studies (della Porta and 
Diani 2006), we will suggest that our contemporary movement parties reflect an evolution in the 
organizational structures, identity frames and repertoire of action. This adaptation is however not 
without tensions as movement parties have to balance the different logics and pressures presents 
within party systems and social movement networks as main fields of intervention. In the 
movement parties we analyse, we will point out dilemmas and turning points on all three main 
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dimensions (organization, frames and repertoires of action) trade-offs. Movement parties’ 
organizational model, framing and repertories will be influenced by their relations with two 
fields of action: the party one and the movement one. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is not to be seen however in a deterministic way. In fact, movement parties—and the 
various actors that compose them—make strategic choices, which are to be understood as 
decisions addressed multiple dilemmas such as between adaptation and innovation, alliances and 
purity, moderation and radicalism, rationality towards the mean versus ratonality towards the 
ends. As party literature has singled out,  tradeoffs also exist between seeking electoral supports, 
offices or policies. Parties trade spoils for policy influence, or vice versa. Or choose between 
vote seeking, on the one hand, and more immediate policy and office seeking, on the other as 
“Party behavior in office affects subsequent performance at the polls” (Strom 1990). “Office-
seeking (and policy-seeking) behavior may conflict with vote maximization to the extent that 
government incumbency is likely to have subsequent electoral costs. …  Governing parties have 
their reliability (consistency between promise and performance) more severely tested than the 
opposition. Since votes are valued instrumentally only, the conflict between present office (and 
policy) seeking and future vote seeking boils down to a trade-off between short-term and longer-
term benefits” (Strom 1990). As Chironi (2014)—citing Jasper (#)--noticed, in their relations, 
party and movements have to address: 
Extension Dilemma. The further you expand your alliances, the less coherent your goals 
and actions can be. Part of this dilemma arises also from the benefits or costs of 
maintaining or otherwise a sharp collective identity. 
Naughty or Nice Dilemma. Some goals may require a more dialogic tactic while others 
may depend on their capacity to disrupt normality. Interacting with parties may influence 
in favour of following the logic of persuasion rather than that of disruption. 
Reaching out or Reaching in. The movements can develop different tactics according to 
their target: some are oriented toward those on their team, others to outsiders. Connection 
with parties requires the second type of tactics. 
Direct or Indirect Moves? A movement can opt for direct confrontation with opponents, 
or for indirect moves such as persuading third parties to side with them. 
Party System: dominant 
organizational model, framing, 
repertoires 
Social Movement Field: 
dominant organizational model, 
framing, repertoires 
Movement Party:  
organizational model, framing, 
repertoires 
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The Radical-Flank Dilemma. Extreme words and actions get attention, but they usually 
play poorly with external sympathisers. Cooperating with parties may require movements 
to moderate their words and actions. 
The Bridge-Builder’s Dilemma. Individuals who mediate between the movement and the 
party can lose the trust of their own group in accomplishing this task. 
The Familiar and the New. New tactics, such as cooperating with a party, may be useful 
to reach a certain goal and defeat opponents, but they are typically hard for the internal 
group to accept. 
Strategies are chosen in addressing these dilemmas. As van Cott noted with reference to 
indigenous parties, among their positive effects for social movements that support them are their 
promotion of not exclusive, healthy society-party relation, of value of recognition and respect for 
diversity, more transparency in politics, internal democracy, increased participation. Potential 
negative outcomes are however present as well as participation on party politics increases 
division in social movements—as, as Kitschelt (1989) notes, fractionalism is normal in parties 
with grass-roots participation. Risks of contamination of indigenous culture from western models 
of parties and of destabilization of collective identities have been noted for ethno-nationalist 
parties. Also, “Successful new parties may reduce the effectiveness of indigenous social 
movements by distracting them from past priorities, such as the defense of territorial autonomy 
and the construction of new political institutions rooted in indigenous values and modes of self-
government and participation” (van Cott 2005, 234). 
 
3.1. Party models: hegemony and counter-hegemony 
Party literature has devoted much energies to singling out dominant organizational models and 
their evolution in time. Looking at parties’ internal characteristics along three dimensions—
organization, strategies and culture—Panebianco’s (1988) typological approach pointed at the 
types of parties that are dominant (even if not exclusive) in specific periods, linking them to 
contextual characteristics. Literature on political parties described in fact a trend of continuous 
approaching of the parties to the state institution and distancing from the state.  
Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond (2003) suggested a typology based upon three criteria: “(1) 
the nature of the party’s organization (thick/thin, elite-based or mass-based, etc.); (2) the 
programmatic orientation of the party (ideological, particularistic-clientele-oriented, etc.); and 
(3) tolerant and pluralistic (or democratic) versus proto-hegemonic (or anti-system)”.  As for the 
formal organization of the party, they observed that  
“Some parties are organizationally thin, while others develop large mass-membership 
bases with allied or ancillary institutions engaged in distinct but related  spheres of social 
life; some rely on particularistic networks of personal interaction or exchange, while 
others are open and universalistic in membership and appeal; and some rely heavily, if 
not exclusively, on modern techniques of mass communication and ignore the 
development of primary, face-to-face channels of communication or secondary 
associations. The second classificatory criterion involves the nature of the party’s 
programmatic commitments. Accordingly, some parties derive programmatic stands from 
well-articulated ideologies rooted in political philosophies, religious beliefs or 
nationalistic sentiments; others are either pragmatic or have no well-defined ideological 
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or programmatic commitments; still others are committed to advance the interests of a 
particular ethnic, religious or socioeconomic group, or geographically defined 
constituency, in contrast to those that are heterogeneous if not promiscuously eclectic in 
their electoral  appeals to groups in society. The third criterion involves the strategy and 
behavioural norms of the party, specifically, whether the party is tolerant and pluralistic 
or proto-hegemonic in its objectives and behavioural style: some parties are fully 
committed to democratic rules-of-the-game, are tolerant and respectful towards their 
opponents, and are pluralistic in their views of polity and society; others are semi-loyal to 
democratic norms and institutions, or are explicitly anti-system, favouring the 
replacement of the existing pluralistic democracy with a regime that would be more 
uniformly committed to the achievement of their programmatic objectives” (Gunther and 
Diamond 2003) . 
At the origins of political parties was what Max Weber (1922) called party of notables, as party 
candidates were capable of devoting time to politics thanks to their economic conditions, and 
built upon their personal social reputation. Parties were organized in (informal) committees, 
made of members of the social elite (Duverger 1953-54) and aimed at electing candidates that 
were  supposed to represent the individual interests of those who voted for them (Neumann 
1956). 
In XIX century Europe, mass parties emerged, endowed with a stable bureaucracy (Weber 1922) 
aiming at representing the collective interest of those who had been hitherto excluded. As these 
did not possess individual resources that would have allowed them devoting themselves to 
politics, the parties (organized in party sections) built complex organizations in which politics 
become a profession (ibid., also Duverger 1953-54). Parties assumed then a function of social 
integration, allowing for the development of collective identification around common values and 
solidarities, with a growing influence on the everyday life of party activists (Neumann 1968). 
Ideological incentives became central for the development of party loyalties (Pizzorno 1981; 
1997). 
After the mass ideological party, defined as an invention from the left, started to decline, various 
labels were used in order to point at the autonomization of parties from their linkages with a 
specific social base (catch-all parties), a prevalent attempt at getting votes (electoral parties), 
general connections with society (cartel party). A catchall party model has been defined as 
characterized by the watering down of the ideological appeals and the aim of representing 
specific classes with, at the same time, a growing power of the leaders and a declining influence 
of the rank-and-file (Kirchheimer 1966). The dominant aim for this type of parties is increasing 
electoral support, rather than the socialization of members. In a similar vein, Angelo Panebianco 
(1982) described the professional-electoral party as characterized moreover by the presence of a 
bureaucracy that specializes in the relations with electors, through marketing and communication 
experts. Organizationally weak, this type of party focuses on the electoral moment, with a 
decline of organizational  ideologies. The relations with the mass media also bring about a 
personalization of the leadership, with often personal conflicts as well.  
Cartel parties represent a development of this trend, as parties collude with each other in order to 
get more and more state support, so losing more and more the relations with their members (Katz 
and Mair 1995). As Peter Mair noted, “The stability which resulted from the capacity of parties 
to draw voters firmly into their organizational nets largely depended upon the immediacy of their 
links with the wider society. To the extent that these links were loosened, and to the extent that 
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the party became more remote from the everyday lives of their citizenry, the organizational 
precondition of such stability would be eroded” (1997, 36). So, in cartel parties, parties become 
mainly partnership of professionals, rather than associations of or for the citizens. 
These tendencies seem to peak in what I named neoliberal populist parties—organizationally 
light, heavily personalized, split in non-ideological factions, with a heavy manipulative use of 
mass media but also a power rooted in the occupation of institutional positions, often used for 
clientelistic or corrupt exchanges. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this model, at the organizational level, there is in fact a centralization of decisions in the 
hands of few visible leaders which is intertwined with the merely formal involvement of the 
rank-and-file members (considered mainly as card-payers) and, especially,  the reduced influence 
of activists, normally considered as more intransigent than both than the leaders and the rank and 
file, and therefore as obstacles to moderate political choices (Crouch 2010). The centralisation of 
decisions and the personalisation of leadership have led to speak of an Americanisation of 
European parties, more and more oriented to an individualistic management of gains, and less 
and less to the creation of collective identities, progressively assimilated into the state 
(depending on the state for finances and profits) and less and less autonomous from public 
institutions (Calise 2010).  
There is also a weakening of relations between parties and civil society organisations  (Allern 
and Bale 2012). Party activists as channels of communication to potential voters are then 
substituted for by the mass media, in particular television, that facilitate direct identification of 
electors with leaders able to transmit a self-assured, confident and warm image, as well as 
appropriate some relevant themes (Barisione 2007), thus side-stepping the mediation of the 
party. Research shows at the same time the decline of members in terms of numbers (van Biezen, 
Mair and Poguntke 2012), and a focus on their role as ambassadors of the party in their 
communities (Scarrow 2009) as well as for legitimacy and recruitment of leadership (Warner 
2000, 164). In fact, parties seem to invest, but differentially, in the recruitment of new members 
(Kittilson and Scarrow 2003, Hazan and Rahat 2010, Cross and Blais 2012). In general, a decline 
of party members is seen as a permanent trend. Not only members became disposable as state 
subsides substituted for membership fees,  and changing lifestyles, post-materialist values  and 
higher educational level reduced the supply of membership (Scarrow 2007), producing rather 
calls for more participatory forms of political commitment (Montero and Gunther 2002). If 
reform tended to empower “ordinary members” rather than activists (Mair 19994, 15) especially 
socie
ty state 
Party of 
notables 
Ideologica
l mass 
party 
Electoral, 
catchall 
party 
Personal, 
cartel 
party 
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on the selection of candidates and legitimization of party programs, party elites keep a veto 
power (Scarrow, Webb and Farrell 2000, 149).  
Framing changed accordingly, as dominant parties tended to lose their ideological aappeals, 
appearing as “all the same” to a growing number of lectors. In fact, the use of an “anti-political” 
language by leaders in contrast with parties and professional politicians (Campus 2006) also 
becomes an instrument for reinforcing personalized leadership by politicians that underline, 
paradoxically, their estrangement from politics. Similarly, populist appeals (to the people against 
the élites) by parties (prevalently, but not only from the centre-right) seek to utilize low party 
identification and mistrust in institutional politics to create an electoral following. In a vicious 
circle, the decrease in trust and identification in parties further pushed for a personalization as a 
strategy to win back consent (Diamanti 2007), above all (but not only) from the most socially 
marginalised and least politically interested electors.  
In sum, in the emerging party model party organization is shallow, ideological appeals are (at 
best) vague, with an  “overwhelmingly electoral orientation, as well as by the prominent 
leadership and electoral roles of the party’s top-ranked national-level candidates. Lacking an 
explicit ideology, emerging parties tend to emphasize the attractive personal attributes of their 
candidates, and nominations are largely determined by the electoral resources of the candidates 
rather than by such organizational criteria as years of experience in, or service to, the party, or 
position within key factions within the party” (Gunther and Diamond 2013).  Electoralist parties 
evolved into personalistic parties, whose “only rationale is to provide a vehicle for the leader to 
win an election and exercise power including through clientelistic ties. It is not derived from the 
traditional structure of local notable elites, but, rather, is an organization constructed or 
converted by an incumbent or aspiring national leader exclusively to advance his or her national 
political ambitions. Its electoral appeal is not based on any programme or ideology, but rather on 
the personal charisma of the leader/candidate, who is portrayed as indispensable to the resolution 
of the country’s problems or crisis. While it may make use of clientelistic networks and/or 
broadly distribute particularistic benefits to party supporters, its organization is weak, shallow 
and opportunistic” (Gunther and Diamond 2003). 
 
3.2. Movements and democracy 
The evolution of social movements has been seen however as towards more and more critical 
positions towards party politics. The tensions between parties and movements are linked not only 
to policy claims, but also to the very (meta) conception of politics. As Robert Michel’s had 
suggested, parties (including those on the Left) undergo oligarchic trends, that detach the 
leadership, more and more oriented to maintain power and positions, from the rank-and-file, 
more interested in identity and ideology.While these tensions had often emerged in the historical 
relations between socialist/communist parties and the labour movement, they acquired more and 
more weight with the emergence of new movements that brought about innovative conceptions 
of democracy.  
The 1968 movements (or the sixty-eight years, as they have recently been defined) called for a 
widening of civil rights and forms of political participation. The anti-authoritarian frame, central 
for these movements, was in fact articulated in claims for “democracy from below”. 
Democracies of the councils and self-management were also discussed in the workers’ 
movements of those years. Beyond the widening of forms of political participation, the student 
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movement and those that followed it (the first being the women’s movement) experimented 
internally with new democratic practices, considered as early indications for the realisation of 
non-authoritarian relations (a libertarian dimension).  
Also the so-called new social movements of the 1970s and the 1980s insisted on the legitimacy – 
if not the prevalence – of alternative forms of democracy, criticising liberal visions. In fact, as 
Kitschelt noted,  “The struggle of the left libertarian movements thus recalls an ancient element 
of democratic theory, which promotes the organisation of the collective decision-making process 
variously defined as classical, populist, communitarian, strong, grassroots or direct democracy, 
against a democratic practice defined in contemporary democracies as realist, liberal, elitist, 
republican or representative democracy” (Kitschelt 1993, 15). According to this interpretation, 
against a liberal democracy based on delegation to representatives who may be controlled only at 
elections, but legitimated to take decisions between one election and another, movements 
affirmed that citizens, naturally interested in politics, must directly assume the task of 
intervening in political decisions. As carriers of a participatory conception of democracy, 
movements also criticise the monopoly of mediation through mass parties, aiming to shift policy 
making towards more visible and controllable places. Democracy as self-management is much 
discussed among social movements in this period.  
Relations with political parties were certainly tense also within the global justice movement. 
While the World Social Forum’s  Charter of Principle described itself as an open space for the 
civil society, it also explicitly defined it as a ‘non-governmental and non-party context’. Like 
military organizations, parties as such were also excluded from participation. Even if the 
European Social Forum relaxed this clause, political parties of the centre-left and traditional 
unions were criticized for allegedly having opened the door to neoliberal reforms in the past, as 
well as for their consideration of the movement as something to be driven toward political 
solutions, able to put forward demands but not to find answers (Andretta and Reiter 2009). 
Perceived as hostile to the movement claims,  parties have been criticised also as the carriers of a 
conception of politics (and democracy) that is limited and exclusive. Distrust of parties reflected 
the perception shared by some activists that “politics from below” is a viable alternative to the 
conception of politics represented by the parties (della Porta et al 2006). The critique of parties—
especially those potentially closest to movements—regards their conception of politics as an 
activity for professionals even more than their concrete political choices. Stigmatised as the 
carriers of an idea of professional politics, parties are seen as at best interested in electorally 
exploiting the movement, all the while denying its political credentials (della Porta 2007). 
Conceptions of deliberative, consensual, processual democracy developed. 
Within this critical political vision, however, many social movement organizations were open to 
interactions with institutions of multilevel governance, this still indicating a belief in the 
reformability of representative institutions. The Demos document analysis of about 250 
organizations participating in the ESF showed that even though about half of those groups 
(concentrated particularly in some countries) did not mention relationships with institutions, the 
data indicate that, when they did, they were quite open to interaction with them: they were not 
simply emphasizing a negative message, but they also often accepted collaboration on specific 
problems (della Porta 2009b).  
The legitimacy crisis of late neoliberalism and the multiple challenges to governments’ 
responsiveness are reflected in anti-austerity protests, first and foremost, in the fall of trust in 
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representative democracy, that is visible in the contentious politics of the 2010s. Protestors in 
Puerta del Sol, or those in Zuccotti Park in New York, did indeed contest the very meaning of 
democracy. The very negative visions of those in power are reflected in very low levels of trust 
in the institutions of representative democracy.  Surveys of protestors in seven European 
countries revealed very high levels of mistrust addressed representative institutions in particular. 
Based on self-positioning on a 5-point scale (Likert) which ranges from 1 (do not trust at all) to 5 
(trust very much), among political institutions and actors only trade unions and the judicial 
systems received a mean of trust that slightly overcomes 3 points on the scale (that is, on 
average, they are trusted a little more than ‘somewhat’). The demonstrators of those countries 
that were hit harder by the economic crisis, cuts in public expenditures, and related increasing 
inequalities were also those who expressed, in general, lower levels of trust. In particular, 
Spanish and (especially) Italian demonstrators expressed much less trust in the institutions and 
actors of representative democracy (parliament and political parties) than other Northern and 
Continental Europeans did. U.K. demonstrators fell in between the two groups in terms of their 
judgments on national parliament and government, but were as mistrustful as the Spaniards as far 
as political parties were concerned (della Porta and Reiter ##; della Porta and Andretta ##; della 
Porta and Bosi ##).  
The comparison of the global justice movement in a moment of still rampant neoliberalism with 
anti-austerity protests during its crisis is telling. While at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century much research had identified a declining trust in representative institutions (signalled in 
particular by declining membership in parties, party loyalty and identification, participation in 
elections, together with increasing rate of participation through unconventional means), since 
2011 protests have reflected and accelerated a further dramatic drop in institutional trust. Even if 
both waves of protest were characterized by multiple strategies, the social movements of rampant 
neoliberalism were still confident in their capacity to influence public institutions through more 
traditional channels, including lobbying, and oriented towards the search for democratic global 
governance, while the social movements in the crisis of neoliberalism have looked for more 
radical changes. Similarly, if the relations between movements and parties were tense in the 
global justice movement, with some parties offering however important resources for 
mobilization, the political parties have been kept virulently out of the anti-austerity movement. 
More and more, the corruption of an entire political class is pointed at as the mechanism through 
which the profits of the few prevailed over the need – the very human rights – of the many. In 
opposition to the corrupt elites, the protestors define themselves as part of the large majority of 
those suffering from social and political inequalities.  
 
3.3. Party movements models 
While party literature focused on dominant party model, one could parallel them by looking at 
movement-sponsored, challenging party models. Some characteristics of movement parties 
changed in fact in time. Looking at the Latin American case, Roberts (1998) has distinguished 
the following model of party/movement relations:  
• vanguard model—with party control of social movements; 
• electoral model—with relations only mobilized at elections;  
• organic model--as “distinction between the party and its constituent party organization 
are deliberately blurred; indeed, the party might appear to be more of a movement than an 
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apparatus for electoral contestation as it is directly engaged in social struggles outside the 
sphere of institutional politics, and party members and leaders are drawn directly from 
social movements rather than from the ranks of a separate political cast” (Roberts 1998, 
39). More open to grass-roots participation, social movements tend to dominate over 
parties. 
Paralleling the evolution in mainstream party type, we could indeed single out specific 
movement parties that at the same time oppose and adapt to dominant party types.  
 
Dominant party 
type 
Movements’ party type Relation 
party/movements 
Notables Ideological cadres party Party as vanguard 
Interclass mass 
party  
Class-based mass parties Symbiotic relation 
Cartel vertical 
parties 
Dual (green) party Fragmented relation 
Neoliberal populist 
parties 
Protest parties Dialectic relation 
 
First of all, the party of the notables was contrasted by parties of (left-wing) cadres that, in 
conditions of limited representation, tended to defend the interests of the excluded, within a 
conception of the party as a vanguard. Similar to Duverger’s cell-based ‘devotee’ parties (1954: 
63–71) and Neumann’s (1956) parties of ‘total integration’ are Gunther’s and Diamond’s proto-
hegemonic mass-based parties, that “place greater emphasis on discipline, constant active 
commitment and loyalty on the part of party members for the conduct of political conflict in both 
electoral and extraparliamentary arenas. Thus, recruitment of members is highly selective, 
indoctrination is intensive, and acceptance of the ideology and short-term party line is demanded 
of all members. In some instances (particularly when the proto-hegemonic party exists 
clandestinely), a secret, conspiratorial cell structure is adopted, in contrast to the open ‘branch’ 
organization that characterizes pluralist mass-based parties” (Gunther and Diamond 2003). This 
type of parties emerged and survived where institutional opportunities for expression of left-wing 
positions were more closed. In these parties, there is “a closed structure based on the semi-secret 
cell (rather than the open branch, which characterizes pluralist class-mass parties). Membership 
is highly selective, and the party demands strict loyalty and obedience on the part of members. 
Ideological indoctrination of party members is intense and uncompromising, and the party 
penetrates into key sectors of society (especially trade unions and the intellectual middle class in 
Western countries, and the peasantry in Asia) in an effort to secure tactical allies over the short 
term and converts over the long term. Decision-making within the party is highly centralized and 
authoritarian, even if ‘democratic centralism’ often allows for open debate prior to the taking of 
an official stand. The party sees itself as the ‘vanguard’ of the proletariat, and even though the 
party portrays itself as representing the working class, it performs an explicitly directive and top-
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down role of leading the class that it represents and defining its interests” (Gunther and Diamond 
2003). 
While initially challenging parties had a small organizational core, they often expanded in the 
class-based, mass, ideological party, characterized by a hierarchical relation with the labour 
movement within an integrated interaction. Classic research on parties stressed the strong 
linkages that, since the late  nineteenth century had grown between socialist parties and trade 
unions in Europe, Linkages developed via  “liaison committees, leadership and membership 
overlap and interchange, and a wide arena of common collective activities” (Allern and Bale 
2012). Research on the class cleavage singled out, indeed, parties as “transmission belts” for 
interests. As mentioned, the ideological mass party was an invention of the working class. With 
different models in different countries, the left-wing parties developed a symbiotic relation with 
between the electoral (party) and the functional (trade unions) representation of the working 
class. Born in Europe in the XIX Century from within the labour movement, these parties raised 
claims for political and social rights, contributing to the development of the very conception of 
democracy (della Porta 2013, chap. 2). They mainly originated outside of parliament, with the 
aim of bringing in the claim of the workers.  
The developments on the Left of the then-movement parties were influenced by the reactions by 
the elites. As Rokkan (1970) noted, in the Scandinavian countries and the UK, open elites 
refrained from repressing the workers, facilitating the growth of large and moderate labour 
parties. Deeper cleavages in Germany, Austria, France, Italy and Spain, with related repression 
of the emerging workers’ movements pushed towards soziale Ghettopartei with radical ideology 
and a consolidated but also isolated membership. In general, the higher the obstacles to enter into 
representative institution, the least appealing was a strategy of gradual reform (Bartolini 2000, 
565-566) and the more divided the Left (Marks 1989). As Gunther and Diamond (2003) aptly 
summarized: 
“Mass based ‘externally created party’, the mass-based party, emerged as a manifestation 
of the political mobilization of the working class in many European polities. 
Organizationally, it is characterized by a large base of dues-paying members who remain 
active in party affairs even during periods between elections. In an effort to disseminate 
the party’s ideology and establish an active membership base, the party seeks to penetrate 
into a number of spheres of social life. Affiliated trade union, religious and other social 
organizations serve not only as political allies (helping to mobilize supporters at election 
time), but for the projection of the programmatic objectives of the party from the 
electoral-parliamentary arena into a variety of spheres  of social life. Extensive arrays of 
supportive organizations are established, including party newspapers and recreational 
clubs, and networks of local party branches are established nationwide. These 
organizational networks not only serve as a framework for mobilization at election time, 
but also provide side benefits for party members, such as opportunities for fraternization 
and recreation”… Pluralist mass-based parties seek to win elections as the principal 
avenue towards achieving their programmatic objectives, and their vote-mobilizational 
strategy relies heavily on the development and activation of a mass membership base. 
Party militants perform a variety of tasks, ranging from  proselytizing to distribution of 
printed propaganda to escorting voters to the polls. The party’s allied secondary 
organizations (trade unions, religious groups and/or fraternal organizations) urge their 
members to support the party, and if the party has succeeded in establishing its own 
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communications media, its newspaper and/or radio and television broadcasts are flooded 
with partisan messages. Recruitment of militants to the party is open, although some re-
socialization of new party members is required” (Gunther and Diamond 2003).  
From the organizational point of view, in what Kirchheimer (1966) called class-mass party, the 
authority was located in the executive committee, which centralized power, even if the party 
congress had formally to act as last legitimate authority and the parliamentary wing sometimes 
aimed at increasing autonomous power. These parties, established “bases within their class 
constituency through groups organized both geographically (the local ‘branch’) and functionally 
(trade unions). While they seek to proselytize prospective members or voters, indoctrination and 
the demand for ideological conformity are minimal. While social integration through the 
activities of party and trade union allies is a significant objective, the party is primarily 
concerned with winning elections and taking part in the formation of governments. Recruitment 
of members is quite open” (Gunther and Diamond 2003).  
Class mass parties have been characterized by collateral, ancillary organizations:  “Whereas 
some collateral organisations are fully independent of a given party, many are strongly tied to 
their party via partially or fully overlapping memberships and mutual co-determination rights. 
Although ancillary organisations are fully integrated in the party organisation and require all 
members to join the main party, they are nevertheless capable of attracting members who would 
not be prepared to join the main party. Such a unitary party structure is typical of social 
democratic parties, while other ideological families often affiliate collateral organisations, which 
means that there is only partial membership overlap between party and affiliated organisations. 
The differences should not be overestimated, however, and parties frequently combine both 
organisational models or relax the membership requirements for some of their ancillary 
organisations” (Poguntke 2002). 
Class mass parties have however transformed dramatically since their foundation. A crisis of 
political parties of the Left has been singled out as related with a decline in party linkages. In 
particular, especially after WWII relations between socialist parties and trade unions became less 
strict, and collective membership rare. As Kitschelt (1994) summarized: 
“The social democrats' and socialists' changing electoral fortunes and capacity for control 
government power have been closely associated with their shifting programmatic 
appeals. In the 1970s, all moderate left parties shared at least three basic  demands. First, 
they generally called for economic redistribution toward lower economic strata and 
employed social and taxation policies for doing so. They also committed themselves to 
place wage earners' job security and income equality at  the top of their policy agenda. 
They were markedly less concerned with policy initiatives to extend civil liberties or to 
promote communitarian values of participation and citizens' self-governance. Second, to 
one degree or another, all social democratic and socialist parties sought to make corporate 
managers more accountable to their employees. Even the most moderate social democrats 
sought some system of codetermination or control that would give nonowners of capital a 
say over investment and employment decisions in private enterprises. Third, all socialist 
parties fully accepted a pluralist civil society and competitive parliamentary democracy 
as the benchmark of an open political order… From the early 1980s to the early 1990s, 
socialist, social democratic, and labor ideologies underwent more change than in any 
decade since World War II. Parties everywhere began to withdraw from old 
programmatic priorities, yet the pace, extent, and direction of that strategic 
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transformation have varied across countries. Issues as diverse as citizens' autonomy and 
privacy vis-a-vis state surveillance,  participatory politics, the development of a more 
communal self-organized social order, environmental protection, and efforts to promote 
economic productivity through more market competition signal new priorities that have 
begun to complement,  if not eclipse, conventional social democratic concerns with social 
security and income equality”. 
It was from the critique of the bureaucratization of the ideological class party that a new form of 
movement party emerged with the development of new social movements. As Hanspeter Kriesi 
summarized, “The classic movement of the left, the labor movement has, of course, not only 
created its own interest organizations (trade unions), but also its own social-democratic and 
communist parties. At the same time, the established organizations of the old left have not given 
up mobilizing protest outside of the political system. Moreover, the more recent left-libertarian 
new social movements which were responsible for the wave of protest that swept across Western 
Europe and North America from the late sixties to the eighties of the last century were highly 
critical of representative democracy and of parliamentary procedures in particular. They sought 
more participatory modes of mobilization, and engaged heavily in protest activities to push their 
claims onto the agenda” (Kriesi 2015). A different type of movement parties—the Green parties-
-emerged when ideological mass parties were already in crisis and cartel electoral parties had 
grown (Muller Rommel 1993).  
New social movement emerged in fact to challenge that model, stressing especially a more 
horizontal relation.  Between parties and movements, tensions increased in fact on the relevant 
organizational format. Face to more and more bureaucratized parties, the democratic quality of 
participation has remained central in the visions and practices of social movements. Left-
libertarian parties have reflected this mood, with attempts at developing more participatory 
conception of politics (Kitschelt 1989, 3). Grassroots democracy was quite central for green 
parties, who defined themselves as anti-parties and were seen as alternative to conventional 
parties. Green parties’ stress on internal democracy has been seen as part of a dialectic process in which  
“each new party type generates a reaction that stimulates further development, thus leading to yet 
another party type, and to another set of reactions, and so on” (Katz and Mair 1995, 6).  These 
movement parties spread in particular since the 1980s, with a main focus on the defence on the 
environment, but soon extending their appeal to civil rights more in general. From the organizational 
point of view, Poguntke (1993) singled out in the German Green party Basisdemokratie, with 
organizational features such as collective and amateur leadership, imperative mandate, rotation, open 
access to meetings, gender parity. More in general, in these parties, “There are no barriers to 
membership in the group, which is open to all who wish to participate, making the social base and 
attitudinal orientation of activists even more diverse. The strong commitment to direct participation 
leads to the weakness (even rejection) of centralized organization and leadership, and a sometimes 
chaotic ‘assembly’ organizational style. … Organizationally, the movement party is based on ‘loose 
networks of grassroots  support with little formal structure, hierarchy and central control” (Kitschelt 
1989, 66). Also Gunther and Diamond (2003, 188-9) talked of left-libertarian movement parties as 
characterized by open membership, loose networks of grass-root support, negative consensus on 
ideological issues, heterogeneous clientele. From the point of view of their identity, So called left-
libertarian parties are post-materialist in their values, being characterized by “a negative consensus that 
the predominance of markets and bureaucracies must be rolled back in favor of social solidarity 
relations and participatory institution”’ (Kitschelt, 1989: 64). Young, small parties, they have been seen 
to be characterized by the adoption of thin ideology from movements  (Frankland, Lucardie and Rihoux 
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2008), with ambivalent relations with the state—take subsides but distrust participation, frequent 
conflicts as members are ideologically motivated and critical of authority (Kitschelt 1989). At their 
origins, these parties have been characterize by a post-materialist ideology, a participatory organization, 
with low formalization and bureaucratization, large participation from the rank-and-file and a non-
conventional repertoire of action, including forms of protest (Poguntke 1987, 81, also O’Neill 1997, 43). 
Besides their call for a more horizontal politics, green parties have been located at the basis of a 
new cleavage, which has also transformed existing parties and party systems. The emergence of 
Green parties has been linked to the behaviour of the other existing parties—first and foremost, 
those on the left. In Kriesi’s assessment,  
“The Green parties have become the most clear-cut defenders of a universalistic–
multicultural, libertarian position that is opposed by the particularistic–nationalistic, 
authoritarian position of the new populist right … In consensus democracies, the Green 
and right-wing populist challengers have partly given rise to new parties, partly they have 
been co-opted by mainstream parties that have been transformed in due course. Thus, 
some social-democratic parties—the French socialists being an example—have been co-
opting the multicultural program of the Greens, thereby almost entirely closing off their 
electoral niche. On the other hand, some conservative or liberal-conservative parties, such 
as the SVP and the Austrian Liberal Party (FPÖ), have transformed themselves under the 
impact of the new structural conflict to become the key parties of the new populist right 
in their respective countries. … in majoritarian democracies, the rise of new parties 
coming out of social movements is much more difficult, which means that the 
transformation of existing parties by social movements is more likely” (Kriesi 2015).  
Green parties emerged in particular when there were strong environmental movements, from 
problem push (Rudig 1990) but also opportunity pull. Parties as the Greens were however 
perceived as just one node in a (tendentially) horizontal network. With a rather fragmented 
relations with the environmental movements, that never recognized them as true representatives 
of their struggles (Rootes 1995), green parties developed an anti-party rhetoric, reflecting 
however the decline of bureaucratic machines and moving rather towards light structures. 
Interactions between parties and interest groups became more informal with new social 
movements, that indeed tended to protect their independence from political parties (Poguntke, 
2002: 54–6), with relations happening mainly at individual level (Kitschelt 1989). Kitschelt 
(1989) distinguished parties that followed  a logic of electoral competition from those which, 
such  as the left-libertarian ones, privileged  a logic of constituency representation.  
The protest movements of the late 1960s were in fact already interpreted as an indication of the 
widening gap between parties and citizens – and indeed of the parties’ inability to represent new 
lines of conflict (Offe 1985). This is reflected in the growing separation between movements and 
parties, which had together contributed to the development of some main cleavages. Linkage 
between Green parties and new social movements areinformal as 
“New social movements are characterised by a predominant lack of formal organisation, 
which makes formal ties to party organisations very difficult While political parties can at 
best expect to forge informal ties to new social movements, even those are of limited 
value for party elites seeking to stabilise their electorate. The reason is that new social 
movements are weak interest aggregators, which limits the effects of linkage. They tend 
to be based on the smallest common denominator, endorse a plurality of ideological and 
strategic orientations and frequently limit inherent centrifugal tendencies by calling for 
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maximal solutions…. Hence, political parties who depend primarily on linkage through 
new social movements (like, for example Green parties) have to live with a structurally 
weak social anchorage which can provide them with comparatively little electoral 
stability. While good relations to new social movements may be a significant (though 
highly contingent) electoral asset in phases of high protest mobilisation, it is of little 
value in quiet times” (Poguntke 2002).  
This implies unstable relations as “Parties which are generally sympathetic to the causes of new 
social movements will therefore try to establish stable relationships with the ‘protest sector’, 
even though its lack of internal formalisation and dependence on mobilising issues means that 
such linkages are highly unstable and contingent upon cycles of protest mobilization” (Poguntke 
2002). 
A tendency towards institutionalization has been noted also in the Green parties as following 
changes at system level (regime change; electoral system, legislation on party, on financing 
party), in party competition (rise/decline of a competitor), party-level (electoral defeat/victory; 
entry/exit from parliament; entry/exit from executive), intraparty (leadership; factions, 
generational turnover, organizational size, social composition) (Frankland, Lucardie and Rihoux 
2008, 10). Green parties and environmental movements grew even more apart when green 
parties were “drawn in to the normal party political game of negotiation and compromise” 
(Poguntke 2006, 402). When change in the direction of professional-electoral party, green 
ideology becomes more diffuse or eclectic, there are looser ties with movements, refuse to rotate, 
declining participation and professionalization.  
Relations between left-libertarian parties (such as the Green) and so-called new social 
movements are, however, by far less integrated—more dual—than those between labour 
movements and labor parties.  
Notwithstanding the obvious tensions between movements and parties, especially on the 
European continent, relations with parties (in particular, those on the left) long continued to play 
a central role for movements (Tarrow 1998; della Porta 1995). In fact, social movements have 
continued to form alliances more or less tightly with parties – and parties have sought to co-opt 
social movements, to absorb their identities, and to represent them in institutions. The Global 
Justice movement offers examples of, more or less tight, interactions between movements and 
the radical left-wing parties that provide the social forum process with logistic support as well as 
directly participating in the protest (della Porta 2007; Andretta and Reiter 2009). Moreover, 
overlapping memberships are still frequent, even if coupled with strong criticism of parties’ 
oligarchic tendencies by the activists (della Porta 2009).  The main modus of interaction was 
indeed a sort of division of labour between social movements and parties-as-allies. 
In sum, for a long period,  “Notwithstanding the fundamental differences in the organizational 
structure and in the form of action they adopted, leftist parties and movements interacted through 
mechanisms such as: overlapping membership, i.e. double militancy in both movements and 
parties; the participation of parties in the movements’ main initiatives and campaigns and vice 
versa; the effort of the parties to conquer the new electoral niches opened by the movement 
mobilization through the adaptation of their programs, the positioning on some relevant issues 
raised by the movements, the adoption of some less conventional  political actions. As a 
consequence of these efforts, the activists of specific movements often showed propensity to vote 
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for a certain party, to convince someone to vote for it, or to participate in its activities” (della 
Porta and Chironi 2014).  
While the downward trend in party-movement relations had pushed towards expectation of 
further separation, a new wave of movement parties emerged during the antiausterity protests. 
This became visible, first, in Latin America since the 1990s with a parallel move in Europe (in 
particular, in Southern Europe) more than a decade later. We can single out some expectations 
about some common characteristics of the emerging movement-parties, as well as specific ones. 
With reference to the framing of the self and the others, these movement-parties tend to reflect 
the movements’ attempts to develop new subjectivities. The traditional definitions on the Left 
enter so in tension with a perceived reshuffling of old cleavages and the emergence of new ones. 
The very notion of the Left is indeed challenged, and emphasis is put on becoming, rather than 
just representing. 
At organizational level, emerging movement-parties support a participatory vision. Looking at 
the Latin American cases, Kenneth Roberts (2015) so distinguished the participatory linkages 
from the plebiscitary ones: “Participatory linkages or patterns of subjectivity provide citizens 
with a direct role in contesting established elites or in deliberative and policy making processes. 
As such, they tend to rely on autonomous and self-constituted forms of collective action at the 
grass-roots, inside or out of (and sometimes against) formal institutional channels. By contrast, 
under plebiscitary linkages or patterns of subjectivity, mass constituencies—often unorganized—
are mobilized from above to acclaim an authority figure or ratify their leader’s political 
initiatives. Such plebiscitary acclamation often resides in the voting booth or popular 
referendums, and is not predicated on autonomous forms of collective action at the grass-roots. 
Indeed, plebiscitary appeals often rest on a direct, unmediated relationship between a populist 
figure and highly fragmented mass constituencies.” 
As for their strategies, while either developed within waves of antiausterity protests or grew with 
them, several of these parties have had, however, very fast access not only to parliament, but 
even to government. The disappointment of their former voters with the center-left parties has in 
fact often created large electoral opportunities for the emerging parties, so increasing the tensions 
between the strategies on the square and the strategies inside the institutions.   
We can, however, also hypothesize some differences, as movement-parties have to address both 
long-lasting and recently emerged dilemmas. 
We shall therefore single out the following characteristics: 
o At organizational level, emerging movement-parties support a participatory 
vision, within a networked structure. While largely relying on new social media 
for the building of a decentralized organization, they also show some  
personalization trend. If organizational structures tend to be diffuse, taking up the 
movement’s claims for a horizontal, ryzomatic structure, a continuum can be 
singled out here between a structure more rooted in the territory and one more 
reliant on virtual communities 
o With reference to the framing of the self and the others, the analysed movement 
parties tend to reflect the movements’ attempts to develop new subjectivities. The 
traditional definitions on the Left enter so in tension with a perceived reshuffling 
of old cleavages and the emergence of new ones. Within a general tendency 
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towards a re-definition of the constituency, through what Ernesto Laclau defined 
as “populist reason”, a continuum between the framing of “the people” versus a 
more classical leftwing class definition can be detected. 
o As for their strategies, while either developed within waves of protests or grown 
with them, several of these parties have had, however, very fast access not only to 
parliament, but even to government. The disappointment of their former voters 
with the center-left parties has in fact often created large electoral opportunities 
for the emerging parties, so increasing the tensions between the strategies on the 
street and the strategies inside the institutions.  An innovative protest repertoire is 
a main strategy for these parties, with however different balances of investment in 
the electoral and institutional arena.  
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Appendix 2: Statistics !!!
The unemployment rate in Greece 2000-2015: (Source: Quandl (Eurostat)): 
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The unemployment rate in Spain 2000-2015: (Source: Quandl (Eurostat)): 
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Level of citizens confidence in EU institutions in Greece 2000-2013 (Source: Quandl 
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Level of citizens confidence in EU institutions in Spain 2000-2013 (Source: Quandl 
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Confidence in Government in Southern Europe 2008-2013 (Source: Gallup) !!!!
Appendix 3 – Guide to the use of the timeline 
!!
• Open browser and insert the following link: http://www.tiki-toki.com/timeline/entry/550790/
Timeline-Greece-and-Spain/   !
• Close ADMIN in far right corner by simply clicking it.  !
• The Timeline starts in March 2004. This goes for both Greece and Spain.  !
• The events in Greece can be found on the left side, and the events in Spain can be found on the 
right side.  !
• In order to learn more about a certain event, click on the white box with text on it.  !
• Example: the first event in Greece occurs on March 7, 2004. When you click on the white box a 
black one appears. In this black box the event will be elaborated and it will contain a reference. !
• Explore the Timeline with your arrow keys. The left arrow key will go back in time, whereas the 
right one will move forwards in time.  !
• Be aware! Some of the events are placed closely on the Timeline. This happens if events occur in 
the same month with few days apart.  !
• If you want a broader look at the Timeline, you can use the black timeline that goes horizontally 
in the bottom. The orange dots shows when an event occurs. For example we can see many 
orange dots in 2012 because many different events occurs, whereas there are none in 2006-2007.   !
• The Timeline ends in November 2015. !!
